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ABSTRACT 
 
Invisible Hooves: Markets and the Environment in the History of American and 
Transnational Cattle Ranching, 1867-Present 
by 
Timothy Amund Paulson 
 
This dissertation examines the making and breaking of landscape-based economic 
markets over time. It provides a historical narrative of the formation and failure of various 
market situations in the United States beef economy from 1867 to 2017—including the open 
range, grazing privileges on public lands, corporate structure of meatpacking, consumer beef 
prices, live cattle futures contracts, international trade markets, and carbon markets—based 
on archival research and historical datasets. The narrative emphasizes the role of ideas, laws 
(and other types of exchange-rules), and organizations in changing the nature of capitalist 
markets and their relationship with the natural environment. The dissertation argues that 
actors from across the beef economy purposefully altered capitalist markets based on 
differing notions of how free markets and landscapes ought to interact. All efforts were 
united by an enduring faith that markets (if corrected) could serve ecological and social 
goals. The dissertation concludes that different market constructions are possible within 
capitalism and yield different social and environmental outcomes, but it also finds that, in 
general, capitalist markets tend towards instability making them poor mechanisms for 
managing human-environment relationships. 
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Introduction: American Bovine Capitalism 
Global Cattlescapes 
Cows, especially beef cattle, leave an immense social and ecological hoofprint on the 
world. There are approximately one billion cows on Earth.1 In terms of total body mass, 
cows dwarf every other vertebrate species on the planet including humans.2 Rangeland 
ecosystems cover more than one third of the earth’s surface area, and a majority of them 
are—or have been—grazed by cows. Cows also live in, or adjacent to, most urban spaces in 
the world for at least part of their lives and most of their afterlives as food and durable goods. 
Grasslands, deserts, forests, cities, and semi-industrial suburbs have all co-evolved with 
cows. Cattle are so consequential for many social and environmental landscapes that we 
could characterize much of the world as a system of cattlescapes. According to more radical 
scientific claims, agriculture is and has been responsible for about half of all human-induced 
climate change from the first domestication of crops and livestock to the present. Of all 
agricultural pursuits, beef production has the greatest climate impact. If one accounts for all 
the trees that do not exist and accounts for all the years they have not existed for because they 
were cut to make space for cows, then you might conclude that cows—not cars or coal—
caused global warming.3 Indeed, we may be living in a cattle climate. 
																																																						
1 “Number of Cattle Worldwide from 2012 to 2016 (in million head),” Statista, 2017, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263979/global-cattle-population-since-1990/.; Rob Cook, “World Cattle 
Inventory: Ranking of Countries,” Beef 2 Live, 2017, http://beef2live.com/story-world-cattle-inventory-ranking-
countries-0-106905.; Matt Blitz, “Do Cow Farts Really Significantly Contribute to Global Warming?,” Today I 
Found Out, 11 April 2014, http://www.todayifoundout.com/index.php/2014/04/cow-farts-really-significantly-
contribute-global-warming/. 
2 Vaclav Smil, “Planet of the Cows [Numbers Don’t Lie],” IEEE Spectrum 54, no. 4 (April 2017), 24.; Please 
note: The most massive organisms on earth are individually microscopic, and they matter a lot, too, but are not 
the focus of the present study. 
3 R. A. Houghton, “Carbon Flux to the Atmosphere from Land-Use Changes: 1850-2005,” in Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center, TRENDS: A Compendium of Data on Global Change (Oak Ridge, TN: Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, 2008 and 2010), at cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/trends.htm.; Lester R. Brown, Full Planet, 
Empty Plates: The New Geopolitics of Food Scarcity (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012). 
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Fewer than ten percent of the world’s cows live in the United States, but American 
beef cattle have been historically the most important and influential cows in the world.4 
Humans occupied the North American continent about twenty to forty thousand years ago. 
Humans domesticated cattle about nine thousand years. But cattle did not make it to the 
present United States until about five hundred years ago, and they were not significant 
(compared to pigs, chickens, or even buffalo) until about one hundred and fifty years ago. 
However, the past century-and-a-half has belonged to the American beef cow. In 1840, there 
were roughly fifteen million cattle in the United States; in 1890, almost sixty million; in 
1950, over 90 million; and in 1975, the cattle population peaked at 132 million head. For 
comparison, there were 216 million documented humans in the United States in 1975. By the 
mid-twentieth century, Americans—branded widely as “cowboys”—were synonymous with 
their cows in the eyes of themselves and people all over the world. The number of beef cattle 
in the United States has dropped steadily and significantly since 1975 to 94 million animals 
in 2017. Now there are more beef cattle in Brazil and China than in the US, but in important 
ways these animals, too, are American cows. The relatively short history of cows in the 
United States has shaped what it means to be an American and what it means to be a cow 
almost anywhere in the world. 
The impact of beef cattle on America and of American beef cattle on the world is not 
all obvious to plain sight. McDonald’s fast food restaurants serve American-style beef 
burgers to 70 million people in 118 countries every single day, but the universalization of a 
diet of mechanically separated cow tissue is only one of the ways that American beef cattle 
																																																						
4 Almost a third live in India, but no one else treats cows like they do in India. 
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changed the world.5 What is most important for the American beef cow and for its legacy 
around the world is the set of practices, beliefs, ideas, structures, and rules that developed 
historically to define how and why a beef cow is raised, processed, bought, sold, and 
consumed. American cows are not just animals—they are a consuming economic, social, and 
environmental system. Cows in America developed from domesticated multi-use livestock 
into a catalyst, justification, tool, and consequence of a particular version of the capitalist 
mode of production (which was also a mode of consumption). 
The purpose of this study is to investigate and critique the origins, developments, and 
consequences of American bovine capitalism from the nineteenth century to the present. The 
major characteristic and consequence of the American beef industry has been the propagation 
of a particularly insidious form of free-market capitalism with consequences for social and 
environmental relationships. Many things in modern society operate by free-market 
capitalism, and cattle did not create the capitalist mode of production, but beef is notable 
because it extends advanced free-market principles to rural landscapes and peoples as well as 
consumers, who we rarely think of living at the heart of capitalism (we may rarely think of 
them as having significant economic lives at all). Further, at certain times and in certain 
ways, (and, in fact, in every chapter of this dissertation), the American beef cattle industry 
did not just carry market capitalism to new places and people—it actually shaped and 
advanced the leviathan itself.6 
																																																						
5 Please see: James L. Watson, ed., Golden Arches East: McDonald's in East Asia (Stanford University Press, 
2006). 
6 There is a growing recognition of the ways agriculture (and livestock agriculture, in particular) leads (or, at 
least, parallels at the same time) wider developments in advanced global capitalism. See for example: Nathan 
Sayre, “Land, Labor, Livestock, and (Neo)Liberalism: Understanding the Geographies of Pastoralism and 
Ranching,” Geoforum 40 (2009), 705-706.; I also participated in a panel on this theme at the Labor and 
Working Class History Association annual conference, Seattle, WA, 24 June 2017. Co-panelists Keith Orejel, 
“The Dilemma of the Industrial Working Class in Rural America, 1945-1965,” and William D. Goldsmith, “An 
Equitable New South Without Unions? The Worker Rights Lacuna of the New Economy Policymakers, 1980-
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Figure 1. “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” US total, 1 Jan’s. 1867-2017, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA 
NASS Quick Stats. Graph by author. 
 
Figure 2. Data compiled by Earth Policy Institute from U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, FAOSTAT, 
electronic database, at faostat.fao.org, updated 23 February 2012. Graph by author. 
																																																						
1992,” both argued that rural settings and context drove developments in industrial capitalist production and 
policy. 
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American Bovine Capitalism 
The graph in figure 1 charts the number of cattle in the United States from 1867 to 
2017 as recorded by the United States Annual Survey of Agriculture. This graph helps 
visualize the important periods and turning points in the history of the American beef 
industry. From 1867 to the present, the American cattle herd expanded and contracted with 
almost a dozen clear peaks and valleys in the population. The pendular motion was greatest 
from 1867 to the 1940s, after which it continued but with less intensity working generally up 
with each swing towards the largest peak in 1975 followed by the sharpest reverse leading to 
a generally downward trend. However, the global cattle population has grown steadily since 
1975 led mainly by explosive herd expansion within (or elsewhere for sale to) China. Figure 
2 charts estimated grazing cattle herd data for the US and China collected by the United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, and it depicts a transition in the classic 
American beef bonanza from an American to a global, especially Chinese, phenomenon. 
Remarkably, a lot of other variables in the history of the US beef industry, 
quantitative and qualitative, overlap with these observations about cattle populations. Beef 
consumption per capita, beef prices, ranching profitability, labour power and worker 
satisfaction in meatpacking, corporate concentration in meatpacking, and environmental 
harmony (including ideas about the environment) all follow a rough pattern of chaos in the 
late nineteenth century, rapid but relatively stable growth in the post-World-War-Two period, 
crisis and protracted decline starting in the 1970s, and then most recently it all takes off again 
on a global scale. This pattern corresponds to important shifts within the American way of 
beef, and it reveals the importance of small changes within the broader economic category of 
capitalism for both people and their environments. Different varieties of capitalism existed 
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over time due to changing ideas, actors, and rules within beef markets. Capitalism changed in 
each instance mainly because of environmental challenges to market stability.7 
Thus, the history of the American cattle industry reveals the close interrelationship 
between social-economic stability or transformation and environmental-ecological stability 
or transformation. Although the changes overlapped and varied significantly at different 
spatial and temporal scales, I argue that social and environmental harmony or discord drove 
or reinforced each other in different ways during five distinct periods or phases market by 
socio-ecological turning points—the crossing of thresholds between human land use ideas 
and practices as well as environmental conditions due to pressures coming from both social 
and ecological instability. These five phases represent the social-economic and 
environmental history of American bovine capitalism: 
1. Colonial Bovine Resettlement (1500-Ongoing) 
2. Open Range Capitalism (1850-1898) 
3. State-and-Industry-Regulated Capitalism (1946-1973) 
4. State and Industry Breakdown and Decline (1975-Present) 
5. Globalization (1500-Ongoing) 
Colonial Bovine Resettlement refers to the conquest of lands and peoples for and by 
domestic livestock, initially for the benefit of European newcomers to the Americas after 
1500. Human intervention in the evolution of crops and animals through selection of 
preferred traits is called domestication, and it began with a process called the Neolithic 
																																																						
7 For more on the “varieties of capitalism” concept, see: P. Hall and D. Soskice, eds. Varieties of Capitalism: 
The institutional foundations of Competitive Advantage (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001).; B. 
Amable, (2003) “A Comparative Analysis of Capitalism,” The Diversity of Capitalism (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2003).; D. Acemoglu, James Robinson, and Simon Johnson, “The Colonial Origins of 
Comparative Development: An empirical investigation” American Economic Review 91 (2001), 1369-401. 
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Revolution that emerged in South Western Asia.8 Humans first domesticated cattle there 
about 10,500 years ago, and cattle production expanded with various imperial and colonial 
expansions until it became a major part of West Asian, African, and European society and 
economy, along with other grazing animals like sheep, goats, and horses, but the same was 
not true for the Americas. The indigenous people of the Americas domesticated few animals, 
and only two grazing livestock—llamas and alpacas—both in the southern continent. 
Indigenous North Americans could have domesticated large grazers like the buffalo, but 
agriculture is not a necessary condition of human progress, and many hunter-gatherer 
societies had remarkably high-protein diets as it was. Thus, the meeting of Asian-African-
European and American peoples was the meeting of people who owned livestock and people 
who did not. 
Environmental historians, as well as earlier historians of American-European contact, 
have argued that this fundamental difference between agricultural and non-agricultural 
societies drove the history of contact, conquest, and genocide in the Americas.9 Even within 
the passé narrative of civilization meeting savagery on the American frontier, we see the 
basic analysis that agricultural people subjugated non-agricultural people and their lands for 
the ultimate spread of agriculture. Historian Virginia DeJohns Anderson and others have 
																																																						
8 Simone Riehl et al., “Emergence of Agriculture in the Foothills of the Zagros Mountains of Iran,” Science 341 
(2013), 65-67. 
9 Virginia DeJohns Anderson, Creatures of Empire: How Domestic Animals Transformed Early America 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2004).; William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of 
New England (New York, NY: Macmillan, 2011).; Deana Dartt-Newton and Jon Erlandson, “Little choice for 
the Chumash: Colonialism, Cattle, and Coercion in Mission Period California,” The American Indian Quarterly 
30, no. 3 (2006): 416-430.; For more on ideas about animals in Early American History, see: Diane L. Beers, 
For the Prevention of Cruelty: The History and Legacy of Animal Rights Activism in the United States (Athens, 
OH: Swallow Press/Ohio UP, 2006).; Rod Preece, Brute Souls, Happy Beasts, and Evolution (Vancouver, BC: 
UBC Press, 2005).; Richard W. Bulliet, Hunters, Herders, And Hamburgers: The Past And Future Of Human-
animal Relationships (New York, NY: Columbia UP, 2005).; Gerald Carson, Men, Beasts, and Gods: A History 
of Cruelty and Kindness to Animals (New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972). 
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argued convincingly that domestic livestock—the animals themselves—played a vital role in 
penetrating and occupying lands that indigenous peoples had used in different ways. Animal 
agriculture is a very competitive and often exclusive form of land use, and herds of cattle 
have a way of making hunting grounds unviable.10 
Colonial bovine resettlement was a necessary pre-condition for the establishment of 
bovine capitalism on American landscapes. The expansion of cattle herds for distribution to 
large consumer markets in the pursuit of profit could not and did not occur until the beef-
eaters violently expelled native people from potential grazing lands. Despite the Wild West 
myth, and despite the above analytic points about farmers vs. non-farmers, cowboys did not 
defeat the Indians—that required the full force of the US Cavalry, battle-hardened by four 
years of industrial-era combat in the East. Nonetheless, the US wars against the sovereign 
nations of the American West were fought on behalf of the farmers and ranchers. This was 
the initial seizure, or primitive accumulation, of land, people, and resources into the capitalist 
system, and it also introduced one of the first essential rules, or institutions, of capitalism—
private property.11 Although not commodities by the strict definition (because capitalist 
markets were still in the early stages of formation), European immigrants to the Americas 
																																																						
10 This leads to ongoing conflict and controversy between recreationists and ranchers on public lands in the 
American West to this day. 
11 “Institutions” in this context refer to all the different sorts of rules that can dictate economic or market 
exchange. This is different from the common usage of the term to refer to established, organized groups often 
with specific buildings. However, in the theoretical vocabulary used here, those things are “organizations,” and 
organizations make, implement, and use institutions. Institutions may include formal laws, customs, norms, 
taboos, and all sorts of other structures that dictate what people do and why. Throughout the dissertation I use 
“rules” over “institutions.” Please see: Douglas North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).; Fred Block and Margaret Sommers, 
“Ideas, Markets and Institutions over 200 Years of Welfare Debate,” American Sociological Review 70, no. 2 
(2005), 260-287.; Neil Fligstein, “Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions,” 
American Sociological Review 61, no. 4 (1996), 656-673.; Gary Hamilton and Woolsey Biggart, “Market, 
Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East,” American 
Journal of Sociology 94 (1988), S52-S94.; Richard Whitely, Divergent Capitalisms: The Social Structuring and 
Change of Business Systems (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999).; [Also “varieties of capitalism” note 
above]. 
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imported the notion that land, animals, and other resources could be owned by one person 
creating exclusive rights to use and abuse that property. 
Open Range Capitalism refers to the first phase of market capitalism in the American 
West following the genocidal seizure of landscapes for grazing. It was a period of laissez-
faire, or relatively unregulated capitalist production. It began at different times in different 
places, but in general, it emerged in the mid nineteenth century due to a confluence of 
factors—including expansion of urban populations; establishment of Western borders; 
increasing immigration to the West; establishment of transcontinental communication and 
transportation technologies; corporate consolidation of industrial meatpacking; and expanded 
demand for wool and beef during the American Civil War (1861-63). From this point 
forward, Americans produced cattle not for the subsistence of a community but for large 
scale distribution and profit. During Open Range Capitalism, animals-as-property became 
animals-as-commodities. Commodities are material goods that have become fully 
exchangeable units of capital—in this sense cows and dollars are just two expressions of the 
same thing. However, cattle production in the American West did not necessarily respond to 
market forces well (“efficiently” in economic terms). 
This period is known as the Wild West in popular culture, which captures two 
different ideas about the period: one that it was free, and another that it was chaotic. Open 
Range Capitalism marked a period of economic, social, and ecological instability. The 
central problem was that the American state and Western land users set up market 
conditions—or rules—that encouraged overproduction. The American state cleared out the 
indigenous inhabitants of the West and with them all existing cooperative land management 
systems, and it expected free enterprise to replace them, but the American state did not 
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adequately establish new ownership rules or provide for the enforcement of private property. 
Thus, western land users “owned” their animals but not their land, and these users had to 
compete for resources without a legal way to protect them in the present or future. Grazing 
animals overtaxed rangeland ecosystems across the West, and many users reported rapid 
degeneration of vegetation, soil, and water resources. This led to huge die-offs of livestock, 
which Harper’s described in 1872: “Grazing grounds at great altitude became graveyards of 
cows. […] It was said that in ten years the bones of a million Texan cattle were strewn on 
roads, on ranges and in shallow streams, a monument of man’s cruelty to beasts.”12 As cattle 
populations boomed and collapsed, so too did cattle and beef prices on Eastern markets. All 
levels of the beef economy—including cattle growing, industrial manufacturing, financing 
and investment, and beef eating—experienced massive, rapid expansion as well as turmoil. 
Some scholars have called the Wild West the closest thing to a capitalist “free 
market” period in US history.13 Others say the Wild West existed because capitalism had not 
arrived to save the West yet.14 In fact, open range capitalism was a historically particular 
variety of landscape-based market capitalism that was created by the American state. The 
state did not provide for regulation, but it certainly was not a “free market” without 
regulatory rules. In the absence of indigenous cooperative norms and state-enforced property 
rights, western land users sought to create and enforce their own market rules, mostly 
through interpersonal violence and murder. The range wars, and especially the sheep wars 
discussed in Chapter 1, were not symptoms of the poor economic system but rather a 
																																																						
12 As quoted in Clara Maud Love, “History of the Cattle Industry in the Southwest,” MA. thesis, University of 
California, 1914, 114. 
13 Edward Norris Wentworth, America's Sheep Trails: History, Personalities (Iowa State College Press, 1948). 
14 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968), 1243–1248.; See also: Gary D. Libecap, 
“Bureaucratic Opposition to the Assignment of Property Rights: Overgrazing on the Western Range,” Journal 
of Economic History 41, no. 1 (Mar. 1981), 151-158. 
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concerted effort at regulation. Range violence was a form socio-ecological management 
stemming from the central contradiction of the free-market mode of capitalist production 
then existing: ecosystems could not handle extreme increases in production caused by 
unrestricted competition for money. 
State-and-Industry-Regulated Capitalism refers to the phase of market capitalism 
produced by the American federal government and Western land users in response to the 
chaos of unbridled free enterprise in the nineteenth century. It was marked by cooperative 
efforts to actively and directly regulate grazing access to public lands as well as other aspects 
of the beef economy—including corporate organization in meatpacking, retail beef prices, 
and international beef imports. The instability of Open Range Capitalism provoked a broad 
consensus around regulation, and the beef industry achieved a modicum of stability. This was 
an amazing feat involving efforts from all levels of industry, government, and the public to 
re-shape how the beef market worked. Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 6 all discuss different rules that 
helped remake cattle and beef markets between the 1890s and 1930s. 
Public-private regulatory efforts transformed the fate of the American beef economy 
for about thirty years. During the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, cattle herds 
and prices swung rapidly creating surpluses and gluts in the food supply and ranchers’ 
incomes. After 1946, Americans ate steadily more beef in each year, and ranchers supplied 
them. There were still bad years, but there were more and more-evenly-distributed good 
years. Reasonable corporate competitiveness existed in beef manufacturing, and meatpacking 
workers organized strong unions to improve workplace conditions. Conservation, or 
“sustainable,” land use became the norm on western rangelands, and cattle and cowboys 
became a lot of people’s favourite things about America whether they lived in the United 
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States or not. During this period, economic power over the market became more evenly 
distributed across the beef supply chain, and actors cooperated through new economic 
organizations. That meant not only profits, but also high-calorie food at a reasonable price, 
good wages for a safe job, and security of rural lifestyle for different people. Certainly many 
individuals could have complained that their right to and pursuit of profit were severely 
limited, but overall society and all interests in the beef supply chain enjoyed relatively great 
stability and shared in sustained economic growth. 
State and Industry Breakdown and Decline refers to the period following 1975, 
during which most of the previous positive trends reversed suddenly and then stayed that 
way. As it turned out, regulated capitalism was sustained, but not necessarily sustainable. 
Many of the rules were imperfect, and new organizations with new interests put pressure on 
the relationships creating both economic stability and ideological consensus in the first half 
of the twentieth century. Ideas about the market and about the environment had a profound 
effect on actual tangible change in the fates of Western ranchers and many others. In chapters 
2 and 3, I argue that public lands ranchers and government agents shared ideas about 
conservation and sustainable land use based on an understanding that landscape vitality was 
linked to a stable beef market. Ranchers wanted long-term stability of their businesses, 
livelihoods, and lifestyles, so they were good stewards of the land. New ideas from 
environmental groups challenged the compatibility of grazing and landscape health as well as 
the relationships ranchers had with government regulators. This is not to say environmental 
ideas were bad, but their impact was to break a political and working consensus around 
conservation and to produce chaos for many ranchers’ lives. But the challenge did not only 
come in grazing and conservation.  
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The fate of the American beef industry after 1975 was marked by decreasing cattle 
numbers, political controversy, market instability, and social-ecological turmoil. New 
corporations challenged workers, producers, and small businesses’ economic power. 
Consumers also challenged producers’ profits, and bankers challenged the very nature of 
market exchange through the invention of futures trading. Decreased domestic production 
combined with increasing concentration of cow-calf operations to make ranching a loser’s 
business for many families who traditionally thought of themselves as rugged individualist 
entrepreneurs and American heroes. Likewise, ranchers declined in the American psyche as 
Hollywood produced steadily fewer Westerns, and Americans consumed steadily less beef. 
One of the major causes for the failure of regulated capitalist growth was ongoing 
faith in market stability. In fact, there was a sort of collective forgetting of the role of social 
rules and organizations in sustaining semi-humane capitalism, and many interests began 
trying to reproduce free market conditions similar to those of nineteenth-century open range 
capitalism. Free markets can never be real because an economic market cannot logically exist 
independently from human society, but belief in free markets can be a major driver of how a 
society sets up its markets. Chapter 5 discusses one such case, when a select group re-
imagined and then recreated the beef market through futures trading in 1964. Ultimately, 
capitalist markets again proved poor mechanisms for social and ecological stability. What 
followed was a sort of second expression of many of the patterns and institutions of the 
nineteenth century but without the boom-bust pattern. After 1975, on a broad scale, there was 
only bust. 
However, the American beef economy is far from broken, and the future crisis will be 
on a global scale. Globalization is fairly literally how this whole story began in 1500, and a 
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vibrant Atlantic beef trade developed in the nineteenth century, but it entered a new and vital 
phase in the Pacific region after the 1970s crises in the United States. American producers 
increasingly looked for markets abroad; American capital invested in foreign beef industries; 
American ideas about free markets effected land use patterns in the new competitor nations; 
people around the Pacific ate more American-grown beef products; and East Asian cultures 
adopted consumption of American-style beef products. The formation of new market rules in 
the Pacific is discussed in Chapter 6. Within the last two decades this process of 
globalization has intensified most in China, and it threatens to be the biggest transformation 
and catastrophe the global beef economy has yet seen. 
Each of the following chapters explores one or more aspects of the periods and 
transitions in the history of American Bovine Capitalism. They also each explore some of the 
specific ideas, rules, technologies, individuals, and organizations that shaped, drove, and re-
shaped the United States beef economy and its relationship with the natural environment. 
The chapters also follow beef market landscapes outwards in scale: local grazing lands 
managed and fought over by cadres of up to hundreds > federally regulated and 
bureaucratically managed grazing districts of sub-state to super-state size covering tens (and 
hundreds) of thousands > the national industrial supply chain, vied over by national 
organizations representing many interests from cattle breeders to beef eaters > the financial 
market for American beef cattle, created and shaped by relatively few, but which nonetheless 
broke the bounds of physical space > the Pacific Rim beef trade market produced and fought 
over at the transnational scale > and finally, in the epilogue, carbon markets for beef, which 
aim to produce a market-landscape as large as the troposphere! 
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Figure 3. “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” state totals, 1 Jan’s. 1867-2017, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA 
NASS Quick Stats. Graph by author. 
 
 
Figure 4. “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” state totals, 1 Jan’s. 1867-2017, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA 
NASS Quick Stats. Calculations and graph by author. 
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Figure 5. “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” state totals, 1 Jan’s. 1867-2017, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA 
NASS Quick Stats. Calculations and graph by author. 
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Figure 6. “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” county totals, 1 Jan’s. 1867-2017, US Survey of Agriculture, 
USDA NASS Quick Stats. Graph by author. 
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Lincoln Counties 
The preceding periodization is a cartoon of a much more complex story. While each 
of these periods led into the other, they all overlapped in time and proceeded at different 
paces and in different ways depending on the place or scale of analysis. If we narrow the 
scale of analysis, the neatly delineated periods evident at a national scale do not all match up. 
The local experience of change also appears much more chaotic across the whole data set.  
 When we compare the cattle populations of Texas and Wyoming (see figure 3), for 
example, it appears that Texas experienced a very similar cattle population trajectory to the 
national average (see figure 1 again) whilst Wyoming experienced little change. In fact, the 
Texas cattle population was so large that it drove national trends, and flattened all the change 
that Wyoming experienced on its own scale. Figure 4 charts the annual rate of change for the 
Texas and Wyoming cattle populations, which reveals that Wyoming was just as dynamic as 
Texas and several times experienced much greater contractions in the cattle population. 
Figure 5 is a scatter plot of annual rates of change for several states, and it bears no 
resemblance to the neatly delineated historical periods above. There is no identifiable pattern, 
and you can see how chaotic this becomes when dealing with multiple smaller scales. 
Dramatic as this is already, the state is already a much larger scale than how most ranchers 
perceive their social, economic, and environmental space. 
Figure 6 depicts cattle population for Lincoln Counties in various Western grazing 
states. Though they share a name, these places exhibit very different herd trends because 
different places had different roles within the changing landscape of bovine capitalism. The 
cattle population of Lincoln County, Colorado, seems to have peaked and declined in line 
with the national trend, but the herd in Lincoln County, Nebraska, has exploded right off the 
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scale of the graph. Lincoln County, Nebraska, is one of the state’s largest beef cattle 
counties, and it has grown due to its proximity to corn and major packing plants such as the 
Dakota City Tyson’s plant (formerly IBP) that opened in 1966.15 Lincoln County, Colorado, 
is no more typical, though. The county made headlines in 2016 for a real-life serial killer of 
cows.16 Lincoln County, New Mexico, gets lost in the graph, but it is actually the best known 
Lincoln County in the West because it was the site of the “Lincoln County War” involving 
gunslinger Billy the Kid in the 1870s. The different Lincoln Counties highlight the 
importance of taking caution when generalizing about the cattle industry. 
The Market in the Archives 
“Invisible hooves” refers to the hidden impact of American cows and American 
bovine capitalism on the people, environment, society, and history of the United States and 
much of the world. It also refers to the American beef industry’s greatest flaw—a lie. The 
idea was, and is, that within a pure capitalist system, the free market produces an invisible, 
rational equilibrium force that ensures the best of all possible outcomes for the people who 
raise, kill, and cut up cows; the people who buy and consume cow products; and the 
landscapes cows live in or pass through during their lifecycles. More simply, capitalism is 
stable; capitalism works. The idea is familiar, but counterintuitive: how does individual 
competition for money produce stability? Eighteenth-century philosopher Adam Smith 
encapsulated the complex of theories supporting free-market capitalism—including supply-
and-demand, production efficiency, comparative advantage, liquidity of exchange, ecosystem 
services, ad nauseum, some of which existed and some to come—with the metaphor of an 
																																																						
15 Thomas L. Holman et al., “Nebraska’s Cattle Feeding Industry: Size, Structure and Related Industries,” 
University of Nebraska – Lincoln Extension, 2015, http://extensionpublications.unl.edu/assets/pdf/ec847.pdf. 
16 Anica Padilla, “$10,000 Reward Offered for Lincoln County Cattle Killing,” KDVR Denver 9 August 2016, 
http://kdvr.com/2016/08/09/10000-reward-for-shooter-killing-cattle-in-colorado/. 
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“invisible hand” guiding the market.17 Economists of the twentieth century resurrected and 
popularized Smith’s childish quip because they, and many capitalist elites, were unsatisfied 
with the incomplete application of and retreat from free-market capitalism since Smith. 
Human hands, when they interfered with free markets, obstructed the ability of the invisible 
hand to perfect society. Bad things resulted not from too much capitalism; but from not 
enough! The problem is: that is not what markets actually are. 
Markets do not have laws—they have rules. Markets do not make their own rules; 
people (often in organized groups) make, break, follow, or change the rules of exchange that 
make the market exist. A market is simply the sum total of transactions by people in a 
delineated area of exchange; it has no life beyond human actions. I use the term landscape-
based markets in reference to some of the major historical market conditions of the US beef 
industry because landscapes often delineated the market arena (sometimes this was literal and 
sometimes it was abstract). Markets do have observable tendencies. For example, we can say 
that most capitalist market variations used to produce, exchange, and consume beef tended 
towards instability in the United States from 1867 to 2017, but not all variations tended so as 
much as others. Likewise, we can say most capitalist market variations tended to degrade 
landscapes, but landscapes, just like markets, could be re-engineered to cooperate with 
capitalist production. Considering that people kept changing markets to fit environmental 
constraints, we might say conversely that most landscapes tended to degrade markets. Rather 
than trying to determine the internal laws of theoretical markets, we can learn more by asking 
what actually happened, who was responsible, and how did they do it? 
																																																						
17 The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759); The Wealth of Nations (1776). 
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So what is a “free market” or any market in historical reality? It is a set of rules 
leading to practices, or exchanges. The free market refers to a capitalist-exchange-arena left 
entirely to its own internal forces without limiting actions by governments or workers’ 
organizations. In its simplest expression, the free market is the market of supply-and-demand 
and nothing else. However, the free market is more proscriptive than descriptive, since 
markets cannot exist autonomously from human societies. Very often what seems like the 
absence of a rule (say environmental regulations) is not an absence at all; it is merely a 
different rule with a different goal. Thus, it is possible to create a set of exchanges that 
approximates a theoretical free market, but it is still a purposeful human construction. People 
involved in the American beef economy tried to make free markets on several occasions—
when the federal government opened rangelands to unmanaged competition between cattle 
and sheep; when bankers and others created a mechanism for free exchange in an open 
marketplace turning cattle into financial objects; when the executive branch of the US 
government attempted to destroy protective organizations and institutions in Japan; etc. 
The free market was a seventeenth-century day dream that has become a twenty-first 
century wet dream. It is a fantasy, but belief in the fantasy still drives a great deal of social-
economic action. The free market is the fundamental assumption of economics, but it takes 
significant suspension of disbelief to describe. We believe in and talk about the market as if it 
is a real thing that exists separate from the people, organizations, institutions, and products 
doing things within it. The market has a logic and force of its own; it is an “invisible hand” 
whose effects can be seen in the economic successes and failures of individuals, firms, or 
countries. I argue that it is better to think of the market not as its own thing, but as the 
product—the sum total—of all economic actors and the things they do. The market, 
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therefore, is made and re-made constantly with every transaction within it, calculation about 
it, and even argument about how it should be.18 Markets are fundamentally human and 
historical (not superhuman and universal). 
This means adapting the way we think about good and bad markets. In mainstream 
economics, good markets are ones with free and open access for any participants. It is no 
coincidence that they are also those that best resemble the “free and perfect competition” 
model that Adam Smith took to represent the thing in essentia and that most mainstream 
economics uses for market analysis and research. In fact, this model often becomes the 
market, and any diversions from this in the real word become constraints against the market. 
I argue, in contrast, that those constraints against perfectly free enterprise are, in fact, the 
market, as it exists at that time. Further, these details are not actually constraints against free 
enterprise at all—they are exactly what makes a market function in real time.  
There are two reasons this heterodox way of thinking about markets is necessary for 
understanding the history and future of the beef economy: 1. The perfect competition model 
tends to obscure the most important variables shaping markets, especially in sectors like food 
where all kinds of cultural, political, and historic forces shape people’s choices. Further, 
because the perfect competition model assumes that economies consist of free, rational, and 
atomized actors, it renders invisible the most important actors in the beef trade, who happen 
to be none of those things.; 2. Hyper-attention to the ideal free market by historic actors in 
the beef economy (which, to reiterate, did not actually exist) better explains some of their 
choices than thinking of it as rational analysis of market forces. These people were engaged 
in re-making the market at the same time they were operating within it. This is important 
																																																						
18 This claim draws from performativity theory in economic sociology and heterodox economics. See: Callon, 
Fourcade, Kieran, Garcia-Parpet 
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because sometimes these ideologically-motivated economic actions were thoroughly and 
severely economically irrational. 
So markets are not invisible—they do not even exist apart from visible reality—but 
how do you see, describe, or understand something (the beef economy, for example) that 
might include every transaction, decision, and belief of every person engaged in a multi-
billion-dollar global productive enterprise without reducing it to market forces or laws? I 
believe the best way to understand markets is to find out what people actually did to create 
them and why. The best places to find out about that are in the archives that hold the 
documents they created and left behind. Archives can be physical places with vaults of boxes 
full of paper, or they can be online repositories of digitized information, and I have consulted 
both extensively for this dissertation. Even though mainstream economists and most people 
today do not think of people as deliberately making and sustaining markets, people in history 
have not been shy or secret about these efforts. I have chased beef industry market-makers to 
both sides of the world, and I have found plenty to suggest that organized people—and not 
markets—drove change in the American and global beef economies for the last one hundred 
and fifty years. People will be responsible for what happens with these markets in the future, 
too. 
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1. Cattle, Sheep, & Open Range Capitalism 
In 1892, the newly created Battlement Mesa Forest Reserve, in western Colorado, 
became famous not for its stately peaks or forested plateaus, but for bloodshed.19 The reserve 
contained prime grazing land coveted by both cattle and sheep owners. Over the course of a 
few months in 1892 and 1893 hundreds of cattlemen and cowboys staged two masked raids 
in which they slaughtered more than 2,200 sheep, and cattlemen held the range with threats 
of more attacks for decades. Battlement Mesa became infamous, but it was not unique. 
Between 1870 and 1920, a series of clashes—now known as the Sheep Wars—erupted 
around the American West, from Texas to Oregon to Wyoming, killing something in the 
order of hundreds of sheep producers and hundreds of thousands of sheep. According to one 
account, cattle producers in Colorado killed 800,000 sheep on a single occasion, and 
according to another “the shooting affrays between cattlemen and sheepmen are of almost 
daily occurrence during the summer months.”20 
																																																						
19 “Fighting for Pasturage: Cattlemen and Sheepmen War on a Colorado Mesa—Three Reported Killed,” 
Omaha Daily Bee, 17 Aug 1893. [All newspaper sources accessed from Chronicling America: Historic 
American Newspapers, an online database of the Library of Congress].; “Are Racing to the Mesa: Utah Sheep 
Men Said to be in Colorado,” The Salt Lake Herald, 9 April 1894.; “Ready for Battle: Colorado Cattlemen 
Prepared to Fight Wyoming Sheepmen,” The Indianapolis Journal, 9 June 1895.; “Telgraphic Notes,” The 
Pioche Weekly Record (Pioche, NV), 10 May 1894. 
20 Clara Maud Love, “History of the Cattle Industry in the Southwest,” MA. thesis, University of California, 
1914, 200.; Early Vernon Wilcox, “Grazing Problems in the Western States,” Out West 19 (1903), 446.; There 
is a minor controversy over the extent to which the sheep wars were real or a fabrication of the mythic Wild 
West. The argument for myth is based on weak logic (exceptions mean it never happened) or the absence of 
sources to confirm antagonism. Likewise sources on the conflicts tend to overblow the events or neglect their 
regionally specific contexts. While cattlemen and sheepmen certainly did not feud always and everywhere, in 
certain contexts (such as western Colorado in the early 1890s, eastern Oregon in the late 1890s and early 1900s, 
and Wyoming in the 1900s) the violence was severe and commonplace. The worst sheep wars were often in the 
same regions that became forest reserves because the western sheep industry actively sought summer range in 
the forested mountains. It is impossible to quantify the violence fully, since the conflicts were notoriously 
under-documented, but even to the extent that they may have been mythic, the conflicts weighed on the minds 
of policymakers in the east that much more. For the Sheep Wars as myth see: Robert Howe Woods, “Boscoes, 
Greasers, and Cowboys?: Deflating the Cattlemen vs. Sheepmen Myth,” Journal of the West 16.3 (1977): 35-
41. Ethnographic literature on Basques also downplays the conflicts, but most available Basque sources (written 
and unwritten) postdate the decline of hostilities. See J. Mallea-Olaetxe, Speaking Through the Aspens: Basque 
Tree Carvings in California and Nevada (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 2000), 30, 104-5. For Sheep 
Wars as real events see: Melany Tupper, The Sandy Knoll Murder: Legacy of the Sheepshooters (Christmas 
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At the time of the Colorado attacks, Battlement Mesa was a new forest reserve and 
one of the first of its kind in the nation. During its first five years of operation, from 1892 to 
1897, the federal government banned cattle. Stockmen flouted the law by illegally occupying 
portions of the reserve, building crudely marked “deadlines” to warn the area’s sheepherders 
not to trespass on their claims, and even establishing a secretive vigilante “Stockmen’s 
Protective Association” to enforce their version of backwoods justice. At the time only a 
handful of men managed all the reserve lands in Colorado, and they allowed cattlemen to do 
as they pleased. In 1897, the U.S. government officially allowed cattle into the reserve, at 
which time federal officials established their own sheep deadlines. Two decades later, forest 
rangers finally allowed a small number of sheep back into the reserve, although officials still 
separated them from cattle using their own “unfenced line.”21 By this time, however, the 
Sheep Wars were a distant memory. In the words of Bill Kreutzer, the United States’ first 
federal forest ranger and the ranger for Battlement Mesa from 1901 to 1905, the government 
had “solved a problem with its controlled range management which the stockmen would 
never have solved with their ropes, rifles, and six-shooters.”22 
Scholars have interpreted these events—and in particular the role of the federal 
government in these events—in three ways. In one version of this story, federal range 
																																																						
Valley: Central Oregon Books, 2010).; Forrest R. Pitts, “A Colorado Sheep Wars Incident, 1894,” Association 
of Pacific Coast Geographers Yearbook 74 (2012): 96-101.; Bill O’Neal, Cattlemen vs. Sheepherders: Five 
Decades of Violence in the West, 1880-1920 (Austin, TX: Eakin Press, 1989).; Bill Johnson, “The Central 
Oregon Range War, 1896-1906,” Journal of the Shaw Historical Library 18 (2004): 75-84.; and John Perkins, 
who argued that in comparison to the co-development of sheep and cattle herding in the same outfits in 
Australia, any conflict becomes relevant, in “Up the Trail from Dixie: Animosity Towards Sheep in the Culture 
of the U.S. West,” Australasian Journal of American Studies 11.2 (December 1992): 1-18. 
21 Len Shoemaker, Saga of a Forest Ranger: A Biography of William R. Kreutzer, Forest ranger No. 1, and a 
Historical Account of the U.S. Forest Service in Colorado (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1958), 
92-99.; See also: George B. Sudworth, The White River Plateau and Battlement Mesa Forest Reserves 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 180-243. 
22 Shoemaker, 98. 
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managers came west to solve to an ecological crisis caused by overgrazing.23 In a second 
version, federal range managers were really the agents of an Anglo-American elite that 
sought to assert racial and class hegemony over non-white or proletarian land users.24 In a 
third version, federal range managers were really out to capture western lands and render 
them suitable for capitalist exploitation.25 
Although each of these three versions of the story has its merits, none adequately 
explains the relationship between federal agents and Western land users because they all 
emphasize conflict and coercion. This is a story about extreme violence, but I also emphasize 
that federal agents and cattlemen cooperated to eliminate sheep from Western rangelands. 
The expulsion of sheep from American rangelands was the first in a series of cooperative 
efforts between cattle producers and the American state to reign in open range capitalism. In 
fact, this public-private partnership did not just seek to save the grass for capitalism; rather, it 
sought to transform capitalism and its relationship to the land. 
 In light of the antagonisms between cattle ranchers and federal agents that have 
persisted to the present, it is remarkable how little State force was exerted to seize land 
																																																						
23 This is the dominant narrative within the forest service and most conservation history, and even scholars who 
criticize the forest service in the twentieth century tend to characterize the origins of the agency as a successful 
response to a bona fide ecological problem. See: Harold K. Steen, The US Forest Service: A History (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2004 [1976]).; David Beesley, “The Opening of the Sierra Nevada and the 
Beginnings of Conservation in California 1827-1900,” California History 75 (1996): 322-337.; Francis 
Fukuyama, Foreign Affairs 93 (2014).; Char Miller, “The Once and Future Forest Service: Land-Management 
Policies and Politics in Contemporary America,” The Journal of Policy History 21 (2009): 89-104. 
24 See: Karl Jacoby, Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American 
Conservation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).; Jake Kosek, Understories: The Political 
Life of Forests in Northern New Mexico (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2006). 
25 Traditional narratives still often emphasize that the forest service was saving the land from exploitation only 
for longer-term private exploitation. See: Steen, “Grazing and the Environment: A History of Forest-Service 
Stock Reduction Policy,” Agricultural History 49 No. 1 (Jan 1975): 238-242. The corporate liberalism and 
regulatory “capture” schools also emphasized this, though with more negative implications. See: Christopher 
McGrory Klyza, “Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Patterns: Hardrock Mining, forestry, and Grazing Policy on 
United States Public Lands, 1870-1985,” Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall 1994): 341-374. 
For an opposing vision of capture, see: Richard W. Behan, “Degenerate Democracy: The Neoliberal and 
Corporate Capture of America’s Agenda,” Public Land and Resources Law Review 24 No. 9 (2004): 9-23. 
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management from individual users (ie. cattlemen) in the first place. The Sheep Wars help 
explain why cattlemen and forest rangers cooperated, and why sheep—and nomadic 
pastoralism in general—suffered most from the imposition of federal control. The 
conservationist mission that federal rangers brought with them to the American West 
combined science, ethnocentrism, and capitalism in ways that made a greater federal 
presence palatable even for those who were otherwise disposed to resist it, and enabled a new 
state regime to take hold far from its source. Science justified the dispossession of lands from 
targeted groups, ecological concerns masked the encroachment of state-supported capitalism, 
and federal intervention fed racism and xenophobia. Conservation integrated these 
approaches, bound them together, and delivered them in a bureaucratic package. 
Ultimately, however, federal intervention on the western range was as much about 
quelling the violence as it was about healing the land. Conservation was an antidote to unrest, 
and ecology was a tool to stop the killing. The Sheep Wars catalyzed the rise of the US 
Forest Service and federal management of Western land in general in three ways: 1) The 
extreme and enduring social violence on Western rangelands made heavy-handed State 
intervention necessary—or at least justifiable; 2) Cattlemen’s and most local elites and 
townspeople’s hatred towards sheepmen gave Western stakeholders an interest in stock 
reductions (if appropriately aimed at their enemies); and 3) The Sheep Wars popularized an 
ecological understanding of social violence in the West that was compatible with and 
communicable to the conservation discourse brought by federal agents. Range science was 
brand new at the time, and government experts had no certain way to measure ecological 
degradation over the previous century, but social conflict was a symptom that proved the 
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disease. The Sheep Wars reveal that ecological and social processes were effectively unified 
in the history of early grazing management, and they have ultimately remained so. 
 
Figure 7. “Sheep, Incl. Lambs – Inventory,” and “Cattle, Incl. Calves – Inventory,” US total, 1 Jan’s. 1867-
2017, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA NASS Quick Stats. Graph by author. 
 
Sheep versus Cattle 
Ironically, the Sheep Wars and anti-sheep state regulations, which ensured the demise 
of American sheepherding, were the product of the sheep industry’s remarkable strength in 
the peculiar setting of the American open range. Until the late nineteenth century, the 
American state acted more as a realtor than owner of the West, and lands unfit for 
homesteading effectively had no owner. Sheep thrived in this barren ecological and 
institutional landscape, but the expansion of the sheep industry provoked resentment first 
from cattlemen and later from conservationist range managers. 
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The Sheep Wars exhibited characteristics of both racial and economic conflict, and 
they established the terms by which regulators made sense of both the social and ecological 
crisis of the west in the late nineteenth century. The Sheep Wars pit an Anglo-American elite 
against a motley proletarian crew of Tejanos, Navajos, Mormons, Basques, and several 
different immigrant groups, as well as younger and poorer Anglo-Americans in the west.26 
This was a consequence, in large part, of the structures of the sheep and cattle industries. 
Cattle were a capital-intensive commodity to produce, since they required heavy costs in 
buildings and pens, and the lifecycle of a cow made for a long turnover on investment. 
Sheep, on the other hand, were comparatively cheap, and you could pull the operation off 
without any fixed capital apart from perhaps a wagon. Also, since sheep in the US were 
produced for the wool market—and not for meat—sheepherders could realize profits much 
more quickly and regularly. That said, for those who could afford the start up and operating 
expenses, cattle held potential for far greater gross profits. In 1881, for example, the average 
price for a cow was $19.89 compared to $2.37 for a sheep, and even though there were about 
half as many cattle in the country as sheep, the cattle herd held five times the total value of 
the sheep herd.27 And so cattle became the purview of the higher social strata, while sheep 
became the purview of the lower—or less powerful—strata. 
																																																						
26 The sheep wars have never received the same kind of attention as other types of range violence, but the 
revisionist “New Western Historians” did fit them into their larger social violence approach to rethinking 
Fredrick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis. See especially: Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of my 
Own”: A New History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 344. The 
racial/ethnic narrative has, nonetheless, been somewhat present probably since the conflicts ended. See for 
example: Edward Norris Wentworth, “Historical Phases of the Sheep Industry in Wyoming,” (1940), 36, 
Wyoming Stock Growers’ Association Records, Box 233, Folder 3, American Heritage Center [Hereafter 
AHC].; Bob Barry, “The Sheep Shearers,” Journal of the Shaw Historical Library 18 (October 2004): 43-45. 
27 Report of the Commissioner of Agriculture for the Years 1881 and 1882 [Hereafter RCAY Year], H.Exec.Doc. 
228, 47th Cong., 1st Sess. (1882): 612. 
		
31	
The nineteenth-century western sheep industry was unique from previous sheep 
herding regimes because it combined the eastern Anglo-American focus on commodity 
markets and the open range land use developed in the Spanish empire to the south. Sheep 
first arrived in the present boundaries of the United States by way of Virginia in 1609, but 
demand for both wool and mutton did not expand beyond home production until the late 
eighteenth century. Flocks thus remained small. The market revolution in the first half of the 
nineteenth century and the demand of growing numbers of urban Americans created 
opportunities for larger-scale wool producing operations, then the Civil War created a 
suddenly inflated demand for woolen goods for military consumption at the same time that 
the North became deprived of Southern cotton.28 
Sheep in the east and mid-west competed for space with cattle, hogs, wheat, and 
people, so eastern Americans could not take full advantage of the overvalued price of wool. 
Instead, flocks expanded northward from Texas and New Mexico, and especially in the 
1870s, sheep expanded east from California and Oregon into the relatively open and mostly 
free grasslands, deserts, and forest lands of the western United States. The western sheep 
industry therefore followed Spanish flock husbandry methods as opposed to the English 
husbandry that developed in the east. English-style husbandry ran smaller flocks in smaller 
plots of fenced-in land, and it required on-going land-management to sustain feed production. 
Spanish husbandry as it had developed in the Americas utilized larger open spaces and 
																																																						
28 D.A. Spencer et al., “The Sheep Industry,” Agriculture Yearbook, 1923, H.Doc. 209, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 
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United States Department of Agriculture, 1914. H.Doc. 1682, 63rd Cong., 3rd Sess. (1915): 320. [Hereafter 
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available forage to maximize production where labor was scarce and expensive.29 In the west 
the main competition for space came from cattle, which had just finished expanding from the 
east. 
Cattle were already established on the large swaths of unclaimed government land 
available for grazing, but sheep were better able to take advantage of the opportunities the 
landscape afforded. Cattle tended to remain relatively stationary because they are 
cumbersome to move and because the value of these animals for their flesh decreases as the 
animals exercise and become leaner. A relatively short period of long-distance cattle trailing 
from the mid-1860s to the 1880s ended as the cattle business found itself on the defensive 
due to a depressed beef market and a series of harsh winters climaxing in the “Great Die-Up” 
of cattle in the winter of 1886-87. Due to cattlemen’s Anglo-American origins and the 
failures of cattle on the open range, cattlemen began raising their stock partly or fully on 
enclosed ranches similar to the English pasturing method. Eventually that would mean 
buying land and erecting fences, but in the initial stage it meant enforcing land claims and 
drawing boundaries on un-owned territory largely by force. In the late-nineteenth century, the 
rise of large, efficient packinghouses and stockyards and a growing taste for beef among 
urban consumer caused the price of beef to increase steadily, and it became even more 
important for cattle operations to invest heavily in land, labour, and facilities in order to 
improve breeding stock and the quality of their beef. Cattle operations also became land 
companies. 
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By comparison, the nomadic sheepherding model reduced labor and eliminated the 
need for capital investment in land or buildings. Western sheepmen ran huge flocks (2000 to 
5000 head per flock was common), with only one permanent herder tending to each flock. 
Another man would serve as a tender running for supplies for up to three flocks, and bigger 
operations would have a foreman managing up to ten flocks and searching out the best 
grazing lands. Often the owner of the operation would serve as the tender or foreman and 
would run these huge flocks over distances from several hundred to several thousand miles 
on an annual cycle between winter ranges in arid valleys and plains and cooler summer 
ranges often in the mountains.  The U.S. department of agriculture (USDA) estimated that 
western sheep operations in the “pioneer phase” cost about $200-400 for the camp outfit, $2 
per head for the sheep, and just 50-75¢ per head on labour and supplies. It was especially 
easy for men without investment capital to get a start in the sheep industry, since they would 
often collect their unpaid wages in breeding ewes. Some men would even run their own 
sheep with those of their employer until the flock grew large enough to run on its own.30 In 
the context of the free-land regime of the mid-to-late-nineteenth century it looked to many, 
especially cattlemen, that the nomadic sheep industry would eclipse cattle production in the 
west.31  
  
																																																						
30 Beltran Paris, Beltran: Basque Sheepman of the American West (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1979), 
57-67. Willard Leonard, “A Boyhood With Sheep in the Oregon Desert,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 76 
(1975): 341-2. 
31 Marshall, 320.; Spencer et al., 251-52. 
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Figure 8: Sheep on Farms and Ranges, 1860 and 1900. From D.A. Spencer et al., “The Sheep Industry,” 
Agriculture Yearbook, 1923, H. Doc. 209, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924): 236-7, 240. 
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Cattlemen fought back against the perceived invasion with a series of attacks 
historian Bill O’Neal likened to a “guerilla war” in reference to their episodic and spread-out 
character.32 However, the Sheep Wars were a guerilla war against a marginal caste. The 
confrontations began in Texas in the 1870s or perhaps earlier as incoming Anglo-Americans 
with Mexican cattle tried to force out resident Tejano sheepherders.33 The conflicts heated up 
in the 1880s in Texas, Colorado, and Arizona, and by the 1890s they expanded to 
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. The violence poured over into the 
twentieth century especially in Wyoming and Oregon until the last recorded killing in 1921. 
A pattern of racial and class motivated violence carried throughout the conflicts, but 
especially in the later northern episodes the Sheep Wars were really about material interests. 
What began as local skirmishes between individuals or small groups became protracted 
struggles between powerful transnational corporations and whole classes of people that were 
defined more by land use than by race. 
For example, in 1883 Alexander Hamilton Swan with backing from lucrative Scottish 
investors formed the Swan Land and Cattle Company out of the consolidation of three 
Wyoming cattle operations near Laramie. Swan’s quickly became one of the biggest cattle 
companies on the northern plains in terms of both land and stock. The company invested in 
fences and ranch sites, and Thomas Lawson, who worked for the Scottish financiers, 
claimed, “The improvements are decidedly the most permanent and complete I have seen on 
any ranch in the West.” Nonetheless, most Swan cattle still grazed on open range. At that 
																																																						
32 O’Neal, 1-2. 
33 John Perkins hypothesized that the Texan cultural origins of the western cattle industry explained widespread 
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time the prevailing practice was to loose all the cattle onto the range for the winter and round 
them up in the spring for calf-branding. The method saved on feed and labor costs, but 
cattlemen were already growing dubious due to heavy losses from rustlers when the severe 
winter of 1886-87 killed as many as 50% of untended stock in some areas of Wyoming. 
Swan branded only 8,800 calves in 1887 compared to 16,035 the year before, and the Scots 
seized the company from its American founder, who went bankrupt. The company now 
viewed the open range as a threat, and it began protecting its investments through more 
careful management of its land and breeding stock and by hiring gunmen to close off its 
lands from rustlers and sheep.34  
Sheep had ranged in Wyoming since the 1860s, but there was little conflict with cattle 
due to an abundance of space until both populations surged in the early 1880s. Sheep outfits 
fared better through the Die-Up winter than cattle because herders stayed with sheep year-
round and managed winter grazing, and afterwards more sheep expanded east from Utah as 
cattle died and vacated the range. Cattlemen perceived sheep as the primary cause of the 
increasing ecological hardships on the range. As one cowboy complained, “now this once 
beautiful country is so badly beaten down with sheep that there is scarcely enough grass to 
support a sage hen.”35 Cattle barons dug-in and fought against anyone they saw challenging 
their monopoly on the range. 
This pattern drew the Swan Company into one of the more famous conflicts of the 
Sheep Wars. As Swan’s replacement John Clay recalled, “Sheep trespassers on our plains 
lands were hard to handle and we had a continual fight on our hands.” In 1894 the company 
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hired a notorious gunman named Tom Horn to act as a stock detective,  and in 1901 it sent 
Horn to take out Kels Nickell, who had just introduced sheep into the region. 36 Nickell 
ignored the cattlemen’s warning to leave with his sheep, and Horn allegedly shot Nickell’s 
son, Willie, twice on 18 July and then shot Nickell three times on 4 August. The second 
Nickell lived somehow, but four men on horses located Nickell’s thousand sheep, chased 
away the Italian herder, and shot into the flock, killing seventy-five animals. For the Swan 
Company at that time, reorganizing herds into individually managed ranches, investing in 
better breeding stock, and killing sheepmen were all part of the same process and logic of 
protecting and increasing return on capital investment. The Nickells were not itinerant 
herders having been established in Wyoming since 1881, but by this point cattlemen saw the 
Sheep Wars less in terms of a hegemonic power struggle against racially-inferior herders 
than as an economic and ecological struggle against sheep.37 
Tom Horn’s trial and execution assured that the Nickell raid would become infamous, 
but other raids in the state featured much greater animal killings. In 1902, cattlemen 
“rimrocked” two whole bands near Meeteese, which meant driving them off a cliff. In 1903, 
three raiders clubbed and shot 200 sheep near Black Mountain, and later seven raiders killed 
500 sheep near Lusk. In 1904, cattlemen trailed 500 sheep into the mountains near Laramie 
and poisoned them.38 It became more common for sheepmen to arm themselves and shoot 
back, but most herders knew better than to resist the powerful cattlemen who more than less 
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dominated territorial governance and policing through the Wyoming Stock Growers 
Association.39 
Cattlemen continued, to club, shoot, dynamite, trample, burn, poison, and drop 
Wyoming sheep to their deaths, as well as murder and torture sheep owners and herders for 
another decade, but the dramatic physical violence did not itself deter nomadic sheepmen 
from crossing the cattlemen’s ranches as they traveled towards the mountains and forests for 
the summer.40 As journalist William Macleod Raine explained in 1903, “defeated in nine 
battles out of ten the sheepmen have yet usually come out the victor in the end” due to their 
persistence.41 Eventually, the trial of Herbert Brink, who murdered two prominent sheepmen 
and two herders in a raid outside Ten Sleep in 1909 finally demonstrated that the state could 
and would intervene against violence between cattlemen and sheepmen. The case set no 
remarkable legal precedent, since it simply affirmed that murder and destruction of property 
were illegal in the state of Wyoming, but it was a cultural turning point since those laws had 
not applied for sheepmen before.42  
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At the time of State of Wyoming v. Brink, cattlemen looked like the losers in the 
Sheep Wars, since they had failed to stave off the expansion of the sheep industry and the 
cattle business was suffering repeated economic depressions brought on by cyclical droughts 
and price instability. Within fifteen years, however, they would become the clear victors and 
cattle would dominate agriculture broadly in the arid and semi-arid west for the next hundred 
years. What happened was that the conflict was no longer just between cattlemen and 
sheepmen over control of open range. Starting in the 1880s and picking up especially after 
1905, the federal government decided that it owned those lands and had the right and duty to 
manage them for the public good, the meaning of which was up for debate. In fact, just two 
years after Wyoming took away cattlemen’s right to abuse sheepmen, the Supreme Court 
confirmed federal agents’ right to do so in United States v. Grimaud (1911). A forest ranger 
had arrested Pierre Grimaud for trespassing in the Sierra Forest Reserve, and the sheepman 
sued on the basis that Congress could not delegate legislative powers (ie. area specific 
regulations) to an administrative officer. Grimaud failed. Cattlemen could not kill all the 
sheepmen, but grazing regulation could and did make trailing sheep a crime. The pastoralist 
mode of production, which had had a distinct advantage in open range conditions, suddenly 
became marginal. 
In the mid nineteenth century, both sheep and cattle ran freely on the open lands of 
the west, but then the cattle business shifted towards semi-enclosed ranching at the same time 
that the state began encouraging and facilitating more private ownership on the range. The 
open rangelands began contracting as early as 1862 with the first Homestead Act. 
Homesteaders forced range stock (both sheep and cattle) onto smaller spaces, and, in 
particular, off open plains ranges and into forest ranges. The continuous slow retreat of the 
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free and public west set the overarching context for most range violence. As New Mexico 
Congressman Harvey B. Fergusson put it in his analysis of the troubles, “The little stockman 
was afraid of the big stockman, the big stockman was afraid of the dry farmer, and I guess 
the sheepman was afraid of everybody.”43 The trend culminated with the Stock-Raising 
Homestead Act of 1916, which partitioned remaining public grazing lands into full section 
plots (640 acres) as special grazing homesteads. As more and more animals crowded onto 
smaller and smaller grazing lands, overstocking emerged as a central concern for 
conservationists and land managers in the growing American bureaucratic state. 
The United States government did not manage the public domain in western states 
and territories until 1897, when the rivetingly-titled Sundry Civil Appropriations Act 
provided for management of forest reserves by the Department of the Interior (DOI). Even 
then, the DOI did not actively manage the grazing lands choosing instead to simply prohibit 
sheep from all forest reservations except in Washington and Oregon.44 This impotent 
combination of indifference and outright prohibition changed dramatically when the USDA 
seized control of the forest reserves and placed them under the management of the newly 
created U.S. forest service in 1905.45 Chief forester Gifford Pinchot and his officers did not 
oppose grazing by any means, but they did insist that it had to be regulated and scientifically 
managed so that the range would sustain stable commodity output well into the future. In 
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practice this meant limiting overall grazing, spreading stock out, erecting fencing, and 
separating cattle and sheep where necessary.46 
State management of grazing contributed to a larger shift in American capitalism 
from the hands-off approach and ensuing chaos of unbridled free enterprise to a nebulous 
alliance of corporate and government management of markets, or in this case nature. 
However, this shift also spelled the demise of the western sheep industry, which only really 
flourished for about fifteen years in the west. Starting as early as 1884 sheep production went 
into decline. The sheep industry continued growing in some regions like Montana and 
Wyoming, but not after 1903. In the last regions to be hit, sheep populations declined by 
sixty percent from 1909 to 1919.47 Overall, the American sheep population has fallen from a 
high of over 57 million head in 1884 to about 5 million head today.48 Was the dispossession 
of sheepherders by the American state an accidental consequence of sound conservation? 
The Ecological Case 
A number of different factors and forces probably motivated cattlemen—racial and 
class antagonism, economic uncertainty and anxiety, a culture of vigilantism—but they 
overwhelmingly pointed to ecological concerns when trying to explain and justify their 
violent exclusion of sheep from public rangelands.49 The race of both cattlemen and 
sheepmen to resettle the west had in many places overstocked the land putting negative 
pressure on ecosystems. Cattlemen recognized this ecological crisis even before professional 
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conservationists like Pinchot and influential preservationists like John Muir documented and 
described it for the American state and public. Cattlemen exploited the declining health of 
the range to justify their turf war with sheep and in the process bound the ecological crisis to 
the social crisis. The cattlemen’s ecological case was not an especially good one, but it 
allowed them to communicate with federal agents on issues of conservation. More 
importantly, its assumption that ecological inefficiency was about cattle versus sheep made 
sense in large part because the Sheep Wars made those categories inescapable. By the act of 
killing, cattlemen shaped the analysis of scientifically-minded experts. 
In 1898, it was not easy to determine whether the range was degraded at all never 
mind how, how much, by whom, when, or why! Unfortunately, it is no easier to answer these 
questions today, although both scientists’ and livestock producers’ certainty about their 
answers have cemented if anything. The problem then and now is that we do not have a 
reliable sense of the baseline conditions (in terms of flora, fauna, soil, and climate) for 
Western rangelands before the arrival of European livestock (in the past this was the “virgin” 
or pre-human condition, since experts did not believe indigenous people could impact the 
land). We are even less capable of determining site-specific conditions, which are essential 
due to the remarkable ecological and historical diversity of American landscapes. The best 
and most thorough studies of pre-European American grassland conditions are a century old 
now, and they reveal the limits early experts faced in understanding ecological decline.50 
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In the nineteenth century, it was not at all common knowledge that cattle could 
destroy grass over the long term. “Next in importance to the divine profusion of water, light, 
and air, those three physical facts which render existence possible, may be reckoned the 
universal beneficence of grass,” John J. Ingalls, US Senator from Kansas, waxed eloquent in 
1872, “when the fitful fever is ended, and the foolish wrangle of the market and the forum is 
closed, grass heals over the scar which our descent into the bosom of the earth has made […] 
Grass is the forgiveness of nature—her constant benediction.” Ingalls had no claim to 
expertise in ecology, but his treatise on grass was quoted at length by Will C. Barnes, 
Assistant Forester and Chief of Grazing USFS, before Hearings on public lands grazing in 
1926, and it was reprinted in its entirety in the USDA’s special grass-themed yearbook of 
agriculture in 1948. Even as evidence of ecological decline emerged, most people assumed 
the grass would return if you removed the excess animals (in the 1890s that meant sheep; in 
the 1970s it meant cattle). For over a century, Ingalls captured the position of the 
government, the educated elite, and even (or especially) the mass of land users in the United 
States: “grass is immortal.” 
However, Barnes and other early range historians were beginning to understand that 
the grass had changed. These studies examined an impressive array of primary sources for 
evidence on grass—including newspapers, Spanish explorer reports, pioneer diaries, and 
various obscure books—but these sources left an incomplete picture of the land. More than 
any other source, the authors relied on the expertise of cattle producers who lived out West. 
In 1885, Joseph Nimmo of the Bureau of Statistics recorded that the capacity of Texas ranges 
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could be greatly increased based on the authority of George B. Loving (One of the most 
famous Texas cattle barons and the one half namesake of the Loving-Goodnight Trail).51 
Barnes, too, asked “some of the most experienced cowmen of central Texas” about the 
capacity of the range, but by then they claimed “the overstocking of the ranges has continued 
year after year [… and] the injury has gone almost past the point where redemption is 
possible.”52 Obviously this contradicts the grass is immortal claim, but that is fairly typical in 
these documents. The point is that the experts asked and listened to cattle producers. This is 
not a cynical point—cattle ranchers living in the West for decades with kin going back even 
further are exactly the kind of people I wish I could ask about changes in the range—but it 
meant that experts were working with a narrative of ecological change that cattle producers 
constructed to blame sheep. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, cattlemen understood that the abundance of the 
grasslands was finite, and they attempted to monopolize the land—famously against rustlers 
and homesteaders—but more consistently and importantly against sheepherders. First, 
cattlemen argued that sheep unjustly crowded cattle out of rangelands because cattle could 
not graze in an area with sheep or even after sheep had passed. Most often cattlemen just 
claimed axiomatically that “sheep and cattle don’t mix,” but those who cared to explain 
further alleged that sheep had an oil gland in the crevice between their hooves which left a 
stink so foul that cattle refused to drink or graze anywhere sheep had passed. Second, 
cattlemen asserted that whatever sheep did not eat (and they ate a lot) they would trample out 
with their sharp hooves.53 As a USDA expert would later point out, “It is therefore asserted 
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that the sheep men thus have a distinct advantage over the cattle men in that the former can 
drive the cattle off the range by the mere presence of sheep.”54 
The cattlemen’s ecological argument was not scientifically founded as it turned out, 
but it appealed to politically active conservationists in the waning years of the nineteenth 
century. It also ensured that the experts would not ask if sheep were the problem, but rather 
why sheep were the problem. The eastern elites, who began to study and then intervene in the 
western range problem, obviously differed from cattlemen, but they shared both ethnic 
identities and class interests with the rougher men who made up the western elite in the 
nineteenth century. In comparison, sheepmen had virtually no voice, and ruminations by men 
like the great John Muir that sheep were “hoofed locusts” were typical.55 Muir and other 
preservationists were convinced that “ignorant, alien” sheepmen started destructive fires, and 
they demanded the complete removal of sheep from reserve lands as matter of principle.56 
The more bureaucratic Pinchot and his staff in the forest service (and in the various agencies 
in the USDA and DOI that preceded its formation in 1905) approached the range problem 
more soberly and found that fires were a long abandoned practice by the time of Muir’s 
journeys, but even more than pundits like Muir they relied on cattlemen for local expertise 
and political legitimacy.57 This group of civil servants, drawn from an emerging class of 
university-educated botanists and foresters, eventually became instrumental in closing off the 
public domain to sheep and those types of men who ran them. 
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Before the mid 1880s, the few government reports on the sheep industry were 
generally friendly and reported dryly on the various breeds of sheep and how they adapted to 
different conditions, but in the waning decades of the nineteenth century the influence of 
cattlemen’s bias began to leak into official USDA documents.58 H. M. Taylor, an agent of the 
Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI), reported in 1886, “There has always been more or less 
trouble out on the range between the cattle growers and sheep men. This grows out of the fact 
that wherever sheep graze the cattle will not remain. Range cattle dislike the smell of sheep, 
and will not stay in the same neighborhood with a flock of them. Again, sheep travel as they 
eat, and bite the grass so close to the ground that cattle could not stay on the range where 
sheep had been if they wanted to, for the reason that there is absolutely nothing left behind 
for the other stock to eat.”59 Taylor was relying on reports by cattlemen, a practice that 
became increasingly common in these documents.60 Far from impartial, having likened sheep 
to “a swarm of Egyptian locusts,” Taylor asserted that the USDA should “require sheep 
owners to hold their flocks on the range adjacent to their water rights the same as cattle do.”61 
Sheep had to stay on ranches. 
Despite the experts’ inclination to side with local elites, the cattlemen’s version of the 
ecological argument proved problematic. Experience on the ground as well as some 
experiments, loosely-defined, quickly demonstrated that sheep and cattle could graze 
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together. The forest service dropped the specter of the destructive stench of sheep, and by the 
1920s they would be positioning themselves against such superstitions.62 Herbert Smith, 
assistant forester in charge of public relations, recorded a hypothetical argument during 
which a forest supervisor responded to some cattlemen’s protests against sheep by insisting, 
“It isn’t true that sheep on the range spoil it for cattle. That is an exploded idea. Our tests 
have proven the contrary.” For Smith, the forester’s invocation of the scientific method was 
essential to sustain “the esteem in which he is held locally for his fairness, capacity, and 
leadership.”63 Science apparently distinguished the men representing the American state from 
cattlemen and their petty local squabbles, but their analysis still circled back to the same 
conclusion due to the fundamental distinction between the categories sheep and cattle.64 
The experts’ analysis sounded more like a scientific version of the cattlemen’s. 
Frederick Coville, a USDA botanist, was one of the first and best at this reframing of the 
cattlemen’s ecological case, and his discussion of forage trampling in a report investigating 
sheep grazing the Cascade Mountain ranges of Oregon is revealing. “The principle bad 
effects of overgrazing are to be attributed rather to trampling than to actual close cropping,” 
Coville explained, “There are very few plants which from simply being eaten off will fail to 
grow again, but where repeatedly trampled, particularly in wet weather, when the plants are 
soft and the roots are easily pressed out of the ground, almost any plant will suffer.” Coville 
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then concluded that the greatest threat from this was not even the immediate loss of forage, 
but rather potential for long-term soil erosion and “the substitution of other less valuable 
forage plants.”65 Coville harbored no pre-existing antipathy towards sheep, and unlike the 
cattlemen he distinguished myth from fact and backed it up with plenty of details and 
caveats, but the conclusion was still essentially the same. In this way, cattlemen’s arguments 
and experts’ science worked together, and for the men running sheep across American 
rangelands, who suffered, ‘anti-sheep’ and ‘anti-nomadic pastoralism’ was a meaningless 
distinction. 
Overgrazing was not actually federal conservationists’ primary motivation. Coville 
described “gullies 20 feet deep” in some of Oregon’s plains, and various others reported 
erosion, flooding, and other disasters connected to the denuding of ground forage by sheep. 
But, in spite of all these pressing threats to the longevity of the grasslands, of more 
immediate concern for the forest service was the accusation that sheep inhibited timber 
growth. In addition to eating or trampling seedlings, it was alleged that sheep would “nibble” 
at young pines, which when they grew could “be seen standing crooked and incapable of 
developing into sound trees of a healthy growth.” But conservationists did not need to ask 
whether these “gnarled and stunted” still served their ecosystems because they were clearly 
unfit for timber production, which was their primary value.66 Conservationists at the turn of 
the century may have shared many of the scientific methods of contemporary ecologists and 
environmental scientists, but they did not necessarily privilege ecological concerns over other 
economic or political goals. 
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Early experts like Coville bridged the cattlemen’s ecological case to state policy, as 
Pinchot revealed in an official USDA report from 1898: “A careful study of the whole 
question has been made on the ground by Mr. Frederick V. Coville, […] whose conclusions 
are to be trusted.” Pinchot used Coville’s analysis of the Cascade range to lay out general 
concepts that would motivate forest service grazing regulation for decades to come. Pinchot 
was far more sympathetic to sheep than Muir, but he did conclude from reading Coville and 
others, “Many forest regions should be entirely protected against sheep.”67 
On the ground, it was even more clear the forest rangers were affecting the work of 
cattlemen. For example, when ranger Bill Kreutzer reached the Battlement Mesa reserve in 
Spring 1901 it was already infamous across Colorado for violence between cattlemen and 
sheepmen, and tensions peaked again just as Kreutzer arrived. Sheep from Utah were 
overcrowding the low country of Western Colorado and threatening entrance to the reserve. 
Federal law excluded sheep from forest reserves in Colorado, and for years Kreutzer’s job 
became border patrol against sheep. Decades earlier, cattlemen had designated “deadlines” 
against sheep with piles of rocks, and federal rangers’ “invisible” stocking borders were often 
metaphorically and literally the same. 
Although some rangers “openly cast their lot with the cattlemen,” Kreutzer saw 
himself as an impartial enforcer of rules developed two thousand miles to the East. 
Nonetheless, when two aggressive sheep owners pushed onto the reserve in 1903, Kreutzer 
rode out to protect the cattle growers’ monopoly. Local cattlemen discouraged him, saying 
they would “take care of the situation,” but Kreutzer did not want another range war on his 
hands. The sheep owners were surprised that he did not show up with a posse of cowboys, 
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and Kreutzer apparently scared them off by threatening to bring down the full force of both 
civil and criminal prosecution by the United States government. There was no more violence 
for Kreutzer’s time at Battlement Mesa, but after he left in 1905 cattlemen again killed a 
herder and his sheep. Kreutzer did not specifically hate sheep or favor cattle (though, he did 
grow up raising cattle and looked upon ranching favorably for the rest of his life), but his 
work in support of state-sponsored conservation and cattlemen’s murderous vigilantism were 
effectively interchangeable.68 
In the dominant narrative about the origins of grazing regulation, agencies like the 
forest service were created to intervene in an ecological crisis, but at the time the ecological 
crisis was inseparable from the social crisis. The social violence of the Sheep Wars was itself 
a major motivator for state intervention, and cattlemen effectively connected the contest 
between elite Anglo-American cattlemen and socially heterogeneous sheepmen to the 
developing ecological question. Even the scientifically-minded USDA and DOI experts 
could not isolate overgrazing from the questions of who did or should own the land, and their 
own class interests motivated their analysis. Some experts took care to emphasize that sheep 
were not necessarily bad for the west and to clarify rather where, when, and why they posed 
problems, but this seemingly sensible clarification only justified their overwhelming distaste 
for the miscellaneous riffraff herding sheep.69 It was exactly the way that experts and later 
rangers veiled their social domination with science that ultimately made the forest service’s 
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regulation so much more effective than cattlemen’s physical violence at reaching their 
common goal—enclosure and the eviction of pastoralist sheepmen.70  
 
  
  
Figure 9: Evidence of overgrazing by sheep, 1901. From Filibert Roth, “Grazing in the Forest Reserves,” 
Yearbook of the United States Department of Agriculture, H. Doc. 661, 57th Cong., 1st Sess. (1902): 342-3. 
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Tramps and Enclosure 
In the hands of the experts recruited to investigate the range question, the case against 
sheep and sheepmen became an attack against an unfashionable mode of production and way 
of life. Sheepherders were no longer targeted as immigrants or ethnic others directly, but 
rather those herders who did not adapt to the ranching mode became “tramps,” and the 
experts determined that so-called “tramp sheep” were the worst culprits of ecological 
degradation. The experts often observed that most sheepherders were foreign, but that was 
not fundamentally their crime. While clearly linked to older nativist and white supremacist 
ideologies, the discussion of “tramps” represented these ideologies filtered through newer 
capitalist ways of understanding the world because the tramp was a character who did not fit 
into modern market relations and the division between property owners and those who toiled 
for wages. Tramps were lazy, dirty, and tended towards theft, but their greatest sin was 
simply refusing to fit into modern capitalist society, which in the context of western 
rangelands at the turn of the century meant ranching.71 
The “tramp” discourse appeared as experts tasked with preparing reports for Congress 
or the USDA and DOI interviewed western stockraisers and tried to make sense of their 
grievances. These experts almost all shared Gifford Pinchot’s “wise use” intention for the 
public domain of the United States, which meant that they believed strongly in conservation 
but also in maximizing valuable economic output. They aimed to scientifically interrogate 
the causes of ecological problems, so as to stabilize the public domain for sustained 
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commodity production. In the practical question of the sheep wars this meant they were 
sympathetic to the most stable producers—ranchers. The experts reframed the sheep and 
cattle wars into a conflict between sedentary producers and irresponsible, itinerant tramps. As 
E.V. Wilcox of the BAI summed it up, “Perhaps the chief cause of the unpleasant feelings 
between cattle men and sheep men, and certainly one of the chief causes of the frequent acts 
of violence on the summer range, is the presence of tramp sheep.”72 If the state could get rid 
of the tramps, they argued, both the violence and the ecological degradation would end. 
Wilcox set out his case by defining the tramp sheepmen and their tramp sheep against 
good local stockraisers of all kinds. “Throughout the range States hundreds of thousands of 
sheep are owned and maintained by men who either have no permanent home or at least have 
no sheep ranch,” explained Wilcox, and further after explaining the “extensive” seasonal 
migrations of the industry, “It may therefore result that excessive numbers of sheep attempt 
to find grazing ground in one part of the mountains, and that the grass may be grazed off so 
short as to be almost destroyed for a number of years and the sheep may even then be unable 
to secure enough forage to prevent great loss in weight.” This last thought is notable, since 
Wilcox portrayed the tramp sheep industry not only as ecologically destructive but also as 
economically inefficient. In addition to undermining their own bottom line, the tramp 
sheepmen compromised the profitability of land-owning ranchers, especially cattlemen.73 
As the experts perceived it, the problem with these so-called tramps was that since 
they were nomadic and did not own their own land, they had no respect for the future 
productivity of the land and overstocked it leaving “great and even irreparable damage […] 
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to the grass.” This argument rested on the elusive concept of carrying capacity, which could 
vary wildly across different conditions.74 Wilcox explained that, “In some localities an acre 
of ground will maintain two sheep during a whole season, while in other localities as much as 
2 or 3 acres may be required for a single sheep,” but forest rangers collecting this data could 
never really isolate on a per sheep basis like this, since sheep passed in and out of the 
reserves by the thousands. Wilcox implied that capacity could be scientifically determined, 
but in practice the experts often deferred to local experience. Sound carrying capacity, as 
Wilcox admitted, “is a matter which is thoroughly appreciated by the sheep men, and where 
the land is largely controlled by local men, so that tramp sheep can be successfully excluded, 
permanent injury to the range is being largely avoided.” Carrying capacity as a concept and 
as a measurement required stability, which meant nomadic pastoralism was necessarily 
inconsistent with scientific conservation.75 
Further, cattlemen argued that ranching, especially on privately owned land, was 
more sustainable and compatible with the conservationists’ goals, and pastoralism threatened 
to undermine the ranching mode of production where they mixed. Vernon Metcalf, a 
cattleman and former forester, testified before Congress in 1926 on how he believed tramp 
sheepmen were undermining the land value of private ranches near forest reserves such that 
“land ownership is absolutely discouraged.” Metcalf argued that the “original ranchers” put 
most investment in winter quarters outside the elevated mountain grazing lands of the 
reserves, but tramp sheepmen “see that the key to the whole thing is the summer range, 
because there are plenty of the other seasonal ranges.” The tramps, not owning land or 
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paying taxes could “afford to bid for [a grazing permit] a price that represents per head all it 
is worth to run his sheep the year around” and thereby outbid the cattle rancher of his 
summer range.76 Metcalf brought the tramp discussion and ecological problem back around 
to the fundamental problem motivating the violence of the Sheep Wars—the pastoralist and 
ranching modes of land use clashed. Metcalf made it clear that the only solution was 
supporting ranchers. This is how cattlemen won the sheep wars—not through killing but 
through adapting themselves and their words to a new mode of production more in line with 
both conservation and capitalism. 
Cattlemen’s complaints about sheep developed into a sweeping behavioral model in 
the expert analysis. As Coville reported in 1898, the stockmen (especially sheepmen) of the 
public range ran by the adage, “Every man for himself and the devil take the hintermost.” 
Acecdotes to prove the claim abounded. Clara Maude Love, a Master’s student in history at 
the University of California, described a story of a man who bought a piece of land to raise 
cattle, but his land was abused by various itinerants and trespassers driving their animals on 
his land, so the man sold the land. He then used the money to buy more cattle and he just 
trespassed on the lands of the new owner and his former nieghbours.77 The forest service 
discovered what we now understand as the classic tragedy of the commons dilemma. With 
each user trying to suck the most value out of the land before his neighbor-competitors could, 
ecological degradation was inevitable, and the experts decided that giving stockmen a longer-
term stake in the land through a permit would incentivize sound management (or 
improvement). “The evident fact that if the forest grazing privilege is valuable at all,” 
theorized Coville, “it is most valuable when the amount of forage it furnishes is maintained at 
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its highest limit of continued production.”78 Thus the experts theorized just as ecologist 
Garrett Hardin would in 1968 that private property was the best, if not only way, to conserve 
vital natural resources. But the tragedy of the commons conceals as much as it reveals. The 
forest service, like Hardin, conceived of the open range commons as an institutional vacuum. 
As economist Elinor Ostrom argued, governance of a commons operates at multiple levels 
and from different directions.79 In the nineteenth-century west, violence between cattlemen 
and sheepmen was not a tragedy derived from the absence of institutions; rather, the Sheep 
Wars represented the execution of ethnic and social institutions to govern use of the 
commons. Property rights were more a translation than a resolution of existing racial and 
class structures, and removing them from the model made it that much easier to justify 
dispossession. 
The experts did not, however, follow their model to its final end because they came to 
the conclusion that private-lands ranching was superior at the same time that the American 
state decided it wanted to keep its land in the west. What would ranching look like on land 
that the federal government owned and which was increasingly understood as public? The 
experts suggested simulating the economic and ecological incentives of ranching on land that 
the state would maintain ownership and control of. Imposing this vision on the western 
livestock industry required fences and leases, both of which were intended to dis-incentivize 
overgrazing by limiting competition and establishing semi-permanent status for certain stock 
growers on the public domain. 
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Fences were necessary to physically delineate the ranch as an enclosed grazing space, 
and leases ensured that production within that space would improve the range and make it 
more efficient. The forest service began allowing (and sometimes encouraging) stockmen to 
build fences on public lands, and Albert Potter, Associate forester of the USDA, estimated 
before Congress in 1926 that the forest service itself erected about 650 miles of drift fencing. 
This was nothing compared to the amount of fencing raised by the Civilian Conservation 
Corps in the 1930s, but it was certainly a sign of the direction management was going. The 
forest service simultaneously worked to establish sound and uniform grazing privileges and 
to enforce fee collection. Although cattlemen and foresters would continue to debate the 
correct value of the grazing privilege, prominent cattlemen fully supported the principle of 
leasing as a step towards their ultimate goal of fully privatizing the public domain. The forest 
service believed that if the modern capitalist logics of profit and property rights could be 
applied to the range, ecological sustainability would necessarily follow economic efficiency, 
and by this time the cattlemen agreed. It has become somewhat of a myth in recent decades 
that cattlemen seek free and unrestrained access to use and abuse the public domain; rather, it 
has been their goal for over a century to control that land through direct ownership.80 
Fencing and leasing, while sound from the conservationist point of view and popular 
among cattlemen, spelled disaster for the western sheep industry. The sheep industry of the 
west was incompatible with private access to limited plots of land specifically because it had 
developed symbiotically with the existence and philosophy of the open and free public lands. 
Obviously, sheep can be ranched, as they have been throughout the twentieth century, but the 
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industry could never operate on the scale that it enjoyed before, and, more importantly, the 
men who ran nomadic flocks across the west would not be able to adapt. Even in 1897, 
Coville aimed to prescribe a fixed-capital basis for sheep outfits, but admitted “in general it is 
a prerequisite of success that an owner shall have for winter headquarters a permanent and 
commodious, properly fenced ranch, provided with a house, one or more hay barns, and 
several substantial corrals. […] Such a ranch represents a capital of about $5,000 or 
$6,000.”81 The new mode required a much higher level of capitalization—in some areas costs 
rose from $2 per sheep before enclosure to as high as $14 per sheep by 1924.82 It followed 
directly from this that the much smaller sheep ranching business that emerged ended up 
dominated by former cattlemen. In fact, the same Swan Land and Cattle Company that had 
so violently fought against sheep just years earlier introduced sheep to their ranches in 1905 
as a capital diversification strategy, and a decade later they would be the biggest sheep outfit 
in Wyoming.83 But still, Swan’s success ranching sheep could not have happened with 
Basque or Mormon sheepherders still criss-crossing the range. 
Evicting tramp sheep and sheepmen turned out not to be an easy proposition for the 
new federal agents. According to ranger Bill Kreutzer, sheepmen had openly resisted rangers 
since the DOI first banned sheep from proposed forest reserves in Colorado and Oregon in 
1893. “Some of the rangers had openly cast their lot with the cattlemen,” Kreutzer explained, 
“Therefore, sheepmen looked on all rangers as part of the force arrayed against them.”84 
Range sheepmen (not actually being unsophisticated, anti-modern tramps) hid from rangers, 
spied on rangers, and when caught took full advantage of the tenuous legality of early ranger 
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regulation.85 As forest supervisor White reported in 1902, “The owners were all Basque 
French, and each was in possession of a letter from the Wool Growers’ Association of San 
Francisco, advising them that under the recent decisions of Judges De Haven and Welborn 
they had the right to graze their sheep on the reserve.” Sheepmen barely distinguished 
between attacks from cattlemen or from forest rangers, and in 1905 sheepmen in Wyoming 
formed the Wyoming Wool Growers Association to address both threats. By 1906, the 
association offered $1000 rewards for any convictions of sheep raiders and raised a fund to 
lobby against the forest service’s grazing regulations.86 In stark contrast to the picture painted 
by Smith in his imaginary portrait of the forest supervisor, earlier rangers found it very 
difficult to control sheepmen.  A ranger might have to travel as far as 75 miles to sign the 
necessary affidavits to evict a trespasser, and in some cases lacked any meaningful 
legitimacy and authority. “In these cases the supervisor did his best to remove the trespassers 
from the reserve, but was cautioned to use no violence, and consequently was unsuccessful in 
keeping any of them off the reserve, as they were apparently well informed as to all the 
instructions he received from time to time, made fun of him at various times, and refused to 
leave when ordered to do so by forest officers.”87 
After 1905, the new forest service became much more effective at barring nomadic 
sheepmen from reserve lands. Forest service rangers did not attack sheep camps with guns 
and clubs under the anonymity of night or bandanas, and they did not throw dynamite into 
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flocks or drive sheep off cliffs, but their actions were not necessarily non-violent. Journalist 
Charles Shinn examined rangers’ daily reports and found, “Mostly they began with ‘rode 
patrol’ and followed this by a series of ‘dittos,’ excepting on those noble and joyous 
occasions when one could say ‘ran out Basco sheep’.” The rangers’ strategy was “making it 
unprofitable for sheep herders to trespass,” and they scared off herders, seized dogs, stole 
essential equipment, and “mixed, scattered and drove out the bands.”88 Rangers were also 
willing to threaten violence, and one forest ranger even proposed—perhaps in jest, but 
perhaps not—“If you meet a sheep raising so-and-so on the trail with a broken leg, break the 
other leg and go on.”89 Nonetheless, most often forest service rangers did not draw their 
power from violence, but rather from the legitimacy of science and conservation, which was 
symbolized for Kreutzer by the bronze forest service badge depicting a coniferous tree that 
replaced his law-enforcement-styled silver DOI “ranger” badge in 1905.90 The forest 
service’s on-going efforts to run off nomadic herders did not make the papers the way 
cattlemen’s spectacularly violent sheep raids had, but they were nonetheless devastating. 
The forest service effectively regulated the pastoralist mode of production out of 
existence in favor of ranching. From there on out, sheep herding would no longer be an easy 
business for less established and financially-secure operators including Navajos, Mexicans, 
Mormons, immigrants from Canada, France, the Basque region of Spain, China, Portugal, 
and young and poor Anglo-American men trying to make a go of it in the free west. As 
dominant as the discourse of the tramp was, one USDA bureaucrat recognized what was 
happening. In 1890, H.A. Heath of Kansas, while reporting on the western sheep industry, 
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recorded that “cattle began to supplant the sheep, a circumstance which has resulted in more 
detriment to the masses, and especially the poor, than most of us are willing to admit.”91 
In the late nineteenth century, the American state and western land users deliberately 
transformed livestock agriculture and the western American landscape. They changed the 
number and types of animals found there; they changed the types of vegetation; they re-
apportioned land and gave it values and owners (some for individuals and some for the 
government itself); they erected infrastructure ranging from railroads to modest barbed 
fences; and they created institutions and organizations to help manage the landscape going 
forward (like the forest service and stockgrowers’ associations). Land use and the landscape 
both became “improved.” What does it take for a society to decide to transform a landscape 
and its whole orientation towards that landscape? 
Improving the land meant different things to different groups of people, and it took 
science as well as bigotry and outright violence as well as symbolic violence to close the 
open range once and for all. The Sheep Wars may have started out of local racial, religious, 
and class antagonism in an unruly west, but they ended in the context of an emerging federal 
bureaucracy. What began as cattleman versus sheepman ended as forest ranger versus tramp. 
Western cattlemen’s violent assaults on sheep outfits did not cause the collapse of the 
American sheep population, but they created an opportunity for the state to intervene. In 
researching the causes of the Sheep Wars and other problems facing the public domain, the 
state’s experts drew on ecological arguments that cattlemen were already making against 
sheep and sheepmen, and they concluded that the only solution was a managed and 
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incentivized grazing system that fit the cattle industry much better than the sheep industry as 
the two existed at the time.  
There was nothing modest about use permits, grazing fees, or the very notion that the 
federal government is the owner of public lands when these things emerged in the late 
nineteenth century. And there was nothing modest about fences, ranches, or the idea of long-
term economic incentives for land use either. Barnes and Wilcox both asserted that the US 
Forest Service ended the range wars through regulation, but it would be better to say that 
USFS finished the job of the range wars.92 The USFS and private cattle producers cooperated 
to change the market for grazing access on forest reserves. Cattle producers started the 
process of regulation by trying to kill sheepherders, and the USFS concluded it by expelling 
them under force of law and state violence. Murder and Leases were both just market rules. 
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2: Regulating Landscape-Based Markets 
Grazing regulation was a joint project of the American State and private enterprise. 
Land users and government regulators agreed that ecological degradation caused economic 
instability and that unregulated competition necessarily led to ecological decline. Together, 
government experts, bureaucrats, policymakers, and cattle ranchers remade the rules of the 
cattle business. They created institutions—like the Taylor Grazing Act—to alter the legal 
structures of the range; and organizations—like the American National Cattlemen’s 
Association, Bureau of Land Management, and local grazing boards—to develop, interpret, 
and administer the new rules. From the 1890s to the 1930s, ranchers and regulators attempted 
to correct the institutional and organizational deficiencies of open range capitalism, and they 
achieved relative success leading to three decades of stable growth. 
In a study of Utah grazing and regulation, agricultural historian Paul Bonnifield 
called grazing land and feed resources, “the weakest link in the capitalistic chain.”93 The 
American cattle industry’s solution to the chaos of free enterprise was conservation. 
Conservation embodied the idea that stable landscapes made stable capitalism, as well as the 
tautology that stable capitalist production made stable landscapes. Conservationists needed to 
manage access to the violent unowned rangelands of the West, but they did not want to 
curtail the food supply or eliminate private enterprise, the foundation of Jeffersonian yeoman 
democracy. The American State took control of the open range as an emergency measure due 
to ecological and social violence thereby creating the public lands, including the forest 
reserves and public domain lands, but the government still embraced the same ideological 
conviction expressed in the Homestead Act that Western lands should belong to individual 
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agricultural producer families.94 Ranchers agreed. The central problem for these two groups 
of rangeland-market conservationists was how to make public lands into private lands in a 
way that maximized economic and environmental stability. 
The American State and the cattle producers, who used the Western rangelands, 
constructed a hybrid situation in which public lands belonged the government, but they 
would be allocated to ranchers to manage them as similarly as possible to privately owned 
lands. They reached this compromise partly because the government had tried giving away 
and the land unsuccessfully. The gifts, “Homesteads,” were too small for grazing cattle on 
the dry lands of the West.95 Selling it was an option, but ranchers at the end of several 
turbulent decades could not afford to buy the land they claimed. Ranchers and regulators 
initially understood the new grazing structures as a temporary step towards full transfer of 
lands to individuals and a return to regulation through market means. In reality, they created 
an entirely new type of market that continues to shape land use and beef production to the 
present. The market for access to and use of public lands allocated the role of the invisible 
hand to specific agencies, bureaus, boards, committees, and other organizations across 
government and industry, who tried to make it operate similarly to their notion of a good 
stable market. They made the impact of cattle on the land more visible and predictable by 
proscribing specific numbers compatible with the land’s capacity, and they simulated 
individual property rights through long-term leases and permits.96 
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The regulated range differed from typical markets of capitalism. Public lands by 
definition are lands owned in common by all Americans, but, in fact, they are always 
controlled most by some individual or group (ie. the military, an Indian tribe, a corporation, 
an individual producer, or a group of rock climbers). They are basically “owned,” but they 
differ from private lands due to how society designates the owner. Whereas private lands are 
distributed through market exchanges of money, public lands are distributed by the federal 
government based on fluid ideas about use. Because of the greater level of control people had 
over the market, ideas and politics about markets and conservation had a significant impact 
on the administration of the marketplace in reality. This market also explicitly connected 
economic and ecological concerns and decision-making because the creators believed 
markets and landscapes were connected. Ultimately, this market, the regulated market for 
access to grazing resources on public lands, lost its stability because ideas about cattle and 
conservation changed. 
This chapter examines the specific mechanisms, institutions, and organizations that 
produced the regulated grazing market and contributed to the Golden Era of American beef. 
The following chapter examines the ideological and practical consensus around conservation 
and why it fell apart. 
Agencies, Associations, & Acts 
On some level, all markets are the product of ideas because supply, demand, and 
everything else ultimately come down to what all the individuals involved think is going on 
and thus choose to do. However, it takes a great deal of coordination and ideological 
consensus to implement a new idea about how a market ought to be in reality. Markets are 
fluid human constructions, but that does not mean they change easily. Replacing open range 
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capitalism with something else relied on the re-organization of individuals in the beef 
economy, especially into State bureaucratic organizations and private trade associations.97 
The two most important government organizations for forming and executing 
conservation ideas within the market for public lands grazing were the United States Forest 
Service (USFS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). The USFS formed in 1905 by 
an act of law from the United States Congress, but it had precursors in both the Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of the Interior (DOI) back to at least 1876. The 
USFS managed access to grazing lands that fell within the national forest reserves that 
Congress carved out in 1891 and expanded thereafter. The forest reserves contained 
significant and highly valuable (especially in the summer season) grass and other forage for 
livestock, and the USFS directed significant effort to grazing and conservation there, but the 
great majority of unowned or unclaimed government grazing lands remained unaccounted 
for. Eventually, they became the public domain lands, and Congress created the BLM in 
1946 to administer the conservation and efficient production of those lands, but the BLM did 
not receive nearly the same legal ability to manage the public domain as the USFS had for 
the forest reserves until another law of 1976. 
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Since the USFS ultimately fell into the USDA and the BLM into the DOI, they were 
initially and sometimes regarded as rivals—they are not, since they have clear spatial 
jurisdictional borders, but they are different. According to James R. Skillen, the respective 
establishment dates of the USFS and BLM in 1905 versus 1946 meant the organizations 
formed in vastly different political contexts. In 1905, the American state was in a period of 
rapid growth and spending, but in 1946, the American state was just getting over the growth 
and spending of the New Deal and Second World War. Also, 1905 fell in a period that 
American historians call the “Progressive Era,” during which the American state entrusted all 
manner of governance to professional experts and technicians. By 1946, the American state 
(paradoxically) had renewed its suspicion of big government and elite technocrats. Thus, 
according to Skillen, the organizational structure, legal administrative authority, and budget 
allocations of the USFS were all a great deal better than those of the BLM.98 This difference 
meant that the USFS consulted with private stock raisers, but the BLM relied on them. 
The most important private industry organization was the National Cattlemen’s 
Association (NCA), which initially formed as the American National Live Stock Growers 
Association in 1898. Livestock producers on Western American Rangelands relied on an 
economic organizational form distinct from other workers’ and business organizations: the 
producers’ trade association. Stockmen’s associations, as they were most often called, 
originated in the Sheep Wars as groups of cattlemen or sheepmen, who shared a collective 
interest in opposing foreign animals, agreed to work together to kill enemy producers and 
their animals. A notice published in a central Oregon newspaper in 1901, read, “To whom it 
may concern: The Crook County Cattlemen’s Protective Association have located for its 
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exclusive use of the territory bounded on the north […etc.].”99 The environmental context of 
those conflicts meant the grazing regulation was a central purpose of stock associations, and 
in the important testimony on public lands grazing given to Congress to help that 
organization form the best laws, the cattle producers’ interest was almost always delivered by 
someone with an affiliation to a stock association of some kind. 
The NCA was the central voice (to law and policymakers) transmitting cattle 
producers’ understanding of conservation and efficient production throughout the twentieth 
century, but the NCA did not have the greatest role in implementing ideas about public lands 
in practice. The organizational ecology of stock associations was (and is) broader and more 
complex than just the NCA. The NCA had some rival organizations, like the Independent 
Stock Growers of America, but these were few and short lived.100 Other organizations 
developed for specific supply chain functions, like the National Live Stock Feeders 
Association or the American Hereford Cattle Breeders Association. At the national level, the 
NCA subsumed most of these, and it affiliated with those below. The NCA itself was made 
up of individual cattlemen to a degree, but more importantly it connected affiliate 
organizations in every grazing state, and many of those had affiliates at county or regional 
levels. Other producers, maybe also members of some of those previous associations, might 
make up other stock associations for a national forest, grazing district, or even a specific 
local landscape they shared.101 The more local associations had the most direct link to 
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producers’ behaviour within the public lands grazing market. However, members of key 
positions within the NCA also held important roles in various government-industry 
collaboration organizations like the Public Lands Council; the NCA sponsored or promoted 
research that was valuable to public lands cattle grazers; and, to re-iterate, the NCA 
articulated the whole industry’s position to Congress. 
 Producers’ involvement within the regulation of public lands grazing is controversial. 
Scholars have been skeptical of the regulatory regime set up on public rangelands and in 
agriculture more broadly because “in effect, the regulators were being supervised by those 
who were to be regulated.”102 Critics argue that regulatory capture undermined democratic 
principles, but the range had not been a successfully democratic place before at all, and the 
architects of this system believed they were actively creating “democracy on the range.”103  
However, the NCA, its affiliates, and other producer organizations served a vital role in how 
the American state managed grazing on private and public lands. Cattlemen’s associations 
provided the organization necessary for cattle ranchers to play a designed role within the 
legislative and bureaucratic functions of grazing regulation and management. They were both 
a countervailing power and a bureaucracy ready to go. Especially for the public domain from 
1934 to 1976, the stock associations fulfilled a need for bureaucracy that the DOI legally 
could not provide. Further, they provided the organizational coordination necessary for stock 
producers to cooperate and avoid the problems of open range capitalism. Thomas E. Wilson, 
a major Chicago meatpacker, put it this way 1919 during a plea for greater cooperation and 
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market stability across the beef industry: “One of the greatest drawbacks in this industry is 
the failure on the part of producers to properly organize.”104 
The USFS certainly did take producer input seriously, but the organization mostly 
implemented the regulation of grazing on forest reserves on its own accord. Producers and 
policymakers collaborated much more in the regulation of the remaining public domain. 
Regulation of the majority of Western American rangelands was an early priority of the 
Conservationist American State but it stalled several times. Grazing was on a laundry list of 
issues Theodore Roosevelt collected for the State to solve, and it was the only one he left the 
Whitehouse without providing for in some way. Congress passed the Stock Raising 
Homestead Act of 1916 to try to get rid of the Public Domain, but they made the ranch units 
too small. Grazing regulation bills appeared many times, but faded or sometimes their 
authors just died. It took over three decades to finally construct a new set of market rules for 
grazing on the public domain. 
Finally, the Taylor Grazing Act extended the leasing model to roughly 173 million 
acres of remaining open rangelands in 1934.105 The law marked the first meaningful 
regulation of America’s federally owned grazing lands outside the national forests, and it 
codified the notion that stability lay somewhere just shy of private property. The Act 
legislatively transformed the western rangelands into manageable grazing districts that cattle 
ranchers could lease and use for a fee. Land managers would regulate against overgrazing as 
needed, and ranchers’ fees would pay for conservation measures. Ranchers in turn would get 
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secure land tenure on the public domain, which would mitigate social violence, economic 
competition, and incentivize sound long-term land management. Thus the Act purported to 
“stop injury to the public grazing lands,” and to “stabilize the livestock industry” in a single 
move.106 The Taylor Grazing Act also became an vehicle for organizational collaboration 
between ranchers and the State. 
In debates on the Taylor bill, American ranchers expressed mixed views on the issues 
of federal management and regulation on the open range. State-level cattle and sheepmen’s 
associations appeared at Congressional hearings to declare that every stock raiser in the state 
was against the bill, or they were all for it. Those cattlemen, who did support the Taylor bill, 
were instrumental in its passing, and after the Act passed, cattlemen built a broad consensus 
around the double-management of public lands by both government and users that lasted 
until the 1970s. Despite vocal opposition immediately after the bill passed, cattlemen never 
really tried to resist regulation, and most stockmen eventually remembered the bill 
favourably. Many scholars argue that the Taylor Act was flawed due to the contradiction of 
its separate conservation and production goals; in fact, the law represented the culmination of 
forty years of public lands management and debate concluding that ecological and economic 
stability were one and the same. It was not the case that cattlemen submitted to conservation 
regulation as the price to pay for economic stability. Ultimately, the Act imposed almost as 
much self-determination for western stockmen as external regulation, and it was a ranchers’ 
brand of conservation that the regulations aimed for. 
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It is hard to assess exactly what proportion or class of stockmen opposed the Taylor 
bill, but even if it was a significant share, the opposition can be misleading. “Since stockmen 
may be charged for a privilege they have enjoyed gratis all these years,” economist Virgil 
Hulburt predicted, “opposition is to be expected.”107 In this light support is what needs to be 
explained—not opposition. Will Barnes, who was the first secretary of the American Stock 
Growers Association, estimated that the “lease-law matter” had “come up at practically every 
meeting of the National” since 1889, and his notes indicated “the vote generally being about 
50-50.”108 If Barnes was right, that meant that fully half of stockmen actually supported 
leasing from an early stage, and it is probable that an even greater share of stockmen 
supported leasing by 1934, since many ranchers were in devastating crisis after drought and 
depression swept the plains early in the decade. The Dust Bowl accentuated the cyclical 
ecological-economic-social crises cattlemen had faced since the mid nineteenth century. 
Small cattle ranchers seemed most likely to support leasing and federal grazing 
regulation because they faced the most abuse under the open range system. Frank Bryant and 
a group of other small ranchers formed the Mesa-Alto Livestock Association in New Mexico 
specifically “for the purpose of trying to get some legislation that will help us along.” Bryant 
travelled to Washington in 1933 to stand in front of the Senate public lands committee to 
declare, “We are for the Taylor bill.”109 Rush DeNise of Wyoming wrote to Joseph 
O’Mahoney, who sat on the committee, to back up the claim that small and honest stockmen 
could not survive without the bill. Ranching “should be the foundation of Wyoming wealth 
but, as it stands today, the ownership of ranch real estate is a financial burden,” argued 
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DeNise, because “It is an indisputable fact that banks in southwestern Wyoming discriminate 
against livestock and sheep outfits that have a heavy land investment and tax overhead, in 
favor of the outfits that own little, and in many cases, no land at all, but roam the range, 
feeding out the less mobile outfits who are tied down by their ranch and land holdings.”110 
The literature on ranchers support or opposition of the Taylor Act is mixed. Joe Stout 
argues that cattlemen strongly opposed the Taylor Act, but could not resist the pressure of the 
conservation movement, and “resigned themselves to defeat.” Gary Libecap emphasizes the 
way government agencies resisted assigning property rights to ranchers, and he argues that 
the Taylor Act was a last ditch compromise between fundamentally opposed groups. 
Christopher Klyza recognizes that that stockmen strongly opposed fees in the pre-Taylor 
period but still supported the idea of permits or leasing for stability. Klyza finds “it is unclear 
whether a majority of livestock ranchers opposed or favored the Taylor bill,” but he argues 
that producers “captured” the administration of the Act molding it in their favour. Mike 
Mackey argues oppositely that stockmen supported earlier versions of the Bill, and “it was 
only after the Taylor Act became law that stock associations did an about-face and went on 
record as opposing government interference,” which only lasted until about 1938. Stephen 
Dow argues strongly that cattlemen supported the Taylor bill and that previous animosity 
with the forest service should not be read into this very different mode of management.111 
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 Looking backwards, we might assume that cattle producers would oppose regulation 
of public lands because they have become the most vocal opponents of the USFS, the BLM, 
and environmentalism on public lands since 1979. However, in those producers’ own context 
of destructive open range capitalism, regulation was sensible. In contrast to the view that 
most cattlemen feared the Taylor bill would lead to “financial chaos,” it was chaos that the 
bill promised to stop.112 The bill would “bring order out of chaos,” waxed the bill’s 
namesake, Congressman Edward Taylor, because “There is no such thing as stabilizing the 
stock business under present conditions, when no one knows whether he will have any range 
next year or not, where one cannot know whether some man will have force or influence 
enough to take it from him and hold it.”113 Oliver Lee of New Mexico claimed that as many 
as 80% of livestock raisers in his state supported the bill and that “the endorsement is given 
generally with the idea that something should be done in regard to the public domain and that 
something must be done.”114 
Cattlemen, who supported the Taylor bill, had a genuine financial incentive in 
regulation. Establishing grazing districts with use permits would enable fencing to separate 
out summer and winter ranges and control passing livestock and horses. DeNise believed that 
fences and secure land tenure would actually increase the low calving rates of cows forced 
out on the range in breeding season, and he thought the funds from fees could help 
exterminate poisonous plants.115 Henry I. Harriman, who was actually a large-scale New 
England investor in cattle ranches in Montana and Wyoming owning or claiming about 
100,000 acres, “noted with great chagrin the difference in the growth of grass where there 
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was proper restriction on the number of cattle that could be fed, as compared with the 
condition of the range where there was no such restriction,” and concluded that even he 
needed regulation to protect his investment.116 Cattlemen understood the magnitude of the 
Taylor bill, but as DeNise put it, “it is undoubtedly a good time to revolutionize the range 
conditions.”117 
Stock raisers’ opposition to leasing concentrated among politically weak groups 
including large-scale ranchers and sheepmen.118 Large stockmen opposed leasing and 
regulation because they were the sole group benefitting from the open range system. Through 
a combination of foreign capital investment, illegal fencing, and murder, some livestock 
operations had actually cornered large shares of the public domain, and they would not have 
supported even full privatization of the land if it meant equitable distribution. It was exactly 
these large concerns that drove many smaller stockmen to support leasing. “As you know,” 
wrote rancher John Elder in 1934, “no one bank, business concern, or monopoly of any kind 
can or ever have served a community without prejudice; therefore, I think the passage of the 
Taylor Bill is essential to the best interests of all stockmen.”119 Large stockmen had 
significant power in western state legislatures, but the federal government was strongly 
inclined towards small stockmen’s interests due to the ideology of Jefferson, who said “those 
who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God.” 
Sheepmen likewise only propelled the bill forward when they opposed it. For 
decades, both cattlemen and state regulators had isolated sheep and sheepmen as the primary 
culprits of overgrazing on open rangelands, and leasing had become the primary 
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conservationist management tool on the forest reserves specifically in order to undermine 
nomadic sheep herding. The hearings on the Taylor bill rehashed trodden anti-sheep 
sentiment, and ranchers predicted gleefully that “many nomad bands of sheep would 
gradually drop out of existence” under a good leasing program.120 Sheepmen necessarily 
opposed the bill, but their views garnered very little respect. Ultimately, Taylor boasted in 
1937 that his bill had already enabled the expulsion of over one million sheep from the public 
domain.121 
More generally speaking, stockmen’s opposition to the Taylor bill was not actually 
advocating inaction by the American state. Cattlemen wanted secure land tenure, and 
compared to the violent and illegally fenced open range, the imposition of private property 
rights would be regulation. The majority of cattlemen most wanted full sale and transfer of 
the public lands to private land users eventually, but 1934 would have been a bad time to get 
the necessary capital or credit. Many favoured intermediate transfer to the states, since they 
would ultimately sell to stockmen.122 The Taylor Act did impose secure tenure, and it 
vaguely defined its term as “pending final disposal” of the public domain, so when the bill 
passed several formerly opposed cattlemen accepted it as a move in the right direction.123 
Secretary of the interior Harold Ickes courted stockmen with this view by pointing out that 
either way it would take a separate act of Congress to transfer lands to the states, and “there 
																																																						
120 DeNise, 175. 
121 Mackey, 19. 
122 For example, Martin Baskett of Wyoming wrote to O’Mahoney to explain, “A fair and reasonable solution of 
the whole problem would seem to be to amend the Taylor bill so that those States objecting to its provisions 
may have their public lands given to them in trust, to be sold to the present users at a nominal fixed price and on 
the 80-year amortization plan.” Martin T. Baskett to Hon. Joseph C. O’Mahoner, 28 April 1934, in “Hearings 
[…] Public Lands and Surveys,” 1934, 175. 
123 “The Taylor Grazing Act,” American Forests 49 (1934): 353, as quoted in Stout, 320. 
		
77	
is nothing in the provisions of this bill which preclude or embarrass such action by Congress 
if and when it deems it desirable.”124 
Cattlemen did not have a problem with conservation as such, since they could see in 
the dust that overgrazing was a severe liability. What they did not want, as Wyoming rancher 
Sam Hyatt put it, was “some soft collared eastern boy […] telling the west what to do in the 
handling of his stock and the range.”125 “That our land and water resources should be 
conserved I think we all agree,” wrote Hyatt, “However, I do not agree with the statement 
very frequently made that we are allowing our agricultural land to go ‘plumb to hell.’” Hyatt 
believed most ranchers did try to conserve natural resources, and he responded, “Personally, I 
am operating the land my father homesteaded before Wyoming became a State; the land my 
children were born on. Certainly I have tried to conserve this land for my posterity.” Hyatt, 
like many ranchers who criticized the Taylor Act, recognized that conservation could be 
implemented in many ways with different consequences for stockmen, so he advocated for 
management based on the “common sense practices, such as the stockmen use where given a 
chance.”126  
Some ranchers actually supported state regulation a lot because they genuinely 
believed that they were not among the culprits responsible for overgrazing and declining 
carrying capacities. George Snodgrass, also of Wyoming, was a huge supporter of the Taylor 
bill. He attended all the meetings on the Taylor Act in his state, and he believed state 
regulation was the only way to control sheepmen and other “range pirates.”127 Henry Gerber, 
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of Oregon, wrote to Ickes in 1933 that his local range had been “over-grazed by itinerant 
sheep owners from other states,” who “depleted the range to such an extent that the forage 
thereon is almost wiped out.”128 Like Hyatt, Snodgrass and Gerber ultimately concluded that 
the best solution was state regulation based on significant stockmen’s input. 
And that is what they got. In the testimony for the bill before the Senate public lands 
committee, Harold Ickes promised that the interior department intended to fill all the bill’s 
loopholes and ambiguities with exactly what stockmen were asking for. “It has been 
contended that the administration of the bill will not be responsive to nor meet the problems 
of the livestock industry in local communities,” Ickes explained, but “this is an 
administrative problem.” Ickes pointed out that the bill stipulated that “the Secretary of the 
Interior shall cooperate with local stock associations,” and he assured “it is my intention to 
consult and advise with the stockmen of the various States before rules and regulations are 
adopted which will govern the use of this public range.”129 Rufus Poole, who was the 
department’s solicitor, reiterated even more flatteringly that the department would “avail 
itself of the experience of those men who have spent their lifetime in the livestock industry, 
and to intrust [sic] them insofar as possible the local administration of the problems of 
managing the grazing districts.”130 The department was not just politicking; they needed 
cattlemen to fulfill these roles in order to make the grazing districts work. 
Ickes himself was a technocrat and, according to his wife, the “most fanatical 
conservationist of his generation,” but there was no way to reasonably exclude the 
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cattlemen.131 For one thing, Ickes could not pay anyone else to do it under the budget 
conditions of the time, and in this sense, the interior department wanted ranchers to help take 
on part of the bureaucracy.132 Second, the whole point of the law was to stabilize the 
livestock industry and to minimize social conflict, so the department could not get itself in a 
war with stockmen. Poole put it simply: “I think it would be practically impossible to 
administer a district if they were all against you.”133 
Liberals, like Ickes and Taylor, imagined the bill as specifically benefitting small 
stockmen, who owned ranches around the public domain. Although the era of the cattle 
barons had passed for the most part, they still worried that large cattlemen and sheepmen 
bullied smaller operators, and Ickes promised that locals and small stockmen would be 
“given such a preference to range privileges as may be necessary.”134 Though not strictly re-
distribution, the architects of grazing regulation did want to limit land monopolies and 
facilitate the partition of the range into Jeffersonian farm units. The Taylor Act was legally-
speaking the final nullification of American homesteading, but Ickes and Taylor saw it as a 
way to continue homesteading after that policy had failed. Almost twenty years earlier, 
Taylor had worked for the Stock-Raising Homestead Act (1916) to expand homestead 
allotments to 640 acres especially for grazing to help settle the arid west, but stock-raising 
homestead entries declined from a peak of over 25,653 in 1921 to 4,884 in 1933.135 Taylor 
was especially offended to find the law could be abused to stake extralegal grazing claims, 
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since large stockmen could place homestead claims and then have employees stake the same 
claim repeatedly without ever settling or improving the land.136  
The Taylor bill—as the legacy of homesteading and the Jeffersonian ideal—did in the 
end make a significant move towards entrenching grazing rights for established stockmen. 
Section three ordered that “preference shall be given occupants and settlers on lands within 
or near a district, to such renewal privileges as may be needed to permit of the proper use of 
the lands occupied by them,” and Ickes explained that the department would try to honour 
any grazing rights “to which they are entitled either under State laws or by customary 
usage.”137 This surprised the chief of the forest service, who warned, “If the language […] 
referring to grazing preferences specifically as grazing ‘rights’ rather than as licenses or 
privileges, is not subject to construction as thereby constituting the grant of an easement in 
the public domain lands, it at least comes perilously near it.”138 In fact, one conservationist 
publically criticized the act precisely for “hardening past use of the public ranges into 
permanent property rights.”139 Criticism aside, it was not an accident, but rather the point. 
In the ensuing decades, cattlemen, who were better-organized and more financially 
secure, grew to love the Taylor Grazing Act. At later hearings on public lands in the 1960s, 
top executives for the cattlemen spoke as if nothing could have been better. In 1963, Floyd 
Lee, representing the public lands council of the ANCA, applauded the act as “one of the 
greatest conservation measures passed in this or any other century” and a “milestone in 
federal land administration.”140 Leonard Horn of the same committee waxed in 1965 that the 
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Taylor Act could be “the greatest revolution in land use in the history of the world.”141 Lee 
believed that the single most important thing the Act had done was to create secure tenure on 
the public domain by the “tying together of the permission to graze on federal lands with the 
base or private property owned by the livestock operator.”142 Horn agreed, saying “The act is 
unique in that it does not attach the use of the land to a person, but to other land or water. It is 
set up to keep faith with the promise of the United States, made to homesteaders, that they 
could use the lands around them for their livestock.”143 Both the favouritism of past use and 
the attachment of a grazing privilege on the public domain to an adjacent ranch property 
became institutionalized. By the mid-twentieth century, ranchers capitalized grazing permits 
into the ranch value when taking out loans and when selling the ranch with the permit 
attached. Cattlemen effectively owned any improvements they made, and the state would 
compensate them if their permits were revoked. 
Thus from the 1930s to the 1970s, cattlemen generally understood leasing as closer 
to—rather than farther from—property rights. The debate over the Taylor Act was not really 
a case of those for and against; but rather, it was a case of the interested parties shaping an 
institutional product, and that process continued afterwards in the administration of the Act. 
The Taylor bill, as written, remained vague on both cattle ranchers’ formal roles and the 
issue of grazing rights, but the final institution (or body of rules) included the norms 
established by the organizations that oversaw it. Harold Ickes probably exaggerated how 
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much he trusted ranchers with the land, but he made good on his promise by hiring a man to 
lead the program, who believed thoroughly in rancher conservation.144 
Farrington Carpenter was by 1934 an accomplished Colorado rancher and lawyer, and 
his personal experience with overgrazing, economic and environmental instability, and the 
way cattle barons had abused smaller ranchers made him a fierce advocate of federal 
regulation in aid of small ranchers.145 Carpenter testified in favour of the Taylor bill arguing 
that large cattle outfits were responsible for the dust bowl and “the only chance against being 
completely wiped out of existence as far as the cow industry is concerned is to have it 
controlled by federal authority.”146 In just a few months, Carpenter was hired into the 
position his support had helped create, and he was an instant success with most stock 
growers. 
Carpenter was the person most responsible for the relatively smooth transition from 
open range to regulated grazing districts, and his great innovation was the assembly of 
advisory boards including local stock raisers. All over the west, Carpenter and the grazing 
division at the interior department got more applications for grazing leases than they could 
allow while still maintaining carrying capacities, so opposition to the Taylor Act flared up 
most immediately after it came into effect.147 Carpenter did actually believe that ranchers 
were conservationists in a utilitarian sense, and he attributed their sometimes-negative 
reactions to eastern preservationists’ accusatory tone. Carpenter saw himself in a leadership 
role helping ranchers “to assume their real role as the best informed and most competent 
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conservationists of range resources in the United States.”148 Carpenter went out to western 
states and held meetings with stockmen, and he came up with a system of boards to enable 
and encourage cooperation between permittees and the state. Carpenter wanted to delegate 
grazing management on all the new grazing districts to these advisory boards. Carpenter 
declared that “nothing but appellate power is expected to be reserved in the Government, 
thereby delegating to the committees practically the entire administration of the Act.”149 
Ickes never appreciated it much, but Carpenter’s administration successfully minimized 
conflict during the initial stage of regulatory implementation on the public domain.150 
In the postwar period, ranchers and bureaucrats settled into a cooperative grazing 
management regime. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the principles of the Taylor Act were 
tested by still-skeptical ranchers and policymakers, but the framework survived and 
expanded to cover the forest reserves, too. In the 1940s, ranchers still made anti-statist 
arguments like, “Do you want America to have a Russian land program? I think not,” but by 
the 1960s they would be stomping feet in Washington on behalf of greater funding for the 
forest service and BLM.151 It took almost twenty years for ranchers and the state to come to 
terms on exactly how to work together, but the result held a lot of promise, if only for a 
relatively brief window.152 
																																																						
148 As in Hendricks, 26. 
149 As quoted in Hendricks, 30. 
150 The advisory boards subsequently earned a statutory basis in an amendment to the Taylor Act in 1939 
(Section 18), which stipulated that they consist of five to twelve local stockmen and at least one wildlife 
member. The grazing permittees of a district would generally elect representatives to recommend to the 
secretary of the interior for appointment. 
151 Sam Hyatt, “Statement of Sam C. Hyatt, Representing the American national Livestock Association before 
the House Agricultural Committee on H.R. 6054,” n.d., Folder “Misc. Statements, Statements 1938-1949,” Box 
668, NCA, AHC. 
152 NB—The cooperative conservation regime of the Taylor Act almost fell apart in the late 1930s and 1940s. 
The first attack on cooperative management came from the top of the department of the interior. Cattlemen were 
very satisfied with Carpenter’s approach, but the secretary of the interior was not. Ickes fired Carpenter late in 
1938 for undermining too much of the department’s authority, but Carpenter’s advisory boards remained intact. 
Mostly the event just embarrassed Ickes. The second, and more serious, attack came from Western anti-statist 
		
84	
Cattle ranchers brought manpower, legitimacy, and—most importantly—expertise to 
federal grazing management at the local level. According to Harry Lee, of the Public Lands 
Council (PLC), “The men who comprise the grazing district advisory boards are men of 
experience, knowledgeable of the economic and range conditions in their areas as well as 
local history,” and he argued that they were essential to conservation because “They furnish 
the expert advice required by the district manager if he is to properly perform the task of 
administering the Taylor Act in his district.” Even if land managers in the forest service and 
BLM could sometimes be annoyed with ranchers’ power to counter state authority, they 
would have generally agreed with Lee that ranchers offered “the type of advice which flows 
only from the knowledge gained through experience” and that it was valuable.153 
Disinterested experts within the bureaucracy trained in general models and methods for 
observing analyzing range conditions, but range management was an essentially site-specific 
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science, and ranchers could provide a sense of change over time that many rangers did not 
have in the early years. 
In the 1950s, stockmen and forest service rangers developed close working 
relationships to administer grazing regulation. According to Thomas Alexander in a case 
study of the forest reserves of the intermountain west (District 4), forest rangers found both 
users and stockmen’s associations generally cooperative. Ranchers often reacted gruffly to 
any announcements of stock reductions, but in most cases they would comply. If a forest 
service plan called for grazing reductions, the ranger would ride the grazing allotment with 
members of the local stockmen’s association and “point out the problems, listen to their point 
of view, tell them of the forest’s proposal for dealing with the difficulties, and consider any 
counter proposals.”154 Alexander estimated that as many as 90% of cases of forest service 
conservation initiatives requiring a reduction in livestock did not need to go to appeal.155 In 
Utah, in one case, the local stock association agreed to hold all cattle off a reseeded range for 
three years so the forage could fully recover, and in another case, the forest service reduced 
grazing up to 70% without official complaint.156 On the occasion of the Multiple Use—
Sustained Yield (MUSY) Act hearings of 1960, one cattle rancher mused, “It never occurred 
to me several years ago that I would be working so closely with and devoting so much time 
to trying to promote the interests of the national forest program.”157 
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Cattlemen also helped the agencies to practice conservation by sustaining them 
bureaucratically. If a USDA or DOI agency office faced funding or personnel cuts, local 
ranchers would use the same political channels they had for lobbying against additional 
wilderness legislation etc. to lobby for allocations to keep existing agencies and mandates 
operating. Cattlemen especially supported conservation and research programs that had clear 
economic benefits. In 1967, for example, C. W. McMillan158 appeared for the NCA at public 
hearings to reject a proposal to close the Saylor Creek Experimental Range, which was a 
joint BLM and forest service project in Southern Idaho studying cheatgrass.159 McMillan 
reminded the review committee that research like this into how to improve forage and range 
conditions was essential for ranchers and the state to fulfill their promise as good land 
stewards. Programs like Saylor Creek tried to deal with overuse of the range by increasing 
productivity rather than just reducing grazing, so it was exactly the type of conservation 
ranchers wanted. McMillan also listed other benefits to both ranchers and rangelands that the 
Saylor Creek program provided “such as range reseedings, brush spraying and removal, 
drainage, water development, fencing and cross-fencing, road development, proper 
distribution of livestock over the range, proper and optimum seasonal use of the range, 
etc.”160 
Cooperation yielded meaningful results for conservation, and conservation yielded 
many of the economic benefits its advocates had promised. Stockmen cooperated with rest-
rotation strategies, especially when rest periods were also used for improvements like 
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weeding and reseeding, and they found cattle weights improve as a result. Charles Redd, a 
Utah rancher, reported in the late 1960s that his cattle weighed 200 to 250 lbs more than they 
had in the 1910s.161 In direct contrast to the capture thesis argument that advisory boards 
undermined sound management of the public lands, in comparison to the turmoil on 
American rangelands in other periods, advisory boards may have been the greatest success of 
American grazing and conservation policy before the 1970s. Many criticisms of the system 
were valid, but the regulatory capture thesis ran both ways. Vernon Dalton, a Nevada 
rancher, also made a good point that “if you are going to have a valid and effective citizens 
advisory board, then the board should not be selected and controlled by the agencies they are 
to advise.”162 
The mechanisms of grazing management on the public domain, which included 
conservation, became leases and advisory boards, and the philosophy became “multiple use.” 
The system was designed to apply the principles of markets and private property to public 
lands without fully relinquishing final control to land users. The American state held on to 
formal ownership specifically in the interest of long-term conservation, but the state saw its 
role as smoothing out free enterprise rather than inhibiting it. Ranchers in turn got a 
significant share of state management and the administration of conservation. The agreement 
was flawed and tense at times, but within the longer history of destructive land use and social 
strife it was decidedly better. But it also failed. 
Rent 
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The United States’ first comprehensive conservation and regulation strategy for the 
public domain was based on leasing. The idea was that stockmen would conserve the land 
themselves as long as they had the security to do so. On the face of it a lease is not a 
remarkable thing—it is a kind of rental contract that most people today have encountered as a 
way to use a car or an apartment for some period of time—but the decision to structure the 
public domain through leases was transformative. Leases provided a mechanism for making 
public lands operate like private lands without the risk or cost of true privatization, and cattle 
ranchers bought into the idea. For most of the nineteenth century, cattle producers had used 
the grazing lands of the West like they owned them. It was not always clear that they did not 
own them either, since the federal government seemed intent on transferring all its land to 
productive individuals when it was not ignoring those lands altogether. Cattlemen believed 
they deserved all the Western rangelands because they had gotten there first, and no one 
else—ignoring the exception of sheep herders—seemed to want them anyways, but in the 
early twentieth century some cattle ranchers began to support leasing. It would be one thing 
if the ranchers had just accepted regulation without fighting, but this was more than a 
begrudging compromise. Cattlemen were divided on leasing at first, but some lent significant 
support, and many more bought-in to the programs thereafter. Why did ranchers suddenly 
accept something short of owning the land that came with external regulation attached? 
Cattle ranchers needed regulation more than they needed ownership. In fact, private 
property rights are a type of economic and social regulation by the State, and cattle ranchers 
initially saw leasing as a step in the direction towards ownership because what they had was 
nothing. In the nineteenth century, cattlemen staked informal claims on the open range and 
used violence to try to maintain some semblance of order. Violence was not good at 
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maintaining order. Cattlemen fought sheepmen; big cattlemen fought little cattlemen; and all 
of them fought homesteaders. Livestock grazing in the West resembled the chaotic markets 
of the East, which tended repeatedly towards crisis and depression at the time. But unlike in 
the East, where robber barons took advantage and grew fabulously wealthy at their 
competitors’ and workers’ expense, the great cattle barons of the popular press failed to live 
up to the name. Livestock grazing was too unstable to be profitable over the long term. 
When cattle ranchers, land managers, and policymakers agreed on leasing as the 
solution to the public lands problem they acknowledged the limits of free market capitalism 
while paradoxically re-asserting its possibilities. Leases enabled public rangelands to 
function like private property in some ways without leading to the inevitable social and 
ecological strife of unbridled free enterprise. Leasing was like private property without the 
capitalists being allowed to do everything they wanted with it. It was the profit incentive 
without competition. Leasing fit with the larger industrial trends in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries towards corporatization and regulation to mitigate competition, but 
it was a very different type of solution for a different context.163 
Leasing as a concept and practice had a mixed past in the United States. Before the 
turn of the twentieth century, western land policy was to get as many people extracting as 
much as possible from the land by giving it to them for anywhere from cheap to free. The 
state only managed the lands of the West in so far as to send armies to eject their native 
residents. Leasing was pretty much nonsense in this context. The American state briefly 
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attempted leasing on the public domain in the 1820s and 1830s for mining purposes, but the 
policy was a flop and remembered as such thereafter.164 The notion did not reappear until 
after Sheep Wars when western land users and bureaucratic experts began trying to figure out 
a management regime around the time of the Sundry Civil Appropriations Act (Organic Act) 
of 1897. The Organic Act in itself did not do much immediately, but once it survived the 
requisite Supreme Court case over constitutionality, the Organic Act enabled the creation of 
reserves and agencies to manage them in the interest of conservation and sustainability. This 
was a relatively sudden assertion of federal ownership and intent to manage.165  
The Organic Act did not automatically suggest that privatization was off the table, but 
it became a step removed. The Forest Transfer Act of 1905 removed it a step even further. 
The Organic Act had placed the reserves under the jurisdiction of the department of the 
interior (DOI), and the department created the general land office (GLO) to manage them. 
The leaders and staffers of the GLO, like Filibert Roth, wanted to stop the violence and 
ecological destruction on the range and especially in forests, but the agency proved 
ineffectual. They issued some permits, charged some fees, and even removed some grazers, 
but overall the GLO’s policies lacked ideological or practical coherence. Gifford Pinchot, of 
the USDA division of forestry, accused the DOI and its secretary of gross mismanagement 
and effectively staged a bureaucratic coup.166 The Transfer Act re-placed the reserves under 
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the jurisdiction of the USDA, which put them under the management of the newly renamed 
US forest service. Pinchot’s forest service was fiercely committed to technocratic 
management and conservation as a means towards economic efficiency.167 The forest service 
continued issuing permits and fees, but initially they lacked a purpose beyond funding the 
administration of the program. Strictly speaking, leases are different from permits and use 
fees because leases are staked to a property value and are intended to respond to property 
markets. Practically, they operated similarly, but ideologically, the distinction was vital. 
The USDA and the forest service learned about leasing in part by observing the sheep 
industries of Australia and New Zealand. On the American forest reserves, most experts and 
bureaucrats believed the single biggest problem was sheep. Most sheep in the west migrated 
into the forests for cooler high-altitude conditions every summer, and they would travel in 
huge herds of thousands of head. Western cattlemen did a good job of convincing eastern 
elites that sheep and sheep producers deserved all the blame for the social violence and 
ecological destruction that followed. By 1914, forest rangers had already been chasing sheep 
out of the reserves for over a decade, which caused a decline of almost 14 million sheep in 
the US since 1900. The forest service did this on purpose for conservation and social 
stability, but the USDA still worried about the consequences for the price of wool, so it sent 
F.R. Marshall, a senior expert for the bureau of animal industry, across the Pacific Ocean to 
find out why “in New Zealand and Australia sheep raising is considered to be a safe and 
profitable business, and except for seasonal conditions the number of sheep is kept steadily 
increasing.”168 
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Marshall discovered that people down under—even cattlemen—did not hate sheep 
the way they did in the United States. Everywhere Marshall looked, sheep and cattle were 
safely enclosed in fenced paddocks, and, in fact, Australia ranged nearly twice as many sheep 
as the US without serious social or ecological conflict. “The settled land policy of the 
Australian States has given their pastoralists an advantage not yet known in the United 
States,” explained Marshall, and “it may be said for that country as a whole that there is no 
open land and no conflict in the use of public grazing lands.” The advantage was long-term 
leasing, which “gives a degree of permanency to pastoral operations, the lack of which is 
largely responsible for continuing many western American flocks upon a ‘fly-by-night’ 
basis.” Leasing also enabled all sorts of capital incentives including investment in fences, 
wells, and breeding, which meant sheep were better adapted to specific land conditions. 
Finally, Marshall explained that leases were “subject to periodic revaluations for 
readjustment of rents” by the government, and if it needed to terminate a lease for 
conservation or to settle more homesteads, the lessee would “receive compensation for 
improvements left upon the land relinquished,” thereby completing the property feedback 
loop.169 Leasing promised all the good—efficiency, sustainability, productivity—without the 
bad—competition, ecological degradation, monopolization. It was capital harmonized. 
However, the leasing systems of Australia and New Zealand did not originate in 
capitalist values the way they would ultimately be applied in the United States. Leasing 
actually came from the British state’s long tradition of jealous land control and management 
since enclosure. If the American state’s power came from its abundance of available land, 
then the British state’s power came from strictly controlling its own lack thereof. Unlike in 
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the United States, where free land became the basis of the nation’s most enduring political 
tradition, the British state found unrestricted access to crown land intolerable. When British 
subjects began re-settling the Australasian continent in the early nineteenth century, the state 
ordered colonial officials to restrict access to open lands and to uphold a British system of 
land tenure.170 Australian settlers like Americans still tried to occupy and claim lands 
illegally, but the state never neglected the issue as in the US. Leasing was the legacy not of 
careful, rational consideration of free enterprise, as Marshall portrayed it, but rather the result 
of a very un-American form of state centrism. 
Leasing could be seen either way: as an application of market principles or as state 
intervention and centralization. The forest service embodied the paradox as a highly statist 
and technocratic agency motivated by efficiency and productivity, and the Organic Act gave 
it the flexibility and authority to erect a leasing system, so the agency imposed leasing on the 
forest reserves readily and relatively easily. The bigger question would be whether leasing 
would apply to the vast majority of public grazing lands outside the forest reserves. This 
would take an act of Congress, and, as it turned out, a lot more input from American cattle 
ranchers. 
 “We endorse the principle that the United States should receive payment for the use 
of any or all of its public lands,”171 proclaimed Harry Lee on behalf of American ranchers, 
but neither Lee nor his predecessors could ever seem to agree with the state on what the 
payment should be. The majority of disputes between ranchers and public lands agencies 
since the Taylor Act were not actually about conservation itself—fundamentally both groups 
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agreed on the philosophy of market-based sustainability—but rather about how to implement 
conservation. Specifically, what price would optimize the stability, incentives, and project 
funding in the interest of conservation? Too high, and ranchers would not have the ability to 
re-invest in improvements; too low, and the range managers would have no money for their 
improvements. How could they find the optimal market price, when the public lands had no 
free market?  
Practically speaking, the goal of making the public lands operate like private lands 
without privatization was impossible. As a consequence, grazing fees remained too low on 
both the forest reserves and the public domain. Or rather, economists and bureaucrats all 
seemed to agree that the fees were too low, but they did not actually know by how much. The 
fees were low mostly because the USDA and DOI set them that way without much 
consideration in the 1930s. By the 1960s, it became clear that the forest service and BLM had 
really messed up the fee structure, and they tried to reform it. Cattle ranchers resisted. 
The forest service tried to stake its fees to the market value of the land, but found it 
harder done than said. In 1958, the forest service charged 58 cents per animal unit month 
(AUM) for cattle grazing in the forest reserves. The forest service determined that number 
with this formula: 
14.5¢   =     Xt     OR   Xt=0.0219Pt-1 
$6.62          Pt-1 
 
Xt = The fee per AUM (or cow month) in year t in cents. 
Pt-1 = The previous year’s farm price for beef cattle in the west as compiled and published by the 
USDA. 
14.5¢ = The forest service’s baseline fee per cow month from 1927. 
$6.62 = The average farm price for beef from 1921-1930.172 
																																																						
172 B. D. Gardner, “The Pricing of Livestock Forage on Federal Range Lands,” in “Economics of Range and 
Multiple Land Use, Conference Proceedings, Committee on Economics of Range Use and Development of the 
Western Agricultural Economics Research Council, Pullman, Washington, August 11 and 12, 1958, Logan, 
Utah, July 13 and 14, 1959,” 106. 
		
95	
 
Reasonable people could call this needlessly complex or unjustifiably simple, but what 
matters is that the only independent variable is the price of beef. What this means is that the 
forest service locked-in a fee formula that tied the cost of grazing land to the value of the 
cattle grazing it. The price of land was only tied to the value of the land itself in an indirect 
way. It sort of makes sense to assess the value of grazing land by its economic output in 
cattle, but beef markets and land markets do not actually move together. Further, the fee 
would be forever tagged to a number picked in 1927 before the cost of conservation included 
concerns about wildlife or wetlands, etc. 
The fees the BLM charged did not even begin to fulfill the promise of running the 
public lands like private property because the agency did not have any sort of market-based 
formula for assessing fees. Rather, the agency estimated its minimum administrative 
requirements for the year and divvied up the costs among users. In 1958, the cost of funding 
the BLM was a bargain at just nineteen cents per cow month. Within the ideology of market-
based conservation, the BLM fees were absurd both for how exceedingly low they were and 
for how completely arbitrary they were. The BLM fee system actually harkened back to the 
debates on the Taylor Act, during which Ickes tried to curry favour with stock growers by 
promising only to charge enough to cover bureaucratic costs, which ended up being even 
lower than he could have expected then due to Carpenter’s use of advisory boards.  
In 1961, the BLM adopted a similar formula to the USFS, and in a letter to permittees 
explaining the change, the agency emphasized the ease, flexibility, and fairness of linking 
fees to beef rather than land values.173 Despite the obvious disconnect between the ideology 
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of market-based conservation and the specific mechanism of these fee formulas, the 
alternative would be exceedingly difficult to implement. There were at least three major 
obstacles to a fee staked directly to land value: first, collecting the data; second, correcting 
the data; and third, accounting for the already-established legacies of low fees.  
The Forest Service’s formula had a lot to do with the relative availability of data on 
cattle prices versus land prices. Cattle were a commodity, so it was easy to determine the 
average price. In fact, the USDA already did exactly that and published the data regularly. 
Land values necessarily varied depending on a property’s land quality, physical plant, and 
proximity to other places and things. Even if the state could compile an average market value 
for grazing land from the privately-owned ranches of the west, the agency would have to 
correct it for application to public lands allotments because they did not have all the stuff 
(like houses, corrals, watering facilities, etc.) that contributed to private land values. And 
even if the agencies could figure that much out, they would still have to assess the possible 
values from uses other than grazing like recreation and wildlife, which would send them right 
back to making numbers up. “I believe many of the uses are substitutes, i.e., an increase in 
one use at the same time precludes an increase in a competing use,” explained Delworth 
Gardner, an economist who was critical of what he called the “misallocation” of resources on 
the public lands. Gardner argued that determining how to pick the optimal use was “difficult 
in an economic sense, because in many uses we are out of the area of the market,” and since 
these uses did not have established dollar metrics, achieving “economic ‘efficiency’ in the 
use of the land becomes an unmeasurable magnitude.”174 This is what the public lands 
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agencies faced when they decided to try to restructure grazing fees around land values 
instead of cattle prices or administrative costs. 
The third obstacle came from the fact that grazing permits were already attached to 
private land values unintentionally. In the application of the Organic Act and Taylor Act on 
the public domain and forest reserves, the BLM and USFS inadvertently gave public lands a 
market value that was completely separate from the mechanism (fees) that was supposed to 
do that. Basically, for ease and political legitimacy, both agencies began to favour issuing 
grazing permits to ranchers who had a historical claim to grazing in the region and who 
owned a ranch adjacent to the reserved government land. Gardner argued in 1959 that these 
practices were institutionalized, and he called them “commensurability” and “priority of 
use.” The consequence of commensurabilty (the tying of a permit to a private ranch) was that 
the value of the permit became included in the value of the private ranch unit when it was 
bought or sold, and priority of use (or the de facto permanent ownership of a permit) meant 
that ranchers could use their permits when assessing property values to take out bank 
loans.175 
In other words, public lands did actually have a market value, but the money was 
flowing between ranchers and banks (as happens with markets) and not to the state for 
conservation. Further, this value relied on fees remaining low, and it led to serious resistance 
by ranchers against raising grazing fees.176 
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The forest service and later the BLM worked to establish a new “fair market value” 
(FMV) fee structure based on a comparison with real rents for privately-owned grazing lands. 
Cattle ranchers and their associations resisted and ultimately delayed FMV until the late 
1970s, but by then environmentalists had come to oppose FMV, and ranchers switched 
opinion and fought for the FMV formula. NCA executive Bill Swan, in particular, helped 
establish FMV in law with his work on the Public Rangelands Improvement Act in 1978.177 
The land management agencies and stock associations’ relationships were fluid. The next 
chapter discusses the ideological breakdown of market conservation for American 
rangelands.  
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3: Original Environmentalists 
“There is only so much room on spaceship earth,” warned a 1976 memorandum to the 
members of the American National Cattlemen’s Association (NCA), “so, as population 
doubles over the next 50 years, optimum use of all available resources will become critical.” 
The NCA lamented overgrazing and other land abuses by American ranchers in the past, but 
the memo assured members that “this type of problem was corrected with the advent of 
Forest Service administration and the passage of the Taylor Grazing Act,” and “it is now 
common knowledge that proper livestock grazing is compatible with and complementary to 
other uses of the land resources.”178 This optimistic memo went out just three years before 
the Sagebrush Rebellion—a widespread revolt against the principles and practices of 
environmentalism and federal land management by a wide array of public lands users in the 
West including cattle ranchers. 
Why did American ranchers believe they would be incorporated into modern 
environmentalism, and why did they think sustainable conservation of the public domain 
would still include livestock grazing? The passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 and the 
Sagebrush Rebellion forty-five years later were both tipping points in the history of grazing 
land use in the United States that marked the beginning and end of a half-century of market 
cooperation between land users, federal land managers, policymakers, and the public on both 
public and private lands conservation. In the period before, American rangelands degenerated 
under ecological and social chaos. In the period following, political division over 
environmentalism and the new environmentalists plunged the West again into turmoil. But in 
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1976, even the leaders of the NCA did not predict that ranchers would abandon their 
environmental strategy and turn against organizations like the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM) or United States Forest Service (USFS) so suddenly. 
Rancher conservation motivated meaningful advances of sustainable land use in the 
mid-twentieth century, and before the Sagebrush Rebellion it held the potential to dominate 
cattlemen’s thinking on the subject. The basic focus on securing tenure, incentivizing 
conservation, and collaborating on implementation was not fundamentally different from the 
best conservation theories and programs today, and it worked well until the mid-1970s.179 
The ideological consensus around conservation and the stability of the market for grazing on 
public lands because new ideas and organizations challenged the rules. The 1897 Organic 
Act and 1934 Taylor Grazing Act were loose institutions that relied on norms and customs 
worked out on the ground. This is exactly what made them functional and satisfying to both 
ranchers and regulators, but it also made them subject to unforeseen pressure from 
environmental groups. 
Environmentalism destroyed the conservation consensus and caused chaos in the 
market for grazing privileges on public lands. This is not to say environmentalism was bad or 
even that it was wrong—cattle have certainly caused ecological decline in many places 
across the United States during certain historical periods—but it is possible that 
environmentalists and grasslands ecologists of the time did not have a sound scientific case 
against public lands grazing, writ large.180 In any case, ranchers, who came to oppose 
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environmentalism and federal conservation regulation, focused on a few particularly bad 
cases of their application. Environmentalists, including many within the federal government 
bureaucracy, have viewed ranchers’ opposition to wilderness and stock reductions as 
behaviour motivated by greed and poor scientific understanding or ecological values. But 
ranchers were justified in questioning why land that had been grazed for a century and 
thoroughly transformed from its former state should be re-labeled “wilderness” or why cattle 
populations that had already been tremendously reduced from nineteenth-century levels 
should be smaller still. The political and social disharmony that arose between 
environmentalists, ranchers, and the State ensured that these questions would not be 
answered properly. 
Swan’s Song 
Regulated, rancher-led, market-incentivized conservation proved a huge success in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Government land managers and private cattle producers coordinated 
efforts at fencing; mechanical brush removal; aerial grass reseeding; pesticide and herbicide 
application; stock rotation; and a host of other practices understood as “improving” the 
range.181 One such practice was “chaining,” which entailed using tractors to pull a huge steel 
chain with a massive ball at one end as a weight. The chain would rip invasive and 
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undesirable woody shrubs from the dirt, which could be reseeded with grass, thus reversing 
the effects of a century of overgrazing. The balls were actually military surplus from the 
Second World War originally used as floats by the US Navy. Herculean efforts like this were 
only possible, many believed, with a strong incentive for ranchers to participate in the long-
term future of the land as well as the expertise and materiel of the US federal government. 
As leases, advisory boards, and multiple use provided the ideology and mechanisms 
for market-based conservation of the public lands, the American state sometimes extended 
the same principles to land management programs directed at private lands. The most 
significant program, the Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP), offered USDA 
technical assistance and cost assistance for long-term conservation plans. Cattlemen 
responded enthusiastically by supporting the program publically and by enrolling in 
significant numbers. The GPCP, like public lands leasing, aimed to incentivize conservation 
as a mechanism for economic stability. Another program enabled the state to buy over-
worked private croplands and convert them into grazing range for leasing. These formerly 
private lands became the “National Grasslands,” which the forest service administered under 
multiple use. Ironically then, for much of the first half of the twentieth century the state and 
ranchers tried to make public lands operate like private property, and in the second half of the 
century they tried to make private lands operate like the public domain. 
The National Grasslands originated in the environmental and economic crisis of the 
1930s. In the throes of the Dust Bowl and depression, Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones 
Act of 1935 to enable the federal government to buy degraded farmlands with the dual 
purpose of providing for their recovery and removing land from production to help raise farm 
prices. The USDA created the soil conservation service (SCS) to administer the lands, and 
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the SCS converted the over-worked croplands into rangelands by planting new grasses or 
allowing natural succession, and it set up land utilization projects (LUPs) as models of 
sustainable land management on the plains. In 1954, the USDA named the rangelands the 
national grasslands and transferred them to the forest service for management under multiple 
use.182 
Another major drought and market crash in 1953 provoked the creation of the GPCP 
in 1956. The program aimed specifically to improve conservationist land management as a 
means to stabilize agriculture. The program offered USDA cost sharing of 50-80% on any 
projects deemed to improve and sustain soil quality. The most desirable projects for ranchers 
included reseeding damaged rangelands; planting dependable forage species; drilling wells 
and laying water pipe to help spread out livestock; fencing for rotation grazing; and brush 
control such as using heavy machinery to remove cactus. Ranchers who enrolled would sign 
a three to ten year long contract with the USDA and agree to a management plan for the 
whole ranch which often involved planting windbreaks (rows of trees to prevent dust), 
erosion controls, and “Permitting grazing animals to take no more than half the forage 
produced in a growing season.”183 
The GPCP and national grasslands were hugely popular with cattle ranchers in the 
plains states, which produced between a third and a half of American beef cattle from the 
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1950s to 1970s.184 In 1979, during the second extension of the GPCP, James A. Dickinson of 
the NCA’s private lands and water usage committee told Congress that the “NCA believes 
that the GPC Program is a model for sound conservation of land and water resources in this 
Nation.” Dickinson cited both the many successes of the program (farmers and ranchers had 
singed nearly 60,000 conservation contracts) as well the serious number of projects still to do 
(as many as 5,000 contracts pending to cover 15 million acres) as evidence of the 
overwhelming need to extend the duration of the program. Dickinson further argued 
“Expansion of the program coupled with the innovative incentive techniques such as are 
employed in programs used on the National Grasslands” to areas outside the Great Plains 
ought to merit Congress’ “serious consideration.”185 In a public speech the same year, 
Dickinson also took some credit on behalf of ranchers for making the GPCP a “significant 
contribution to humanity” through “constant and diligent stewardship,” which was true 
because their voluntary involvement made the program a success.186 
Both the national grasslands and the GPCP allegedly responded to the special case of 
the Great Plains. USDA literature highlighted the unique environmental hazards of the region 
formerly called the “great American desert,” which were “dramatized by the Dust Bowl 
days” and the “filthy fifties.”187 Dickinson agreed: “Not too many folks are aware that the 
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Great Plains is an area of unstable climate characterized by bitter cold, searing heat, drought 
and erosive winds.”188 In this analysis it is obvious why ranchers on the plains would seek 
help from the SCS. 
But ranchers also had much to lose from programs like the GPCP and national 
grasslands. Under the GPCP cattlemen gave up a lot of flexibility to manage their property. 
In addition to direct government intervention on land use decisions, ranchers could not sell a 
property under contract unless the buyer agreed to take on the GPCP plan or they paid the 
USDA back for all the improvements. More importantly, both programs aimed to improve 
soil quality by converting degraded croplands into grasslands, and both programs eventually 
allowed for grazing on converted rangelands. In the hearings on the creation of the GPCP, a 
Congressman from Utah asked the assistant secretary of agriculture if there were any 
“assurances we can give our cattle people that this will not just be a measure to produce more 
cattle and further depress the price of livestock.” There were not, even though the USDA 
billed the whole program as a way to stabilize agriculture. Ultimately, cattle ranchers got 
behind the GPCP because the gains in material assistance outweighed the cons of losing full 
property rights.189 Overall, the blurring of private and public property lines on all grazing 
lands of the United States was remarkable. 
Bill Swan in his career was a rancher, chairman of the Public Lands Council 
(representing 27,000 public lands users), president of the NCA, a member of the USDA 
National Forest System Advisory Committee, and advisor to four secretaries of agriculture. 
																																																						
Accomplishment, SCS national Bulletin No. 300-2-7, 24 November 1981, Accessed from USDA Natural 
Resources Conservation Service website. 
188 Dickinson, “Statement […],” 1979, Folder 5, Box 666, NCA, AHC. 
189 “Great Plains Conservation Program, Hearing before the Committee on Agriculture […],” 84th Cong. 2nd 
Sess. (28 June 1956), 22. 
		
106	
Swan was a passionate and careful advocate of ranchers’ interests within multiple use and the 
economic model of conservation, and he worked very closely with Congress to pass the 
Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978.190 Swan, like most ranchers, disliked 
environmentalists and the environmental movement, but his distaste came not only from the 
usual disgust with yappy eastern tenderfoots, but also from his conviction that so-called 
environmentalists were weaker and less rational conservationists than ranchers. That said, 
Swan’s conservation philosophy was not isolated from modern environmentalism. His 
analysis fell squarely within the multiple use framework, but he still seriously considered the 
new categories that environmentalists brought to the discussion, like energy, wetlands, and 
landscape. Swan demonstrates that rancher conservation came from genuine faith that 
cattlemen and free capitalism valued and cared for the land. 
Swan’s understanding of the environment and land use straddled the middle of the 
spectrum representing ranchers’ conservationist appeals. On one end of the spectrum was the 
rare and paradoxical rancher, who was also an un-qualified preservationist. One example was 
Douglas T. Simpson of Utah, who wrote in to the hearings on the Multiple Use – Sustained 
Yield Act (MUSY) in 1960 to emphasize his support of multiple use as a way to have 
grazing and wilderness, too. Simpson had a permit to run his cattle in the Uinta forests, but 
he also liked going into the forest’s “primitive area” without his stock to camp, hunt, and 
fish. Simpson was both President of the Utah Farmers Union and the Kamas Wildlife 
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Association, and he categorically opposed privatization of public lands or transfer to the 
states.191 
On the other end of the spectrum were ranchers who twisted conservationist values to 
defend ranchers’ interests without any real conservation content. In a statement on proposed 
wilderness legislation from 1957, Radford Hall, secretary of the ANCA, used multiple use as 
a benchmark to ridicule the philosophy of wilderness protection. Hall reiterated a common 
complaint that wilderness legislation represented a move towards single use or, as he put it, 
an “effort on the part of a selfish few to […] forever lock up all the other resources in order 
that the visionary values placed by some people on ‘unspoiled nature’ shall be available to 
them and them only.” For Hall, “use” meant “commodity production,” so he could write 
conservation out entirely. Appealing to an alternate vision of wilderness, Hall also tried to 
describe a land without ranchers on the lookout as a biblical wasteland. Hall cited anecdotes 
about accidents that ranchers had stopped to cast “the wilderness” without them as a place of 
dying damsels and exploding grass (because un-grazed grass gets too big, and then it gets 
struck by lightning and blows up!). Hall’s case was creative and well-argued within the terms 
of the debate, but it was in the end a farce.192 
Bill Swan held the more realistic and defensible position of a bona fide rancher, who 
did prefer cows to birds, but who also genuinely valued conservation and believed ranchers 
and federal land managers could do it. By the late 1970s, Swan’s beliefs were on the verge of 
dominating the cattlemen’s ideas at the national level—in fact, Swan would be named 
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President of the NCA in 1981—and they represented the highest promise of rancher 
conservation before the Sagebrush Rebellion. Swan claimed to be an environmentalist, and, 
like Simpson, he really meant it, but whereas Simpson was an environmentalist and a 
rancher, Swan was an environmentalist because he was a rancher.  
Swan declared his priorities in 1978: “I am a cattle rancher, but first I am an 
environmentalist, because I make my living from the environment. If I don’t manage it well 
and use it wisely, it will not be available for me tomorrow. Secondly, I am an ecologist. If I 
don’t understand the ecological needs of the plants that make up my range, I cannot manage 
the land wisely.” In this way Swan built on the fundamental and long-standing argument that 
ranchers had a clear and necessary incentive in conservation of resources, and he continued: 
“Thirdly, I am a conservationist. In this day of energy crisis when we finally are realizing 
that we live on a finite planet and that our resources are limited, we will have to rely more 
and more on our renewable (and I stress the word renewable) natural resources for the 
production of food. […] Fourth, I am a cattle rancher, and with my cattle I convert grass into 
a source of protein that is necessary for human life.” In this second half of the case, Swan 
articulated an argument that public lands ranching was in and of itself conservationist in the 
big picture. He pointed out that whatever the immediate problems of overgrazing, grain 
feeding required heavy combustion of fossil fuels, and cattle on rangelands were there to 
convert the solar energy stored in grass into protein “to feed a hungry world” in the cleanest 
way possible.193 
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Swan believed that the American food system had made tremendous gains, but at the 
expense of excessive pressure on fossil fuels and commercial fertilizers. In a statement that 
sounds eerily contemporary, he suggested trying to make meat with even less grain (up to 
then almost all insiders and observers pushed greater grain feeding) by “using native 
rangelands more wisely” and maximizing “its most plentiful renewable resource—grass.” 
Swan cited USDA reports that implied a comprehensive management system could increase 
forage and livestock production alongside even greater protection of water and (some) 
wildlife. “Livestock grazing and strategic manipulation of vegetation on watersheds have 
been shown to increase forage production, soil protection, and yield of high quality water,” 
Swan explained, “Grazing systems that improve cover enhance food supply and provide 
habitat requirements for successful breeding benefiting many wildlife species.” Swan put it 
succinctly, “I believe that if we manage range for maximum livestock production under 
sound scientific principles, we automatically enhance the other values.”194 These arguments 
were not exactly new, since ranchers regularly appealed to conservation, but Swan put a new 
favourable emphasis on non-rancher science as a way to help. 
In fact, what Swan disliked most about environmentalists was their disrespect not 
only of ranchers but of federal land managers and conservation range science generally, as he 
saw it. In an essay for Rangelands magazine, Swan complained that “too many people, 
especially from the environmental community, criticize the BLM and the Forest Service for 
their management of the public rangelands.” Swan believed these “self-appointed critics” 
ignored the agencies’ important funding limitations and had no sense of “how bad conditions 
actually were” before forest rangers and BLM agents began dedicating their lives to the 
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problem. Swan worried that “the scientist has given way to the lawyer, the judge, and the 
environmentalist,” and as a result conservation and “proper use” were becoming synonymous 
with blanket principles (like rest-rotation) instead of tailored analysis of site-specific 
conditions. Swan liked rest-rotation a lot and used it on his own lands, but it was not 
necessary on every ranch. This was the case for many important methods including select use 
of herbicides, controlled burning, reseeding, and riparian zone (streambanks) conservation, 
all of which could and should be used when beneficial. Swan made a strong case that to 
accomplish this, cattlemen needed to “insist on increased budgets for research” on all fronts, 
and that the state had to encourage ranchers to spend even more “private money to 
implement range improvements.” Swan declared the threat of creating a vested property right 
legally dead, so there was no reason not to create a good investment “climate.”195 In other 
words, you fund the research, and we will fund its application. 
In the end, Swan even tried to broker a limited peace with environmentalists and 
ranchers’ other “urban neighbors.” Swan announced that despite environmentalists’ 
opposition to rancher-led conservation plans like the Public Rangelands Improvement bill in 
the past, he believed “we cattlemen are willing to let bygones be bygones.” Apparently Swan 
even told the DOI that the cattlemen wanted to present “a united front” with environmental 
groups to help get more funding allocations for conservation. Swan first presented his 
Rangelands article as a public talk, and he got a question from the director of the California 
department of conservation about why the public should prioritize funding for conservation 
of grazing lands any more than they had in the past. Swan’s answer spoke to the history of 
grazing regulation. He claimed that the Taylor Act provided only for interim conservation 
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under the expectation that the public lands would be transferred to users eventually. 
Therefore, conservation had largely been ranchers’ responsibility under the Taylor regime. 
The BLM Organic Act of 1976 announced the intention to continue federal ownership and 
control indefinitely, so Swan argued it was now time for the public to start helping ranchers 
with conservation. “You’ve decided you are going to be our ‘landlords’; now assume your 
responsibilities as ‘landlords’.”196 Swan’s case was a far cry from the tenants’ revolt (or 
Sagebrush Rebellion) that began that same year. 
Multiple Wisdoms 
Rancher conservation fell apart and grazing access to public lands became chaotic 
and contested because new ideas put pressure on the rules established by the Taylor Grazing 
Act and the other regulatory institutions that proceeded and flowed from it. Ranchers and 
government bureaucrats designed the regulated market for grazing on public lands to respond 
to the ideas of interest groups. They wanted it that way, and it worked, because the only 
interested parties were ranchers. This arrangement enabled decades of cooperation and 
consensus on the meaning of conservation, but it also produced a flaw in the system that let 
new ideas and groups in. Debates over the concept of “multiple use” capture well the way 
uses became legitimated and delegitimized over time. 
The multiple use concept posited that there existed many legitimate ways to use the 
public domain and forest reserves, and the goal on any given piece of public land was to 
identify the use or complimentary uses that would maximize value output (within the 
confines of long-term sustainability, of course).197 On the one hand, it became very easy to 
																																																						
196 Swan, “Some Grassroots […],” (1979), 96. 
197 Mary A. Yeager, “Multiple Use and Abuse: The U.S. Forest Service and the Problems of Government,” 
Reviews in American History 5, no. 4 (1977), 485-495.; Donald J. Pisani, “A Conservation Myth: The Troubled 
Childhood of the Multiple-Use Idea,” Agricultural History 76, no. 2 (2002), 154-171. 
		
112	
argue that grazing was necessarily the best use of rangelands, but on the other hand, multiple 
use legitimated recreation and wilderness preservation in the bureaucracy (as opposed to just 
in the environmental movement). Multiple use was never especially well-defined, and it has 
been much maligned by environmentalists due to its favouritism for cattle, but it is also 
exactly what allowed them into the debate in the first place. 
Multiple use was both an adaptation of and a rejoinder to wise use—the land 
philosophy coined and applied by the forest service in earlier land management projects and 
policies.198 Proponents of wise use in the early twentieth century argued that land use, 
especially on public lands, required external regulation and management by strong 
autonomous state organizations to ensure the long-term health of the range both 
economically and ecologically. Wise use relied on experts—often university-educated, 
always elite—to study land and resource use and make informed recommendations about 
how to improve on a broad, general scale, which state-empowered officials (called rangers) 
could implement and enforce in each case. In practice, the distinctions between experts and 
rangers and between scientific and local knowledge blurred, but the theory itself was boldly 
elitist and technocratic. Though its proponents and adherents often held a Jeffersonian vision 
for the west, wise use itself was the exact negation of the Jeffersonian ideal. 
At face value, multiple use was a reaction to and rejection of the technocratic ideal 
embedded in early land management policies. It was, but it also built on the core values of 
wise use. Stockmen disliked the implication that they were un-wise and that they were what 
needed to be regulated, but wise use in practice was not fundamentally hostile to grazing. 
Multiple use codified the value for resource extraction that already motivated wise use 
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implicitly. Multiple use idealized a working partnership between land users and state 
managers that already existed for pragmatic reasons. Critics argue that it gave too much 
authority in shaping regulation to the regulated themselves, and at times that certainly 
resulted, but there is also a sense in which it would have been absurd not to. The vast 
majority of Americans who cared at all about what happened on western public lands were 
ranchers, and most of them cared about land conservation on some level. Some cared a lot, in 
fact. And multiple use, despite what its critics said, was explicitly conservationist. Whether 
this was a compromise or not was irrelevant—it still affirmed conservation as a fundamental 
value. 
The most important innovation of the multiple use concept was in how it reframed the 
regulatory relationship. Wise use clearly meant that the state should regulate ranchers. 
multiple use suggested that the state, ranchers, and other land users—including 
recreationists—should work together to regulate land use more broadly. Rhetorically it may 
indeed have diluted conservationism by adding things like food production, income creation, 
and cultural longevity to the list of core values, but it also changed the meaning of 
conservation to something broader. Under wise use, conservation meant sustaining land for 
the purpose of maximum resource productivity over the longest duration (preservationism 
was strictly excluded). Conservation was not hostile to capitalist principles—it was merely 
the perfection of them. Under multiple use, conservation became itself one of the uses of the 
land distinct from productive extraction. It was under this philosophy that the USDA and 
DOI expanded game reserves, wildlife protection, recreation facilities, etc. Conservation 
became more than a means to an end alone. Multiple use eventually became problematic not 
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because it excluded environmentalism, but rather because it did create space for 
environmentalists in a way that wise use would not have. 
American cattle ranchers actually had little role in shaping the multiple use 
philosophy because they already took it as a given. Multiple use emerged in a vague sense 
early at the beginning of the twentieth century in forest and water management ideas and 
policies, and it first became significant as a fundamental management principle in the mid-
1950s in debates about timber production and conservation on the forest reserves. The 
philosophy spread immediately to grazing lands and became hugely popular with both land 
users and the wider public in the 1950s and 1960s. Well before it gained any legal weight, 
multiple use became a benchmark for evaluating public lands policy. In addition, the concept 
held no threat for ranchers as it did for foresters because, at the time, recreationists—
including hunters, campers, wildlife viewers, etc.—wanted access to America’s forests, not 
its open grassy plains. One could be forgiven after reading materials on the subject for 
coming to the conclusion that people in the 1950s did not know wildlife could live on 
grasslands. 
Although the principles behind multiple use developed naturally out of administrative 
practices in the DOI, technically the forest service was the key architect of multiple use as an 
official policy. The forest service supported codifying the concept in law, since it would map 
onto existing administrative practices easily, and they saw the agency’s role in it as a 
middleman or “public interest negotiator,” which would deflect mounting criticism from all 
angles.199 It represented a significant step back from the forest service’s favoured role as 
technocratic leader in Pinchot’s term. The original “multiple-use” bills of 1954 and 1955 
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came from conservationists, who wanted to break the timber industry’s privileged access. 
The timber industry did not oppose it outright, but rather tried to get a hierarchy of uses with 
timber on top built back in. The forest service played the middle accusing timber of 
advocating “overuse” and the conservationists of really wanting “single use” for 
recreation.200  
The final bill that became the Multiple Use – Sustained Yield (MUSY) Act of 1960 
garnered massive hearings with testimony from a large group of interests, but it was not 
controversial, especially not with stock raisers.201 It was an “odd situation,” as historian Paul 
Hirt explains, “in which no one could afford to really oppose a bill providing for multiple 
use.”202 Multiple Use basically just meant that timber, range, watersheds, wildlife, and 
recreation all had to be considered and allowed for in management policies. Multiple use fed 
off the power of any argument for equality in American politics, but the lack of outrage also 
meant a lack of enthusiasm. Between the success of the Granger-Thye Act and the failure of 
the Uniform Grazing bill, stock raisers saw nothing to gain or lose from the legislation.203  
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Ranchers, to the extent that they participated, lent support to the bill. The Paseyton 
Cattlemen’s Association and Pine Creek Cattle Association, both from Washington, wrote 
letters to the MUSY hearings urging the bill’s passage, which they saw as doing the forest 
service a favour.204 The cattlemen’s official representative at the hearings praised multiple 
use saying, “We feel that multiple use has furthered true conservation,” but his only 
suggestion for the law was that “range” be replaced with “grazing.”205 The small critique 
came from a plausible fear that rangelands could be used for things other than grazing, but 
the stockmen were correct that range is a type of land or resource—not a “use.” In fact, 
watersheds and wildlife are not uses either. Range stayed, so the only actual uses mentioned 
were timber production and recreation. The irony of cattlemen’s lukewarm support of the 
MUSY Act was that it did not come from discomfort with the concept, but rather from the 
recognition that multiple use concepts already dictated management across the public 
lands.206 
The Sagebrush Rebellion marked the end of rancher conservation. The Sagebrush 
Rebellion was a broad political revolt against conservation and federal land management on 
public lands in the American West. A critical view recorded: “The Sagebrush Rebels are the 
most recent in a series of covetous groups bent on ‘regaining’ what was never theirs.”207 It 
was dramatic, and received the overt support of Ronald Reagan, but its extent and effects are 
neither uniform nor clear. Some ranchers played a leading role in the movement, but it was 
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probably more significant and representative of the interests in forestry and mining.208 The 
event was, however, part of an ideological shift among ranchers. In the lead up to the actual 
“rebellion” in 1979-80, ranchers focused on a widening list of conservation projects that hurt 
cattle producers. Some of the “environmental” projects that ranchers brought up most often 
were especially ungrounded in any scientific, ecological understanding, and they highlight 
why ranchers never accepted the moral or intellectual superiority of the environmental 
movement. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Wild and Free Roaming 
Horse and Burro Act (WFRHB) were two examples of bad rules that helped undermine 
ranchers’ faith in conservation. 
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) was introduced in the early 1960s and 
earned the intense chagrin of Western cattle producers. The CRP was a USDA project that 
paid farmers to take overworked cropland out of rotation. The program promised to rectify 
ecological problems like soil erosion as well as mitigate chronic overproduction in corn. In 
1963, the program covered about twenty-five million acres, and policymakers wanted to 
encourage its expansion by allowing farmers to start running cattle on grain-conservation 
lands.209 In some ways, this was ranchers’ insistence on the sustainability of grazing coming 
back to bite them. Ranchers were mortified by the proposal, since it meant all these cattle 
would enter market at a heavily subsidized price, which could drive the market down. Further 
these grain farmers would already be collecting an income from corn and a subsidy for 
conservation, so they would have no incentive to plan against beef prices. All the farmers’ 
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cattle would be bonus cash, and they would have little incentive against dumping stock at 
low prices.210 
The Wild and Free-Roaming Horse and Burro Act (WFRHB) is a case of a cultural 
myth driving land use policy. Horses are not native to the American West, but they have been 
common since domesticated animals escaped from the Spanish in the 1500s. Although 
technically feral, wild Spanish horses or “mustangs” became an icon of the American West. 
The population of wild horses peaked in the early nineteenth century at around 2 to 7 million 
free-ranging animals. The population generally declined due to competition with cattle and 
crops, fencing off of habitat, and pest control by ranchers and farmers. The herd was also 
reduced to supply horses to the US military in the Spanish-American, Boer, and First World 
Wars. The herd was also often re-supplied. During the 1920s and 1930s, the first wave of 
mechanization of farm labor with tractors and then the farm crisis of the Great Depression 
led many farmers to simply release their horses out onto the range. During WW1, the 
military also released well-bred stallions to help improve the quality of the wild horses for 
possible later capture and use. The wild horse herd is therefore quite different from what is 
implied by “mustang.” 
The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 authorized the federal government to manage all 
ungulate grazing on public rangelands, and ultimately saddled the BLM with controlling the 
wild horse population. Large scale reductions occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s, driven 
partly by conservation ideas, partly by a market demand for horse flesh for pet food, and 
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mostly to remove a pest and competitor for cattle ranchers. The ranchers benefitted a lot from 
the mythic Wild West heritage, that they used to make claim to wide swaths of public lands 
on the grounds of historic use. But in this case, the mythic Wild West turned against them. 
Starting in the 1950s, people began to protest the inhumane treatment of the majestic 
American mustang by callous cattle barons and bureaucrats. Velma Johnson of Reno, 
Nevada, who was called “Wild Horse Annie,” led the driving force to protect wild horses in 
the West, and her intense dedication and broad support from other ex-urban, middle class 
Westerners led to the Passage of the WFRHB Act of 1971. It is interesting that burros made 
it in, too, since there were not many wild donkeys in the American West until late in the 19th 
century when mining declined. The Act declared wild horses and burros to be “living 
symbols of the historic and pioneer spirit of the West” and therefore could not be killed, 
captured, or harassed on the public domain. Ranchers were livid, and it was really hard for 
the BLM to do. The BLM was allowed to sell the horses under certain conditions, but the 
herd still became unwieldly for them. 
The WFRHB is a clear case of bad conservation. It was motivated by preservation, 
not sound ecosystem management. In 1971, there was very little biology research on wild 
horses, and the bill failed to account for the rate at which the animals increase. In 1971, there 
were 17,300 feral horses on public lands. In 1975, there were 50,000 feral horses and 5,000 
burros on public lands. In 2016, the BLM recorded 67,000 horses and burros. They exhibit 
annual population growth rates of up to 20%. Historically the herd has doubled every four 
years. The BLM had to use helicopters to round them up, and they sold them really cheap. It 
is estimated that subsidized adoption costs tens of millions of dollars to US taxpayers. 
Further, the BLM was not getting enough adoptions to prevent the herd from swelling, and 
		
120	
the ecological toll is intolerable, so they estimate that necessary off-range care will cost over 
a billion dollars in coming decades. Another problem is the BLM is not able to uphold the 
spirit of the law with its adoption program. It is estimated that 90% of rounded up horses 
eventually make it to slaughter. Wild Horse Annie’s organizations still fight for wild horses 
and burros. They oppose the BLM’s round-ups and they dispute they science saying the 
population is overgrazing. 
These are very select examples, and most conservation practices are good for the land 
and for the long-term health of cattle producing communities, but cases like these are 
important for understanding why cattle ranchers have become the enemies of 
environmentalists. Anti-conservation ranchers have grown more violent in recent years, and 
it is in the interest of all Americans to oppose this movement.211 Another movement 
advocates a return to “cooperative conservation” between ranchers and other land managers. 
The movement includes many scientists and other formerly opposed to grazing, who have 
reassessed their understanding of cattle and ranchers’ roles in “working landscapes.”212 This 
is a significant and welcome departure from the incendiary anti-cattle rhetoric of 1970s and 
1980s environmentalists.213 However, this new movement must be cautious not to repeat the 
failures of past rancher conservation efforts that relied on market production for stability. 
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The failure of rangelands conservation in the twentieth century was a failure of 
markets and ideology more than a failure of politics or bureaucracy. Conservation was one 
half of the stated goal of almost all public lands regulation and management (the other half 
was industrial stability, which many believed was basically the same thing), and the 
privatizing force on the forest reserves and public domain was ideologically and politically 
conservationist. Bureaucratically, advisory boards provided an intentional and rational role 
for land users within the state so that both could effectively determine and execute 
management goals. If you accepted that ranchers did not actually want to abuse and 
ultimately destroy rangelands, and American policymakers and bureaucratic experts did, then 
the system made sense. In fact, it is a testament to the strength of that part of the system that 
it actually sometimes even worked. Given the tendency of market forces towards instability 
and crisis and the broken application of market forces in the fee structure, what was most 
surprising about conservation values and grazing management on both public and private 
lands in the twentieth century was that they provided enough stability for some sustainable 
land use from the 1930s to the present. 
American cattle ranchers on both private and public lands made a good faith effort at 
an untenable vision of conservation. Although cattlemen had long-pushed for privatization of 
federally-owned lands, ranchers from the 1930s to the 1970s generally understood leasing 
under the Taylor Act as closer to—rather than farther from—property rights. Ranchers came 
to terms with central management and forged a place within it. The Sagebrush Rebellion 
marked a significant shift, when ranchers began calling again for privatization after thirty 
plus years of consensus around leasing.  
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Faith in cooperative conservation between ranchers and government land managers 
broke because the terms of conservation changed. Cattlemen could not believe that a new 
brand of environmentalists was once again accusing them of mismanaging the public 
domain, and they responded that the Taylor Act had incentivized sound management just like 
it was supposed to. Ranchers reduced stock numbers, controlled invasive weeds, and 
developed water resources. The NCA claimed that “before 1970, the livestock industry 
financed 75% of all range improvements on public lands.”214 In other words, cattlemen were 
conservationists as conservation was defined in the Taylor Act. It is not so much that the 
regulation failed, but rather that conservation changed to include non-marketable natural 
resources like wildlife and landscape. Even on the cusp of the Sagebrush Rebellion and the 
rise of anti-environmentalism in cattlemen’s associations in the 1980s, ranchers thought they 
could come to terms with environmentalists by appealing to their own commitment to its 
principles. 
Ranchers repeatedly responded to pressure from new environmentalists that 
American ranchers were the “original environmentalists.”215 By the 1980s, no one took that 
claim very seriously, but there was still truth in it. Ranchers learned to be environmentalists 
and anti-environmentalists in the twentieth century. Rancher conservation held meaningful 
promise in terms of its advocacy of sustainable land use, its recognition of the need for 
economic and social stability, and its focus on shared responsibility between ranchers and 
government land managers. Nevertheless, rancher conservation, and conservation generally, 
was flawed. No one involved fundamentally questioned the ability of capitalist ideals and 
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social relations to yield positive results—including sustainable land use. Free enterprise has 
rarely turned out well for the land, and this market-based conservation regime did what 
markets do: it failed. 
  
		
124	
 
 
Figure 10. “Summary Table 4--Total grazing land, by region and States, United States, 2007,” USDA ERS 
Major Land Uses Data Online. Graph by author. 
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Figure 11. “Grassland pasture and range (noncropland and nonforest), by region and States, United States, 
1945-2007,” USDA ERS Major Land Uses Data Online. Graph by author. 
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4. SUPPLY CHAIN FIGHTS 
In 1973, American ranchers experienced something they were not used to and were 
not prepared for—the vitriol of the American public. In the first half of the twentieth century, 
the cult of the Western cowboy swelled in the national psyche as cowboys rode steadily onto 
books, films, television sets, storefronts, and cigarette packs. Western American ranchers and 
even concentrated feedlot operators styled themselves as the heirs to America’s imagined 
cowboy past, and they benefited materially from the adoration of the public and especially 
the public’s representatives in Congress. But then, suddenly, women across the United States 
began hurling accusations that cattle producers were not good, white-hat, cowboys at all.216 
Rather, they were collusive, Cadillac-driving, corporate fat cats, who cared nothing for the 
nation’s women or children.217 In short, they were the kind of men that heroic movie 
cowboys dispensed with in the name of freedom, equality, and the American dream. The 
clash came over the price of beef, and it marked a fundamental turning point in the history of 
the American beef industry. Since then, there have been fewer Westerns on film and 
television, less beef on American plates, and fewer cattle on American rangelands. American 
cattlemen have never since had it so good as they thought they did in 1972. 
Beef prices in the United States are political, and at many times beef-price politics 
have become controversial and adversarial. But the ignition of passions, the reasons for 
revolt, the targets of attack, and the goals of political action have all changed over time 
depending on how the American beef supply chain worked, how people thought it worked, 
and how people thought it ought to work. Broadly speaking, the history of price conflict over 
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beef developed from ranchers and consumers versus meatpackers to consumers versus 
retailers to consumers versus ranchers ending where it began with a return to meatpacker 
dominance of the supply chain and pricing at all levels. According to historians of consumer 
politics, the period from the 1930s to the 1970s was a golden age of consumer citizenship 
and an important moment in the history of women’s political engagement, but this was also a 
politics that failed to produce a sustained consumer movement or a healthier food supply.218 
The 1973 boycott that helped break the beef industry was the highest point of consumer 
power in the beef economy, but it was also the last coordinated consumer action to make a 
real impact in the United States. The movement succeeded in producing and entrenching 
low-price food supply, but at the expense of continued consumer power. Cheap beef, the 
original goal of consumer activism, has become a Frankenstein’s monster for the social and 
physical well-being of a majority of the nation’s population and a growing number of people 
around the world. 
This chapter examines the United States beef supply chain, and how it changed over 
time due to pressure from different organizations. A supply chain is another way to observe 
markets by focusing on the flow of commodities from initial production to consumption and 
observing who participates and who controls transactions. In other words, who determines 
the price? The invisible-hand concept of supply and demand overlooks the importance of 
politics in many pricing situations, and politics were very important in the beef economy. 
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The formation of organizations by ranchers and consumers drove change in the structure of 
the beef industry during two important moments in the 1910s and 1970s, and women’s 
organizations became especially important in the later moment. However, the turning of 
ranchers and consumers against each other proved disastrous for the beef industry and 
ultimately both groups’ interests. In the periods before the 1910s and after the 1970s, the 
formation of large meatpacking corporations, another type of economic organization, enabled 
a relatively small group of men to capture the majority of profits and execute power across 
the supply chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. United States Beef Supply Chain, 1800-2000 
 
Producer	 	Processor/Manufacturer	 	Retailer	 	Consumer	
 
Figure 12.a: The general supply chain model. Arrows represent the flow of commodities. The model only 
depicts groups engaged directly in transactions of money for commodities. 
 
 
Farm	 	Abattoir	 	Butcher	 	Consumer		
	
 
Figure 12.b: The United States beef supply chain in 1800 (Simplified). Americans grew most of their beef on 
farms, many of which practiced mixed animal and crop husbandry. Cattle were non-specialized, meaning they 
could be for milk, meat, or labour. Abattoirs, or slaughterhouses, were generally small single-story operations 
that supplied butchers, but both farmers and butchers also slaughtered animals. The consumer in this case might 
even be the same farmer, who produced the beef. The model is highly simplified and mostly applies to the 
Anglo-American states of the East, and not to the Spanish colonies of the South and West. 
 
Rancher	  Meatpacker	 	Butcher/Meat	Market	 	Consumer		
 
Figure 12.c: The United States beef supply chain in 1900 (Simplified). By 1900, most American beef came 
from ranches, specialized beef operations, in the West and Midwest. Multi-story meatpacking factories replaced 
abattoirs and many butchers, and they performed an increasing number butchering tasks and produced an 
increasing number of commodities from cattle carcasses. Butchers and larger “Meat Markets” became primarily 
meat retailers. The model depicts the general nomenclature of the time to speak of industrial sectors and groups 
as individuals. 
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Breeder	 Supermarket	
	 	 			 	 		 	
Cow	Calf	Op.  Cattle	Feeding	 	Meatpacking	 	Meat	Retailer	 	Consumer	
(Ranch)	 Op.	(Feedlot)	 Plant	 (Butchershop)	
	 	 	 	 	
	 Corn	Farm		 Meat	Processing	&	 	Restaurants	
	 Distribution	Plant		 &	Hotels	
 
Figure 12.d: The United States beef supply chain in 1950 (Simplified). From 1900 to 1950, meatpacking 
plants became less concentrated and lost market power. Specialized cattle-feeding operations and smaller, non-
slaughter processing plants became increasingly significant in the supply chain, and Americans purchased final 
beef products from a wider variety of sources, especially supermarkets and casual restaurants. No single sector 
of the supply chain dominated the market, and reasonable (historically greatest) competitiveness existed across 
the industry. 
 
	 Cattle	Op.	(Canada	&	Mexico)	 Consumer	(East	Asia)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Cow	Calf	Op.  CAFO	 	Meatpacking	&	 	Various	Retail	 	Consumer	(USA)	
	 	 Processing	Plants	 Outlets	
	 	 	 	 	
Cattle	Op.	 Cattle	Op.	 Consumer	(Canada	&	Mexico)	
(Australia	&	New	Zealand)		 (Latin	&	S.	America)	
	 		
Figure 12.e: The United States beef supply chain in 2000 (Simplified). In the late 20th century, international 
cattle operations and consumers became essential in the US beef supply chain. Americans traded breeding and 
feeder stock back-and-forth with Canada and Mexico; imported grass-fed and low-quality dressed beef for 
processing from Oceania and Latin and South America; and exported grain-fed and high-quality beef and offal 
to Canada, Mexico, and, especially, East Asian countries. Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, known 
colloquially as “factory farms,” and a new group of larger-still single-story meatpacking plants re-established 
high market concentration, now on a global scale. Major beef retail outlets also broadened with the former 
department store, Wal-Mart, becoming the biggest beef retailer in the United States. 
  
		
130	
Figure 13. Population Ecology of Beef Processing Firms in the United States, 1800-2017 
 
Figure 13.a: Population of Beef Processing Firms, 1800 
(Simplified). A loose network of abattoirs (A) and butchers 
(B) slaughter and process most beef in the United States.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 13.b: Population of Beef 
  Processing Firms, 1900 
(Simplified). By 1900, five 
meatpacking firms 
concentrated production in 
Chicago and captured 
between 45 and 66% of 
market share. These packers 
 cooperated through an informal network known publically as the “big five” or the “beef trust,” and from 1902-
1912 three of them merged into a single mega-firm called the National Packing Company. Despite the 
transformation, many butchers and smaller regional slaughter facilities remained. 
 
 
Figure 13.c: Population of Beef Processing Firms, 1950 (Simplified). Regulation decreased the vertical 
integration and market concentration of major meatpacking firms in the mid-20th century. A greater number of 
large and mid-sized processing facilities, including non-slaughter and specialized processors, rose to 
prominence on a national scale. In Colorado, Monfort became the first major cattle producer to integrate 
backwards into meatpacking. Major meatpacking firms cooperated legally through their trade association and 
lobby group, the American Meat Institute, but competing organizations in New York and San Francisco served 
smaller firms and regional interests. Mechanization and modernization across meatpacking further eliminated 
traditional abattoirs and butchershops. 
 
Figure D: Population of Beef Processing Firms, 1990 (Simplified). Starting in the 
1960s, a new breed of meatpackers started opening large single-story plants near 
major cattle sources in Western States. Their technical innovation and anti-union 
policies enabled them to eclipse the older Chicago-based firms and functionally 
eliminate the need for butchering in the United States. By 1990, a new “big three” 
had captured over 80% of the beef market. 
 
Figure 13.e: Population of Beef Processing Firms, 2017 
(Simplified). High market concentration continues in the 
meatpacking industry with the top four producers controlling 
over 80% of beef production. The largest producer is an 
Arkansas-based chicken company that subsumed IBP. 
Cooperation has also been consolidated into a single trade 
association. There has also been a notable uptick of designer, 
full-service butcher shops operating concomitantly with the 
newly minted “big four.” 
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The Meat Trust 
From the arrival of European settlers and European cows, first in the Southwest and 
later on the Eastern seaboard, until the mid-nineteenth century, the American beef economy 
was barely even an identifiable thing. Cattle served primarily subsistence and imperialist 
goals to feed settlers and secure land from their original native inhabitants, and wider market 
forces rarely touched the lives of American cattle.219 Cattle lived inside or close to the 
communities that ate them, and they were slaughtered and processed on a local scale by a 
disconnected network of abattoirs and butcher shops. There was no such thing as a price for 
beef. 
Prices emerged in the nineteenth century, but remained relatively unmanaged and 
relatively unimportant as an economic driver in the meat economy. Pioneer cattle producers 
in the West responded to hostile natives on the land they were stealing, competition from 
sheep growers and other cattle producers, theft by rustlers, sabotage by fence cutters, 
unpredictable weather and climate, variable ecological conditions, and inexact breeding 
patterns. The goal, then, was always to produce as many cattle as possible under the 
conditions; they did not respond to prices. Consumers did not adapt to prices much either. 
Over the whole course of the nineteenth century, urbanization and industrialization drove 
demand for meat steadily up, and developing urban tastes increasingly demanded beef over 
America’s previous favourite—pork.220 Supply therefore trailed demand. This was the closest 
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the livestock and meat industries ever came to free enterprise and truly open markets, but it 
was chaotic and inadequate as a food distribution system. 
This changed with a corporate revolution in meatpacking in the late nineteenth 
century, which concentrated and centralized much of the butchering of American livestock 
through new technologies, new labour process strategies, and especially economies of 
scale.221 Following the lead of Gustavus Swift, a small cadre of American industrialists 
constructed a large-scale meat-packing hub in Chicago to slaughter, process, and deliver 
meat (especially beef) to growing urban markets in the east. They built factories of 
unprecedented size and reorganized the slaughtering process into discrete parts performed by 
different workers on what they called the “disassembly line.”222 The Chicago packinghouses 
became a template for other industrialists even as they became notorious for horrible labour 
conditions. In an infamous exposé of labour conditions in the packinghouses, journalist 
Upton Sinclair observed: “It was all so very businesslike that one watched it fascinated. It 
was pork-making by machinery, pork-making by applied mathematics … [B]ut this 
slaughtering machine ran on.”223 
The Chicago meatpackers, called the “big four” or the “meat trust,” transitioned from 
horizontal integration and the destruction of small, local abattoirs and skilled butchers, to 
vertical integration across the entire beef supply chain. The meatpackers sought control of 
retail shops, advertising outlets, railroads, cold storage (refrigeration buildings), stockyards 
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(the sale points for live cattle), and sometimes beef cattle production. The first pricing 
mechanism in the United States for livestock and meat became the oligopoly and oligopsony 
of the big Chicago packers. An oligopoly is a concentration of a few sellers, and an 
oligopsony is a concentration of a few buyers, in an arena of market exchange. The Chicago 
meatpackers formed both, since they dominated the beef supply chain from the centre, 
dictating cattle prices at one end and carcass prices at the other.224 
The meatpackers dramatically increased the volume of the meat supply, but in so 
doing they also seized power over pricing from producers, retailers, and consumers. The 
meatpackers used refrigerator technology to extent the lifespan of dead cow flesh, which 
transformed the commodity into something more fungible and manageable. Cold storage 
enabled the meatpackers to time and limit the flow of beef onto retail markets. More 
importantly, the meatpackers applied new work process technologies—including simple 
mechanization and labour management science—within their multi-story factories to greatly 
reduce the labour cost in each cut of beef. This drove retail prices down, but it has long been 
alleged that the large packers conspired not to compete with each other on prices and to keep 
them only low enough to destroy firms outside the club. Which they did. As the corporate 
concentration of meatpacking advanced, a few men in Chicago could effectively dictate the 
price of a steer to a rancher in Wyoming and the price of a beef roast to a consumer in New 
York. Neither was impressed. 
Ranchers & Consumers 
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The meat trust drove both ranchers and consumers to organize creating countervailing 
power against corporations. These groups created economic organizations that were quite 
different from corporations or corporate oligopolies because they did not themselves engage 
in market transactions. That is, they formed organizations that included people directly 
involved in selling and buying beef, but that did not engage in buying and selling themselves. 
The success that ranchers and consumers had in altering the beef supply chain demonstrates 
the importance of these kinds on non-transaction organizations, as well as the importance of 
ideas and political advocacy, in re-shaping markets. 
 By the 1880s, most American cattle producers believed that depressed cattle prices 
were being manufactured by the Chicago meat trust. It is likely that the meat trust did 
contribute to lower cattle prices, but overstocking and violent competition also contributed 
the woes of Western cattle producers. An obvious option available to the larger cattle 
enterprises, known in Western lore as “cattle barons,” was to copy the industrial 
manufacturers’ model of cooperation to capture power over market pricing. Thus in 1887, a 
group of Western cattle interests formed the American Cattle Trust, which the New York 
Times called “an interesting example of a new class of commercial organizations, or 
conspiracies,” modeled after the Standard Oil and Cotton Seed Oil Trusts.225 The stated 
philosophy behind the American Cattle Trust was to fight monopoly with monopoly, which 
was a novel idea since no previous trusts had succeeded where trusts already existed.226 
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The American Cattle Trust succeeded in so far as it formed a massive land and cattle 
company unseen before in the American West. The trustees of the company included R. G. 
Head, president of the International Range Association; John T. Lyttle, executive of the 
Texas Live Stock Association; John L. Routt, President of the Colorado Stock Association; 
Thomas Stugis, president of the Union Cattle Company of Wyoming; and Nelse Morris, 
owner of one of the “big five” meatpacking companies!227 According to reports at the time of 
its dissolution, the American Cattle Trust acquired “over 300,000 acres of deeded land in 
Texas, Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico; also 300,000 acres of leased state and school 
land [… and] upwards of 150,000 head of cattle.”228 The Western range men recruited Morris 
to secure stockyards and a major, modern Chicago packinghouse as well as all Morris’ retail 
contracts for the trust’s beef. The trust also secured sales contracts in Europe and financial 
backing worth $12 million from banks in Chicago, New York, London, and Paris, including 
those of the famous Rothschilds.229 
The American Cattle Trust did not necessarily serve the interests of all Western cattle 
producers. The trust recruited small producers by offering “any cattle owner to put his 
property in exchange for Trust certificates at $25. It is believed by the organizers that the 
certificates will be worth par within eight months.”230 But one writer for the Chicago Tribune 
pointed out, “The obvious purpose for the American Cattle Trust is […] to put the price of 
cattle not included in the trust down to the lowest feasible notch,” because that is what 
monopolies do.231 The trust was a nearly immediate financial failure, and the Arizona 
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Champion wondered if “the poor cattlemen might have found in the end that the monster 
they helped create was a worse foe than that they wished to supress.”232 The Live Stock and 
Produce Review accused the trustees of attempting to “unload upon other shoulders their 
unprofitable holdings” and called it “one of the most stupendous frauds that was ever 
attempted.”233 Despite the scathing obituaries that came three months after it formed, the 
American Cattle Trust continued on as a land and cattle company disabused of its radical 
rhetoric until it dissolved and recombined with an even greater number of land holdings as 
the Western Union Beef Company in 1890.234 
The American Cattle Trust failed in part because small producers across the West 
were not willing to give up their land and economic autonomy, but producers still desired 
cooperation and organization. According to G. F. Patrick, a cattle producer from Pueblo, CO: 
Turn in whatever direction you may, and large interests are protected associated effort… the insurance 
men… the national banks… the stockyard corporations… each speak to us with a single voice, hold us 
in the iron grip of a single strong hand… The single [cattleman], in his effort for terms and conditions, 
is fighting an individual battle against a thousand combined in one, against hundreds of thousands of 
dollars controlled by a single mind, the will of the organization. It is an unequal battle… Alone, the 
[cattleman] is nothing; in combination, everything.235 
 
The next attempt at cooperative organization did not challenge producers’ status as individual 
competitors in the cattle market. 
Western American cattle ranchers formed one of the first, one of the most successful, 
and one of the most enduring national livestock producers’ associations, which is now a 
particular economic organization found from Canada to Kenya.236 The violence and land 
management problems of late-nineteenth century rangelands produced many disconnected 
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regional cattlemen’s organizations. Then in late January, 1898, Charles F. Martin and John 
W. Springer organized “The National Stock Growers Convention” in Denver, Colorado, and 
they enticed participants with “reduced rates on all railroads” as well as “probably the last 
barbeque that will ever be given in which buffalo will be a feature of the menu.”237 The 
convention drew over 1000 participants from 21 states and territories, and Springer estimated 
that they represented “a thousand million dollars of capital.”238 The assembled ranchers 
formed the “National Live Stock Association of the United States,” which changed name 
over time as it evicted sheep producers, welcomed cattle feeders and dairy producers, lost 
members, and subsumed competitors. In fact, the early association even included some 
railroad and meatpacking owners, but it was always controlled by the cattle producers, who 
renamed it the American National Cattlemen’s Association (NCA) in 1951. The NCA has, at 
times, been one of the most influential organizations in the beef economy.239 
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Consumers also organized, but they never formed a sustained national organization of 
beef-eaters. During the cattle trust episode, the New York Times opined, “Unfortunately, the 
consumers are unable to create a Trust for their own protection.” Consumers did, however, 
organize and increase their political and economic influence over the beef supply chain in an 
episodic fashion from the 1880s to the present. In contrast to producers or industrial workers, 
who had perennial problems with the meatpackers and formed strong, sustained movements, 
consumers’ influence waxed and waned with episodes of heightened concern over health and 
safety or price. They were, nonetheless, significant. Consumers launched important 
campaigns to exert change in the beef supply in 1904, 1946, 1948, 1951, 1966, and 1973, 
with the first and last episodes being the greatest.240 Consumer activism tended to conflate 
the slightly contradictory dictums that beef should be healthful and that it should be cheap, 
which underwrites the American public’s Janus-faced relationship with the industrial food 
supply to this day. 
Starting in 1882, so called “beef famines” became a regular feature of life in Eastern 
American cities. The 1882 beef famine drove the price of cattle up by five to six dollars per 
head, and though it did not last, the very knowledgeable General James S. Brisbin of Fort 
Keogh, Montana Territory, wrote to the New York Herald that it “has excited great interest in 
the West.” Brisbin’s letter was reprinted in papers all over the country, and he sounded the 
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alarm for much greater problems to come. “It is my opinion that we have been in a beef 
famine for the past ten years,” he explained due to declining production relative to urban 
growth, “and the only wonder is that beef is as cheap as it is.”241 Brisbin believed the 
capacity of the range and the profitability of cattle raising could be expanded to solve the 
problem, but, in fact, the rangeland cattle industry was in for rough years caused by droughts, 
harsh winters, and unstable prices. Beef famines were further exacerbated by labour disputes, 
which disrupted the supply coming (ever more exclusively) from the big Chicago packers. 
Major “beef famines” occurred or were threatened in 1887, 1902, 1904, 1913, 1943, and 
1951.242  
According to historian Maureen Ogle, who examined the 1902 beef famine in New 
York City, what this actually meant was that there was a shortage of prime cuts, like 
tenderloin—tenderloin is what filet mignon and porterhouse steaks come from—and the 
price rose as a consequence.243 The blowback from the packers’ leaps in efficient production 
and marketing was that by the turn of the century, American consumers absolutely insisted 
on high quality cuts of beef at ill-defined “reasonable” prices. Consumers were furious and 
they blamed the big packing corporations because they thought the capitalists engaged in 
shady dealings to hold beef off the market and set unfair prices. 
Beef famines drove producers and consumers together, since they both blamed the 
meat trust for abusing markets and the food supply. In 1887, the Oakland Tribune reported 
that a beef famine appeared imminent due to heavy winter losses and disastrously low 
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calving rates that spring. In the meantime, though, “cattle producers have been rushing their 
stock on the market at an unparalleled rate” only to incur losses. “The market price has been 
lower on account of the glut,” the writer explained, “for in Chicago alone over 300,000 head 
of cattle have been thrust on the market in the last thirty days.” Consumers in for shortages to 
come should have, at least, enjoyed lower prices and copious supply in the meantime, but it 
turned out, “The consumer […] gets beef no cheaper because the producer sells it for so 
little.” The writer placed the blame squarely on the meat packers, who refused to share their 
profits in glut or dearth with anyone else on the supply chain.244 
Beef famines proved unacceptable to the American public, who demanded and won 
important structural changes in the beef industry. The biggest moment came during the beef 
famine of 1904, which coincided with a Teamster’s strike and general labour unrest against 
the Chicago packers, which the famous muckraking journalist Upton Sinclair observed and 
wrote about in 1905. Sinclair’s semi-factual novel, The Jungle, garnered nearly total credit 
for the legislative changes that followed, but American consumers were already in revolt, 
when he published the expose in serial form. The Jungle served mainly to add disgust over 
poor sanitation to the concerns over prices and supply already levelled at the meatpackers. 
The tide on anti-packer sentiment drove President Theodore Roosevelt to press for the 
passage of the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 and the Federal Meat Inspection Act of 1907 that 
stipulated mandatory inspection of livestock and carcasses by the USDA for meat traded 
across state lines. 
The meat trust was perhaps a more enduring thorn for the ranchers, since the large 
meatpackers owned the stockyards where cattle were bought and sold meaning they literally 
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owned the market on cattle. Ranchers continued to apply pressure on Congress after 1905 to 
address the structural problems of the industry. In the early twentieth century, ranchers found 
themselves in a new position of political power due to their influence with key western 
legislators and general cultural cachet. Ranchers convinced the justice department to conduct 
formal investigations into the big packers, which led to some of the most severe and 
important structural regulation of a major American manufacturing industry. 
In 1904, the House of Representatives passed a resolution asking the Bureau of 
Corporations to investigate beef prices and profits directly in response to pressure from 
cattlemen,245 but the report did not go the way cattlemen wanted, since it concluded that the 
meatpacking industry was sufficiently competitive and benign. A decade later the cattlemen 
agitated for a second report, this time by the Federal Trade Commission, in 1917 (completed 
in 1919), which ultimately charged the packers with attempting to “defraud both producers 
and food consumers.”246 The FTC report accused the large packers of having controlling 
shares in over 500 smaller companies, dominating rail freight rates and cold storage space, 
and manipulating livestock markets. 
Fearing criminal prosecution for violation of existing anti-trust laws, the meatpackers 
approached the Justice Department and proposed the Consent Decree, which solved the 
problem for all concerned parties except the cattlemen. The Consent Decree made packers 
legally responsible for voluntarily selling off their interests in public stockyards, railroads 
and terminals, marketing (newspapers), and public cold storage warehouses.247 The packers 
also promised to disassociate with retail butchers and wholesale grocers. The Consent Decree 
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failed to live up to cattlemen’s expectations, however. The packers did not have to admit any 
guilt, the Consent Decree did not explicitly prohibit packers from influencing the livestock 
market, and the Consent Decree had no explicit provision for its enforcement.  
The meatpackers formed their own non-transactional association in response to 
regulation, the American Meat Packers Association later the American Meat Institute, in 
1906, which enabled legal coordination after the oligopoly.248 Thomas E. Wilson, owner of 
one of the largest meatpacking firms and President of the packers’ association, tried to 
dissuade cattlemen from continuing any further with their push in Congress against the 
packer. Wilson argued, “We do not need legislation. What we need is cooperation between 
the producer, the packer and the government,” but W.W. Turney of Texas captured the 
cattlemen’s skepticism explaining, “There is going around the country today the slogan: ‘Let 
us joins hands with the packers.’ That is not the place to join hands. God knows the packers 
don’t need your help.”249 Ultimately, the cattlemen resolved to continue with their push for 
real legal regulation of the packing industry. 
John B. Kendrick was President of the cattlemen’s association and a U.S. Senator 
when he authored and introduced a bill to prevent vertical integration by meatpacking 
companies in 1919. Unsurprisingly, opponents of the bill argued that it was a conflict of 
interest for the cattlemen’s president to write legislation regulation the meatpacking industry, 
but a similar House bill ultimately passed and became the Packers and Stockyards Act 
(P&SA) in 1921. The P&SA basically entrenched the Consent Decree in law, but it also 
placed industry regulation under the control of the Secretary of Agriculture (who incidentally 
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was Henry C. Wallace, a Progressive grain farmer and another former cattlemen’s 
association executive).250 The P&SA barred packers from engaging in “any unfair, unjustly 
discriminatory, or deceptive practice” or making any deals that had “the tendency or effect of 
restraining commerce or of creating a monopoly.” It also prevented packers from owning 
major stockyards and forced them to pay producers for all stock received within twenty-four 
hours.251 The P&SA enabled producers, through their representatives, to regulate the vertical 
integration of industrial meatpacking, and the NCA carefully watched and intervened in the 
activities of the USDA Packers and Stockyards Administration.252 In fact, in 1957, the 
cattlemen fought a proposal to move the P&SA from the USDA to the FTC.253 The cattlemen 
had designed the P&SA to fall under their sphere of influence in the Department of 
Agriculture, and they made sure to keep it that way. 
The regulation of meatpacking created institutional barriers to meatpackers 
dominating the cattle and beef market. This was a good thing, but it put pricing up for grabs. 
After 1921, the American state, consumers, ranchers, and new corporate organizations all 
vied over beef prices and the power to interpret what the free market wanted. New 
technologies for reading and reporting market data ultimately replaced the word send down 
from the meatpackers, but the market still never became autonomous from the power 
struggles of its users. Further, the structural limits put on the meatpacking industry 
effectively dissolved the problem that joined consumers and producers. With meatpackers 
unable to appropriate cattle production, ranchers gained a new interest in high market prices. 
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As early as 1930, the producers supported a modification of the Consent Decree to allow 
“packers to go into other lines” to give them “an even break with the chain stores 
[supermarkets],” which reveals how little they cared about monopolistic integration of the 
retailing end of the beef supply chain.254 
Government Beef 
After busting the meat trust, the American state became increasingly involved in 
managing live cattle and beef prices. This coincided with sweeping state management of the 
economy during depression and war years, but it was also a particular case. The federal 
government adopted a role on ensuring that the public would have access to—and ensuring 
that they would eat—steadily more and more meat. This aligned with the interests of 
ranchers in so far as they also wanted increased demand, but again it made pricing subject to 
conflict (largely because it became so manageable). The New Deal State aimed to raise cattle 
receipts, lower consumer beef prices, and smooth-out cyclical supply crises all by 
transferring economic management from the free market to professional human regulators. 
The chaos of free enterprise leading to corporate trust behaviour was exactly what motivated 
this action, but faith that the free market could do it better was also the biggest critique 
launched by ranchers and consumers. 
In the 1930s, the New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) sought to 
solve the problem of depressed cattle prices by reducing the cattle supply. AAA agents 
traveled to Western ranches, offered cash for farmers’ livestock, and then shot them and left. 
“Buy-and-slaughter,” which ranchers called “kill-for-cash,” probably saved producers faced 
with drought and plummeting beef prices, but it never garnered much support from cattlemen 
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who later waxed eloquent about the trauma of watching government agents shooting cattle 
and leaving them to rot.255 Apparently, cattlemen could handle sending animals to slaughter, 
but buy-and-slaughter mocked the value of their way of life. It is likely that kill for cash did 
not greatly distress ranchers at the time, but they remembered it as a great insult as ranchers 
increasingly opposed state intervention into beef pricing. This happened because the federal 
government switched rapidly from trying to raise beef prices to trying to hold them down. 
During the Second World War (1941-1945), beef prices threatened to rise too high, 
and the state allied itself with consumers to stabilize the market. The Office of Price 
Administration (OPA) imposed strict price ceilings on beef, and women monitored prices at 
retail points on behalf of the agency. Still, consumers saw meatpackers and retailers as the 
culprits for high beef prices, but cattle producers saw the OPA and the emergent consumers’ 
movement as a threat.256 The OPA was not actually a huge problem for producers in and of 
itself (the price of cattle actually returned to pre-depression levels by the end of the war 
anyway), but it did precipitate a problem by regulating prices at the end of the supply chain 
without adequately regulating supply. The OPA set the price of beef so artificially low that 
packers began holding back their stock partially in protest and partially in anticipation of the 
end of price controls. The government caved due to rampant black-market dealings in beef 
and the price of beef skyrocketed after 1946, which ultimately led to the “beefsteak election” 
of 1946 and the “Cattle Bust” of 1953, which will be discussed in detail shortly. 
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In the process, cattlemen and meatpackers became new allies. After the 1905 
regulations, American Meat Packers organized as the American Meat Packers’ Institute (later 
the American Meat Institute, AMI), and after the 1921 regulations they began seeking 
common ground with producers. This led to the creation of the Meat Board in 1933, which 
was a joint organization of producers, packers, and retailers with the purpose of increasing 
beef consumption, mostly through publicity and advertising.257 Droughts in 1934 and 1936 
led to shortages, which led to high beef prices, which led to consumer resistance against beef. 
Per capita beef consumption dropped from 146 lbs in 1910 to 120 lbs in 1937, which Thomas 
Wilson, a meatpacker and chairman of the Meat Board, likened to 5,600,000 fewer head of 
cattle. Wilson spoke before the national cattlemen’s convention in 1938 making the case for 
cooperation: “The packer is the merchant of the producer’s commodity, and it is obvious they 
can both do a better job—not by throwing rocks at each other—but by working together in 
the solution of their problems.”258 
Wilson argued convincingly that regulation was not the way to manage prices: “These 
frequent and violent changes in prices have been one of the most difficult problems in our 
industry in recent years, and I doubt if any of us know the proper solution to it. Fluctuating 
markets are, after all, a part of our system of free and open competition. For example, the 
near-record prices for fancy cattle this summer were due to the keen competitive bidding of 
the eastern hotel and restaurant trade for the very limited supply of prime beef that was 
available. The live prices merely reflected the competition for the meat. Practically all of the 
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improvements in this industry have been the direct result of keen competition. As desirable 
as it is to eliminate fluctuations, it should not be attempted in a way that would impair free 
and open competitive markets.” The solution was to get consumers to eat more beef. He 
explained that the Meat Board was spending 200,000 dollars a year on advertising, but he 
wanted to get it up to half a million. As long as supply and demand both just kept increasing 
forever, there would be no need for conflict in the beef supply chain.259 
At the end of the war, it was not immediately clear whether the federal government 
would back off on meat prices. The political opposition to continued price ceilings by both 
cattlemen and meatpackers made a post-war OPA untenable in the simplest sense, but the 
rationale behind their opposition was ideologically interesting. The beef interests argued that 
the OPA and price controls had utterly failed because they could not reign in the real market. 
During the war, a vibrant black market in beef developed and undermined the goals of 
centralized economic control. It is impossible to say how much beef was traded on the black 
market in the 1940s, but observers in government and industry seemed to think it was a huge 
proportion. It is also difficult to say exactly what the black market was. There certainly 
would have been back-alley cash dealings (meatpacking workers are known to sell beef out 
of their cars at bars even today), but the black market also included mainstream retailers 
selling beef over the price ceiling through various holes in the system.260 The OPA system 
relied heavily on self-reporting and consumer-activist fact checking. Ranchers and livestock 
brokers could easily misreport sales or fudge their cattle grades to obscure prices, and 
consumer policing seemed to break down further west in cattle country. OPA reports 
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estimated that 80 to 100% of beef retailed in the Midwest sold over the price ceiling. The 
OPA rules also made exceptions for “custom kill” operations, which meant ranchers could 
slaughter their own cattle and sell directly to hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs to sidestep 
the visible market entirely.261 
The creation of a black market undermined the OPA’s goals on their own terms, since 
it meant the real consumer price of beef still rose, but beef interests argued further that it 
made free and legal enterprise impossible. William Clithero, Vice President of Armour, 
testified in 1946 in opposition to continued price controls, saying, “During the war these 
controls served the American public well, and the job done was a creditable one, but if the 
processing and distribution ends of the meat industry are to survive the controls must be 
relaxed so that the law-abiding elements can compete freely with those who disregard and 
violate the regulations.” Clithero claimed that legitimate packers were floundering because 
they couldn’t compete for cattle with those willing to buy over the ceiling, and every black 
market transaction forced others to join in and the “black market spreads and grows upon 
itself.” Clithero also highlighted how the black market undermined the health and safety 
goals of the industry: “Today the product of this industry is being booted around, killed in 
garages, shanties, and barns, without refrigeration, and the American housewife is being 
bilked to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The black market is breaking 
down the morale and honesty of a great industry, and finally the producer will have to foot 
the bill.”262 
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The existence of the black market, even if it was overblown in these arguments, 
demonstrated that the beef economy could not be contained by government. It had a life of its 
own and regulation was futile. So Truman ended the price ceilings, for which he learned that 
failing to regulate was suicide. 
The United States midterm elections of 1946 got the nickname, “the beefsteak 
election,” because President Truman and the Democrats squandered decades of Democrat 
control of Congress over the price of beef. Under pressure from cattle producers and 
meatpackers, Truman decided to end OPA price ceilings in June 1946. The retail price of 
beef rose 30%. Women consumers turned on the Democrats and granted Republicans control 
of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Truman was stunned, but June Shaw, a 32-
year-old housewife from Illinois, was not. She entered and won a Chicago Sun contest to 
predict the election results for Illinois. When asked how she got a near perfect score, she 
replied: “Simple … I just listened to what the ladies said while I was standing in the meat 
line.”263 Truman, ever the charmer, wrote in a speech (but never publicly delivered): “You've 
deserted your president for a mess of pottage, a piece of beef, a side of bacon. You've gone 
over to the powers of selfishness and greed.” While male legislators and policymakers did 
not learn to respect women’s consumer politics right away, they did learn to fear them. One 
commentator concluded, “a housewife who cannot get hamburger is more dangerous than 
Medea wronged.”264 
It took just five years before the State would have to intervene in beef prices again. 
On 26 January 1951, under the auspices of the Korean emergency, the Truman government 
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again imposed a price ceiling on beef. The price of beef had risen steadily with the end of 
controls in 1946, and cattle producers felt they had a right to prosper after years of hardship. 
Consumers, on the other hand, boycotted beef to protest three prices three times between 
1946 and 1951. After setting the ceiling, the government wanted to rollback the price further, 
and the issue became a “battleground between the Administration and the cattlemen.” The 
cattlemen drafted a report for Congress titled “A Common Sense Meat Program” that argued 
“Price controls are a clumsy approach in the war against inflation. They may cover inflation 
for a time, but they cause serious difficulty later on in form of scarcity and black market.” 
They accused Truman of trying to “scare the people into supporting a stronger price control 
program” with lies about the beef supply. Meanwhile DiSalle (head of the program) testified 
that cattlemen were the only ones not trying to help stop inflation branding “the livestock and 
meat industry as a bunch of crooks with the stated purpose to destroy meat price controls.” 
The government never instituted price rollbacks, and the ceiling was lifted on 6 February 
1953.265 
The unexpected consequence was actually a reduction in herds, which led to a 50% 
increase in the price of beef. Herds then swelled to record numbers in reaction, which in turn 
led to an even greater drop in the price of beef.266 On the heels of the price roller coaster 
came the worst drought in the West since the Dust Bowl of the 1930s. One cattle producer 
looked back: “We would prefer not to give the Government all the credit for breaking the 
cattle market. A nation-wide drought had a share in one of the biggest price breaks in the 
history of the industry.”267 It was enough to lead some cattlemen to suicide and to lead the 
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federal government to offer the industry a bundle of relief measures including subsidized 
feed and rail freight rates.268 
Some cattle ranchers sought direct subsidies, which became a contentious and 
divisive issue within the industry. In a 1972 speech, former Cattlemen’s Association 
President Jay Taylor recalled that the post-Korea price collapse and subsequent drought 
divided cattlemen over whether or not to accept subsidy payments from the federal 
government. Taylor argued that most cattlemen still agreed that “free markets make free 
men” and that only an emergency of that magnitude could challenge cattlemen’s commitment 
to avoiding government subsidies.269 In fact, subsidies led to a schism within the Cattlemen’s 
Association and the forming of an independent organization of cattlemen accepting subsidies. 
However, the majority of cattlemen supported the anti-subsidy faction, and the independent 
organization floundered and passed away. 
Cattlemen came out of the bust convinced that government regulation of beef markets 
led to instability and emboldened by their own success at fighting it. Price controls were once 
again suggested during the Vietnam-era inflation crisis of 1966, and an internal long-form 
memorandum on the lessons of 1951 stated “The livestock and meat industry came out of the 
battle of controls with a fairly good batting average, considering the tremendous pressure put 
on by the Administration to control the industry stock, lock, and barrel.” “If there is a lesson 
to learn from the two years of controls on the cattle industry, it would be that cattlemen can 
win the big battles by becoming militant and not giving into those who would take away their 
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freedom.”270 Ranchers successfully opposed price controls in 1966, but consumers also 
increased their activism against high “free-market” prices thereafter. 
Boycott! 
In addition to direct political pressure, and perhaps also to back up that political 
threat, consumer groups organized activism against the market itself through boycotts. 
Boycotting is the act of refusing to purchase a particular commodity or refusing to frequent a 
particular business for political reasons. Beef boycotts were an equal-and-opposite protest to 
ranchers’ and packers’ withholding of supply during low-price periods, and they provided 
evidence of consumers’ commitment to their vision of the beef market (as expressed through 
price). High prices, in theory, resulted from limited supply to meet demand. Boycotts 
threatened to break that pattern by eliminating demand entirely and causing financial losses 
all the way back up the supply chain. Boycotts were powerful economic actions, and they 
infuriated beef producers and their spokespeople in government. 
From 1951 to 1965, beef prices remained stable. Perhaps a bit low for cattlemen’s 
tastes, but not severely so, and a steadily growing number of American consumers could 
afford beef. Beef became America’s favourite food, and individual Americans increased the 
proportion of beef in their diets as purchasing power doubled from 1938 to 1965.271 Beef 
eating marked the ascent of the American middle class, but it posed renewed risk of price 
crises as beef became a staple. By 1973, American’s would be spending 16.6% of their total 
food dollar on beef making them very sensitive to price changes.272 
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Beef prices rose steadily through 1965 and 1966 until a boycott broke out in Denver 
and Phoenix in October and spread to cities across the country. The nation’s men in power 
were not sensitive to the consumer issue. The Denver Post, for example, speculated that 
Orville Freeman’s (Sec of Ag.) position sounded something like: “Avoid food questions if 
possible. If drawn into the debate take the side of the farmers because they’re organized and 
the housewives aren’t.” But they did get organized. Donna Logan of the Denver Post wrote: 
“It’s as though they’ve found a cause, those housewives. Tired of idle-hour coffees in their 
neighbor’s kitchen, they’re making the most of their consumer power.”273 Consumer 
organizations exploited this assumption that housewives were innocent or apolitical. 
The 1966 boycott targeted supermarket chains, which consumers accused of driving 
up prices through promotional schemes like stamps. The boycotters did not target cattlemen 
directly, but producers were nonetheless enraged—mainly by President Johnson’s suggestion 
that women try eating other meats and cheaper beef cuts.274 A Colorado cattle feeder 
complained: “We’ve been subsidizing consumers at our own expense for 10 years.” 275  Many 
cattle producers also targeted supermarkets for using beef as a promotional item. Ranchers 
believed retailers used beef as a “loss leader” to bring consumers in to spend high on non-
food items like fancy shampoos, which left consumers mis-educated about the proper price of 
beef. The 1966 boycotts ended in November, and the whole issue faded as beef prices fell 
back to pre 1965 levels. 
1966 was not a determinative boycott, but it was big and it foreshadowed the 
possibilities for a greater consumer revolt. Rose West, one of the major leaders behind the 
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boycotts in Denver, doubted the boycott had a lasting impact on the beef economy: “The 
boycott did lower prices, but it’s only a temporary thing. As soon as we turn our backs they 
(the prices) will go back up.” Nonetheless, West founded Denver Housewives for Lower 
Food Prices, United National Consumers Association, and National Housewives for Lower 
Prices to continue agitating on behalf of consumers. West’s political acumen derived from 
her lifelong interest in the Democratic party and experience as an aid to Estes Kefauver.276 
Her rival, Ruth Kane, a Red-haired professional bowler, Republican, and wife of a business 
pundit, drew on her experience organizing block parties to support her bowling league. Kane 
accused West’s groups of political capture and accused the boycott of a dangerous anti-
business agenda. Kane thought most American women were basically lazy and ignorant. But 
she, too, saw the boycott as proof that women could organize, and she planned to continue 
educating housewives on economics and politics.277 Even if the 1966 boycott was not strictly 
successful, it was educational. And it did succeed in so far as the majority of delegates 
running in Colorado that month endorsed the boycott providing proof of concept for 
consumer activism. 
As with gas, 1973 was a bad year for food prices. Inflation on groceries reached 20% 
that year, and beef was one of the worst contributors. The combination of a corn blight out of 
Florida and a big wheat deal with the Soviet Union served to drive up the price of feed grain 
for cattle. At the same time severe winter storms in Texas, Colorado, and New Mexico killed 
thousands of cattle, and—because of snow on the ground—forced ranchers to feed more of 
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their stock with grains.278 The price of beef had risen steadily since the mid 1950s, but early 
in 1973 it spiked. A sign of the times came in late March, when a burglar broke into a home 
in Wilmington, DE, and stole forty hamburgers and forty steaks from the freezer taking 
nothing else.279 
This time around, consumers blamed it squarely on the producers. By March, 
consumers had already organized a nation-wide protest on meat prices demanding a general 
rollback of food prices. Housewives organizations and student groups pledged meatless 
Tuesdays and Thursdays, and thousands of women in major cities held demonstrations and 
picketed supermarkets. One organization named UPD (Until Prices Drop) convinced 
supermarkets to place boxes at the tills where customers could sign and leave their grocery 
receipts for a mass mail-in to the President. The issue spawned a flourishing of new 
organizations—including FIT (Fight Inflation Together), WUA (Women United for Action), 
STOP (Stop These Outrageous Prices), WASP (Women Against Soaring Prices), SCRIMP 
(Save Cash Reduce Immediately Meat Prices), and LAMP (Ladies Against Meat Prices)—
and after a government report, released on 21 March, revealed that meat prices had risen 
5.4% in a month, they all promised and prepared for an all-out boycott on beef.280 
The Nixon administration responded by disowning the boycott and announcing a 
ceiling on meat prices on 29 March. It was a remarkable concession given that just two 
weeks earlier Nixon still insisted that “You can be very sure that if I thought […] price 
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controls on farms would work, I would impose them instantly.”281 There was talk in the 
Whitehouse of the 1946 “beefsteak election” and of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson’s 
alleged election loss in 1970 over similar issues. Nixon was also worried about organized 
labour, which had joined in the demands for food price rollbacks as several unions in major 
industries prepared for important contract negotiations. Nixon acquiesced, “the major weak 
spot in our fight against inflation is in the area of meat.” The secretary of agriculture, Earl 
Butz, sympathized with consumers, but he was less submissive when they accused him of not 
doing enough to help beef prices. “You won’t get me to apologize for high meat prices,” He 
retorted, “I’m spending money like a drunken sailor” on subsidies.282 
The ceiling did little to calm consumers, who launched a one-week total boycott on 
Sunday, 1 April. The New York Times reported on a scene from Monday: “a woman 
identified only as Frances furtively put a roast in her cart. ‘But it’s on sale. What can I do?’ 
she asked plaintively. ‘Gee, maybe I shouldn’t. I feel terrible now.’ Suddenly, a friend, 
Roslyn Greenberg, descended upon her. ‘How can you do that you miserable thing. You’re a 
traitor,’ she told Frances.”283 Newspapers reported similar scenes around the country.284 
Consumer groups staged various demonstrations and publicity stunts to draw attention to the 
boycott. In Washington DC, “an armored truck pulled up at a rally outside the White House 
and a cut of sirloin steak was carried out under armed guard.” In Connecticut, local 
Democrats hosted a “Nixonburger-Burn-off” with a contest for the best meatless dishes. In 
Berkeley, an organization made a ten-pound sausage inscribed with the names of thousands 
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of boycotters and sent it to governor Ronald Reagan.285 Sherry Wyler of Drummond Ireland, 
MI, mailed Nixon four-hundred peanut-butter-and-jelly sandwiches to send the message, you 
eat meatless!286 
The boycott was an organizational triumph. Although clearly a middle-class initiative, 
the boycott was especially successful among poorer consumers at discount retailers. One 
clerk remarked that “Even the food-stamp trade seems to be holding back in buying meat.”287 
The price of meat made activists out of women who never dreamed of it. One customer 
reported, “I’ve never protested anything before,” but she could not watch the price of 
bologna rise 40 cents in under a year and do nothing. One of the most active and successful 
organizers was a Californian named June Foray Donavan. Donavan was a voice actress for 
cartoons, and a martini drinker. Unexpectedly, she decided to tackle the meat-price issue, and 
she became the chair of FIT, which achieved the most widespread organization of consumers 
during the boycotts. During the month of April, Donavan was on national news, international 
news (Canada—but it counts), and the front page of several major papers. Nixon flew her to 
Washington to negotiate.288 “I think it’s the phenomenon of the decade” Donavan gloated, “I 
think this is the only consumer revolt that has ever hit with this magnitude.”289  
The boycott had an immediate impact. Markets in New York reported meat sales 
down 80-95% from usual and estimated that only 1 out of 47 shopping carts had meat in it. 
The previous week, the threat of things to come started a panic at the CME (Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange) that caused trading prices on live cattle and hogs to plunge. NCA 
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President Gordon Van Vleck later testified that: “The entire beef industry has sustained 
operating losses of $5 billion, plus a reduction in inventory value” from the 1973 crash.290 
Many state representatives pleaded with consumers to back down, including governor of 
California, Ronald Reagan, who told consumers, “it isn’t as simple as just walking around 
with a picket sign.” “If I am right, and I think I am right,” Reagan reasoned, “acts of God had 
something to do with the present food prices. I’m not in favor of boycotting Him.”291 
Producers and meatpackers pleaded with consumers to be reasonable. A Texas 
rancher named R. L. Bliss argued that historically prices had been too low and only now had 
“your average rancher begun to pull himself up out of the mud.” Bliss claimed that until the 
recent price rise, “ranchers were working for nothing—or they were losing money. Now, 
they’re just getting a fair return.” Nevertheless, he sympathized with consumers and 
apologized, saying “All of a sudden it looks like the meat industry is trying to play catch-up 
for a 10-year period—all in the time span of about 90 days.” An executive of Missouri Beef 
Packers explained, “last year—our profit margin was 6/10ths of 1%.” “This isn’t an original 
thought but it’s true,” he concluded, “We in agriculture can no longer overcome inflation 
through gains in efficiency. The housewife can no longer balance her budget at the grocery 
store.”292 In reality, producers reported double the return on investment they normally 
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expected for cattle sold in 1972 and early 1973, and packers insulated themselves by laying 
off over 20,000 butchers.293 
In response to consumer activism, ranch women formed countervailing organizations 
to subdue urban women’s attacks from a position of mutual understanding. When the male 
officers of the NCA observed the rise of consumer activism against meat prices, they 
identified hysteric, uninformed women as the root cause. The NCA decided to support a 
parallel organization of the mothers, wives, and daughters of ranchers so that ‘their women’ 
could speak some sense into the urban women causing ranchers such grief. However, the 
NCA’s chauvinist rationale need not detract from the legitimate organizing rural women 
conducted or from the underlying wisdom of the strategy. The mothers, wives, and daughters 
of ranchers were, of course and in fact, generally ranchers, too, and they understood the 
complicated environment and economics of rangeland beef production as well as anyone. 
According to Hailey Wilmer and Maria E. Fernandez-Gimenez, women often carried 
knowledge across generations and were responsible for understanding and sharing the culture 
and management traditions of past generations, which made them acutely aware of changing 
conditions over time.294 In addition to their range and barn work, women carried the majority 
burden of managing the family economy which ran just as thin as it did for the urban women 
facing high beef prices. 
Ranch women challenged the strong gendered framing of the beef price dispute. 
Consumer activists self-identified as “housewives” and reluctant female political actors. 
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Consumers took advantage of ranchers’ machismo and remarkable ignorance about women’s 
lives or the way grocery prices work to cast a narrative of greedy men forcing up food prices 
without regard to the proper nourishment of the nation’s children. Male ranchers could not 
help but confirm the narrative because they were absolutely offended by the very notion of 
city-slicking females telling them what they can or cannot do with their dollars on their land. 
Male ranchers publicly accused the consumers of failing to understand supply and demand; 
failing to understand the history of (artificially low) beef prices; and, most often, of failing to 
understand that they could afford beef if they didn’t spend all their damn money on their 
damn hair at the damn beauty parlour. Sadly, the ranchers’ narrative was almost equally 
effective. Either way, ranch women bridged the colossal gulf of gendered distrust and 
misunderstanding. They could present a sound argument for the importance of beef prices 
that supported a ranch family’s livelihood without slandering the majority of the population 
of the country. Ranch women explained that rural and urban families both wanted the same 
thing and faced similar constraints. 
Not to be outdone by the urban housewives, the ranch women called their 
organization, “The CowBelles.” The CowBelles received some material support from the 
NCA, but they became functionally autonomous. The CowBelles made press releases and 
held publicity events to explain how beef prices affected the lives of women and children in 
rural America.295 
In 1973, they travelled to New York city and Washington DC during the boycotts as a 
“beef truth squad” and “Eastern Chautauqua” to “reassure Mrs. America about beef 
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prices.”296 “The American housewife is being panicked by political opportunists,” charged 
Marie Tyler, a North Dakota rancher’s wife (who was, in fact, chairman of the Industry 
Information Council for the NCA). Tyler said boycotts were “not helpful” because “They 
confuse the issue by creating pressures for simplistic solutions—which can cause even 
greater economic disruption.” “We’re all concerned, along with the housewife, over high 
prices,” Tyler said, “And we beef producers are doing our best to hold the line on prices the 
only realistic way—by increasing supply, with breeder herds now at record levels.” “The ill-
conceived pressures of consumer activists who do not choose to understand the supply-
demand-price interaction of a free market,” Tyler further explained, “creates very real danger 
of skyrocketing prices to unimagined levels. Any tampering with the beef producer’s already 
narrow profit margin—which can run as low as 3% on investment, as compared to a savings 
bank interest of 5%—can trigger a sharp reduction, not to say the liquidation of herds.” “If 
current demands for beef from an increasingly affluent population has pushed prices to where 
they stand today, despite record production, imagine what would happen to prices following 
that sort of slash in beef output!” 
Consumer activists in New York confronted the truth squad cursing them for using 
beef cuts as props when local women could not even afford them. One women shouted 
“Don’t tell me you know about being poor. Have you visited Harlem? Have you ever seen 
children with cracked lips from eating lead paint?” The CowBelles were equally 
unsympathetic to New York women: “Look how many of them smoke […] And I’ll bet they 
all have television sets. […] I’m not saying they shouldn’t, but we all have so much these 
days. I bet if you looked at their shopping carts, you’d see that their food costs include hair 
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spray, deodorants, and paper products.” The chautauqua was a success in so far as the 
CowBelles got equal if not greater media coverage to the boycotters in many outlets, and 
many reports portrayed boycotters as an irrational mob.297 The CowBelles could not, 
however, reverse the trends that Tyler predicted would cause the liquidation of the American 
cattle herd. 
Within a week of the boycott’s end, newspapers began reporting the price of beef’s 
recovery to the pre-boycott ceiling. Ranchers and government officials explained smugly that 
a one-week boycott could not disrupt the mighty invisible hand of the market. However, 
before the year was through, the price of beef would ultimately crash so hard that the price of 
beef as well as the American cattle population would never recover. Ranchers called it the 
“cattle wreck,” and it was an unmitigated economic disaster. 
Cattle ranchers and feedlot operators were furious with both the boycott and Nixon’s 
price controls, and they withheld as much stock as possible off market in anticipation of 
higher prices when the ceiling lifted. Ranchers, in particular, were personally offended 
because many consumers accused Western cattlemen of growing fat and rich at the expense 
of hungry middle-class American families. Ranchers were enraged and many of them refused 
to give in and sell low. On the first business day of the boycott, the stockyards of Sioux City, 
IA, reported receiving half as many cattle as usual for a Monday.298 Even if producers 
wanted to sell, with the price ceilings set many buyers just did not show up.299 
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On 12 September 1973, Nixon lifted the beef ceiling, and thousands of cattle flooded 
onto the market. Many of the cattle were overweight, too, since they had been waiting at 
feedlots. In 1973 the optimum weight for steers was about 1050 pounds, but feeders sold 
cattle weighing 1300 pounds and more meaning that much more beef on the market. From 
August to November, the price for choice steers fell 33%, and feeders lost about $100 to $ 
200 per head. Bankruptcies and consolidation followed, and the American cattle herd has 
declined steadily ever since.300 
Christopher Deutsche argues that the era of meat activism was a period of “dietary 
citizenship” for American women, who learned to engage directly in national politics and 
economics. Deutsche cites Allen Mustow’s 1964 quip that meat prices severed as “the 
housewife’s personal inflation barometer” to capture the way beef prices and boycotts made 
economic policy visceral for real families.301 Beef prices and the gendered character of 
consumer-price politics also drew ranch women into more active political and economic 
engagement, and a woman was elected President of the NCA less than ten years later. 
However, consumer activism on beef prices and consumers’ political impact on the beef 
supply chain ended abruptly in 1973. 
After 1973, consumer resistance was less focused, and has had had only limited 
impacts such as removing “pink slime” from hamburgers at McDonald’s and school lunch 
programs for some of the nation’s children. “Pink slime” is a low-cost beef additive used to 
make ground beef cheaper and leaner. It was FDA approved in 1992 and is typical of the 
declining health and quality standards of the US food supply in the 1990s and 2000s. Several 
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fast-food restaurants voluntarily dropped the product, and a Change.org petition led the 
USDA to give school districts the option of refusing it (if they could afford to pay for pure 
ground beef). In general, heightened consumer concern over meat following the release of 
important books (like Schlosser’s Fast Food Nation) or news reports (like the 2012 ABC 
report on “pink slime” that is now the subject of a 2-billion-dollar lawsuit) have not 
fundamentally altered the structure of the beef supply. 
Consumer concerns rarely drive Americans to the streets any more, and they can 
often be dispensed with through disingenuous corporate advertising.302 For example, 
McDonald’s in my current home of Vancouver labels their Filet-o-Fish sandwich with, “wild 
caught […] sustainably sourced,” and their McChicken sandwich with, “not without 
Canadian chicken farmers.” This is typical corporate “green-washing” combined with “farm-
washing” for the Michael Pollan era.303 It is also interesting that these efforts focus especially 
on non-beef options. Consumer activism, of the kind that was motivated by beef prices, has 
become toothless in part because beef has become very cheap and because Americans eat 
other things. 
Diet as Market 
The cattle wreck of 1970s that broke the beef industry coincided with changes in the 
marketing, industrial processing, and international trading of beef that will all be discussed in 
the following chapters, but the most stunning and sudden change was in American beef-
eating. Up to 1976, each generation of Americans ate more beef than the last, then all-at-once 
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they started eating less.304 In 1954, beef industry experts estimated that domestic per capita 
beef consumption would be up to two hundred pounds by 2000.305 In reality, beef 
consumption declined from roughly 90 to 65 pounds per person between 1976 and 2000. 
Each beef famine and each boycott challenged American consumers’ reliance on beef, and 
over time they learned to eat other things. By 1976, consumers were so fed-up with the beef 
industry that they reversed a decades long trend of beef consumption fostered by both 
industry and state policy. The beef market existed in the bellies of the people, and 
manipulating diet was a way to manipulate the market. Markets are made from rules, and for 
a time, the rule in America was to eat beef, and then it was not. The history of beef 
consumption lays bare the absurdity that supply and demand might exist separately from 
politics, society, or culture. 
During the beef boycotts, government experts, packers, and ranchers all argued that 
high prices were a natural free-market outcome of Americans’ natural desire for delicious, 
nutritious beef. All those groups also worked desperately to increase demand by convincing 
the population that beef was delicious and nutritious. Boycotts and the resistance against 
them amounted to another political battle over whose market manipulations represented the 
true desires of the free market and whose were artificial regulations better suited to 
Communist totalitarians.  
One of the few things that united producers and manufacturers was the desire to make 
American consumers eat more beef. Advertising was a major expenditure for both the NCA 
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and AMI, and they formed joint-interest organizations like the Meat Board to further 
advertising goals. The Meat Board distributed full-colour posters of juicy beef to retailers; 
contracted and disseminated scientific studies on the healthfulness and sustainability of beef 
protein; published recipe books on how to use all the different beef cuts; and attacked (by 
counter-advertising or lawsuits) any articles or stories linking beef to disease or obesity that 
leaked into women’s magazines or television news.306 Despite the rhetoric that beef prices 
were an uncontrollable fact of economic demand, the beef industry continuously demanded 
that the people demand more. Anything that lowered demand was an artificial, slanderous, 
anti-American-values abuse of free-market supply and demand principles. 
The federal government also wanted people to eat more beef partly due to pressure 
from the beef industry and partly due to the ideology that free and prosperous societies eat 
more meat. As the Marxist economist, Werner Sombart, whined in his 1906 Why is there no 
Socialism in the United States, “all the socialist utopias have foundered upon roast beef and 
apple pie.” In the twentieth century, many Americans believed that what set them apart and 
above the Soviets was the availability of affordable beef for everyone. In fact, the failure of 
this aspiration to match reality for all Americans led to a bizarre ongoing stereotype linking 
Black Americans to chicken-eating as if that were an inherently inferior way of eating. The 
federal government drove up beef-eating by subsidizing beef production on lands it owned; 
funding health-and-safety inspection and grading programs; privileging beef in school lunch 
and food stamps programs; buying beef for the military; making beef a core item of national 
dietary policy; and, of course, by scolding boycotters and others who dared to challenge the 
supremacy of US beef.307 For decades, it worked. 
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At the same time it engaged in all sorts of practices to distribute beef outside the open 
market, the federal government also worked to ensure that the market price of beef remained 
sufficiently high to keep the beef industry happy. During an exceedingly poorly attended set 
of Senate hearings on “Agriculture-Environmental and Consumer Protection” in March 
1972—many left in the first fifteen minutes because the famous ITT trust hearings were 
happening at the same time down the hall—the following exchange took place between the 
chair of the committee and the secretary of agriculture:  
Senator McGee: To what do you attribute the present favorable price of beef? What accounts for this? 
Very often when other Secretaries have been in here, we have been beating them over the 
head because the price of beef was down and the market was suffering as a result. 
 
Secretary Butz: Do I infer from that, that if I want to be happy before this committee, I must not let 
the price of beef go down? 
 
Senator McGee: Yes. 
 
Secretary Butz: Your message comes through, Mr. Chairman.308 
 
In reality, the USDA worked systematically—though overall unsuccessfully—against market 
forces to stabilize and drive-up the price of beef. It was not really a secret, but they lied about 
it anyway. 
All that work to make Americans eat beef and make them pay top-dollar for it fell 
apart because beef famines and boycotts revealed an American could survive without beef. 
Trying not to eat beef was a recurring theme especially in the humour sections of American 
media during each shortage or boycott. In 1904, John Kendrick Bangs, “The Genial Idiot” 
column devoted fully have a news page to the beef famine:  
“Good morning, Doctor,” said the Idiot cheerfully as he entered the breakfast room, and picked up the 
morning paper. “Now that the effects of the beef strike are coming home to roast I suppose we’ll have 
to live on hash for a little while, unless our beloved landlady with her accustomed foresight has 
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provided her larder with a yoke or two of steers on the hoof from whom we may cut a nice fresh steak 
every morning.” 
 
“It won’t do you any harm to give up meat for a little while,” said the Doctor. “This beef strike that we 
have been going through has been a blessing in disguise. People eat too much meat nowadays and it is 
about time there was some kind of a let-up. I’ve been thinking over your case for some time past and it 
has seemed to me that you wouldn’t be quite so chesty if you beefed less and thought more.” 
It is all a gag, but the voice of the doctor reveals the existence of an opinion even in 1904 that 
the beef industry and government sought to suppress. The idiot goes on to outline his plan to 
eat alternatives to beef: 
“If this beef famine were to come to the worst […] I’d make a bee line for the Navy Yard and lay stock 
in a hard tack. That’s the best substitute for meat you can find in the market, and if you cook it right 
you make it do for lamb, mutton, venison, wild turkey, or porterhouse. It’s all a matter of preparation 
and sauces.” […] 
 
“Ordinarily exacting as we are I venture to say that to a man we will stand by you in this emergency 
nevertheless. Speaking for myself, you need not provide an ounce of beef from this time on. I shall be 
quite satisfied with simpler things not affected by the strikes, things like Terrapin a la Maryland; 
Lobster a la Newburg; Imported French Partridge; Scotch Grouse; Brook Trout en gelee or au natural 
avec butter; Philadelphia Squab; wild Rhode Island Turkey; Canary Birds Tongues and so on.”309 
 
For this to be funny, readers had to understand that protein could be found in many 
alternatives to beef that were neither inedible military rations nor luxuries imported from 
France. The joke is that “the Idiot” could not think of any reasonable alternative to beef.310 
 But it was not really a joke for the beef industry, which tried to scare the public with 
the specter of an America minus beef. In 1913, the San Francisco Call reported of a looming 
beef famine under the headline, “Horse Meat Will Grace Our Tables.” The article quoted 
Gustav Bischoff Sr., owner of a St. Louis packing company: “If the next few years show a 
like decrease in our beef cattle supply, the price of steaks will be absolutely prohibitive, so 
far as the masses of the people are concerned, and porterhouse steak at $1 a pound will be 
considered cheap. This will mean that the great working class of the nation must go on a 
potato and rice diet—like the Chinese and Japanese. Once that era sets in, it will mark the 
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beginning of the decline of the American people.”311 Bischoff’s statement stood against 
alternative claims, like R. B. Ruehling’s, that “It may be that a famine is impending for that 
old, cannibalistic, flesh-eating tendency of the human race,” but “little by little the 
consciousness is dawning upon the human mind that […] the plant world all about us was 
intended to supply us largely with necessary nutriment.”312 Few things scared meatpackers so 
much as these emboldened vegetable-eaters. 
One of the most scathing condemnations of “beef famines” came from the editors of 
the Bloomington, Illinois, Pantagraph, who wrote in 1943: “A ‘beef famine’ is an utterly 
ridiculous use of words designed to frighten the unwary with an ugly sound. It is all sound. It 
has no meaning.” The editors opined, “There can be no famine where pork loins are in the 
butcher shop; or chickens are in the pen, or dried beans are in the warehouses,” and they 
further claimed that cattle were the least efficient protein source per bushel of feed.313  
These views did not turn the public’s appetite for beef all at once, but each shortage 
and boycott provided an opportunity to learn how to eat other things. This was most true 
during the 1973 boycott that finally turned the tide. Betty Furness, the former White House 
consumer advisor and a major supporter of the boycott, explained that the boycott was 
premised on the understanding that Americans wanted red meat more than anything: “We 
want to send them [the livestock men] a message—not saying we don’t want meat—of 
course we want meat—but we will go without to make the point.”314 In making the point, a 
huge portion of the American population was opened up to alternative ways of eating. 
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The state wanted to discourage the boycott and argued that a better way to affect 
supply and demand would be by eating alternative proteins. In the lead-up to the crisis, 
Nixon told Americans that true patriots ate fish; one of his aids suggested cheese. Even 
Reagan admitted to having chicken instead of beef one day, though overall his diet changed 
little.315 Nixon’s standing consumer advisor, Virginia Knauer, explained during a White 
House press conference that “livers, kidneys, brains, and heart can be made into gourmet 
meals with seasoning, imagination, and more cooking time.” Knauer urged consumers to 
plan ahead to avoid the allure of beef at the meat case: “I consider a shopping list to a 
housewife as a battle plan to a general.” This all sounds ridiculous from the perspective of 
today, when chicken, pork, and vegetarian diets have all become mainstream, but in 1973—
thanks to decades of industry and government propaganda—meat was beef. 
Consumers rejected policymakers patronizing suggestions, but in preparation for the 
boycott, they too collected and distributed meatless recipes and information on getting 
protein from different sources. In reading the newspapers and organizational literature, one 
gets the strange impression that most Americans really did not know how not to eat red meat. 
In the early stages, the only meatless meal many women seemed to have off the top of their 
heads was PB&Js. Donavan even admitted that FIT came up with so few meatless recipes on 
their own that they had to cobble together their first cookbook with recipes found from 1924. 
An advice column at the time recommended tuna-fish noodle casserole, creamed chipped 
beef on toast, creamed hard boiled eggs, barbecued corned-beef, green peppers or tomatoes 
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stuffed with corned-beef, oyster soufflé, or Chinese food.316 Almost nothing was vegetarian, 
but the decentralization of beef was still a significant shift. 
The media made fun of the potential dietary consequences. The Los Angeles Times 
quoted one woman at a supermarket during the boycott remarking that “you can see the meat 
counter is completely deserted” and then speculating, “they must all be home killing their 
dogs.”317 Cartoons, depicted scenes like boycotters surviving on ice cream, or rich women 
crying at having to feed their dogs actual dog food. Television news leapt eagerly at the 
opportunity to report on butcher shops selling horse meat. A butcher in Portland making a 
killing on horse commented, “To me it’s a piece of meat—it’s no longer a horse or 
anything—it’s non-existent so far as a relationship to an animal, you know—it’s meat!”318 It 
was supposed to be a joke, but beef consumption has decreased continuously ever since.  
Supply and demand never existed separately from the words and actions of different 
groups on the supply chain. Beef industry and government spokespeople mobilized the myth 
of supply and demand, as an autonomous market force, to justify their own supply-chain 
power politics, but in the end consumers proved that demand was simply a collection of 
individual choices about economic transactions and all they had to do was change their 
minds. In the case of the beef market, demand was a product of diet, and Americans did not 
actually need to demand beef. The great transition in American diets spelled disaster for an 
industry built on the assumption that economic growth was destined in the tastes of the 
nation. In subsequent decades, ranchers, cattle, and beef all became publically maligned 
figures, whether for their rent-seeking behaviour, environmental impacts, or fattiness. Since 
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the boycott and the cattle wreck, the American cattle herd has depleted; corporate 
concentration in meatpacking soared to new heights; the industrial food supply has become 
disgusting on every level; the United States has engaged in increasingly cutthroat and ill-
advised beef export campaigns; and American ranchers have lost relative autonomy, wealth, 
and public status. Many desperate ranchers have turned back to environmentally destructive 
land practices and intensive grain feeding, growth hormones, and antibiotics to compensate. 
Consumers’ actions were clearly justifiable in 1973, but in the long run, the American 
insistence on abundant cheap meat has ultimately aided the degradation of the national meat 
supply. Everyone has been worse off because the American food supply was turned over to a 
thing called “supply and demand” that did not even exist. 
 
 
Figure 14. “Cattle, Calves, Slaughter, Commercial – Slaughtered, Measured in Head,” and “Beef, Slaughter, 
Commercial – Production Measured in LB,” annual totals, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA NASS Quick 
Stats. Graph by author. 
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Figure 15. “Meat Consumption Per Person in the United States, 1909-2012,” Earth Policy Institute, Data Center, 
Food and Agriculture.; “Beef: Supply and disappearance (carcass weight, million pounds) and per capita 
disappearance (pounds),” 1970-2016, USDA ERS Livestock and Meat Domestic Data Online. Graph by author.		
 
Figure 16. “Cattle, Calves, – Price Received, Measured in $/CWT,” Monthly, US Survey of Agriculture, USDA 
NASS Quick Stats. Graph by author. 
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
100.0
lb
s./
ye
ar
Time
United	States	Per	Capita	Beef	Consumption,	1909-2016
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Pr
ice
	($
/c
w
t.)
Time
US	National	Price	Received	for	Cattle,	1909-2016
		
174	
 
Figure 17. “Cattle, Calves, – Price Received, Measured in $/CWT,” 1 January only, US Survey of Agriculture, 
USDA NASS Quick Stats. “Historical Consumer Price Index (CPI-U) Data,” January only, Compiled from US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics by Tim McMahon, available online: 
https://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Consumer_Price_Index/HistoricalCPI.aspx?reloaded=true#Table. 
Calculations ($y/CPIy*CPI2017) and graph by author. 
 
Figure 18. “Consumer price indexes historical data, 1974 through 2016,” USDA ERS Food Price Outlook Data. 
Graph by author.  
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5. Paper Steaks 
I first encountered futures about ten years ago, when I drove across the North 
American continent from my home on the West Coast. I remember vividly crossing the Great 
Plains, and tuning into this continuous rattling of farm goods and prices on the AM radio: 
“feeders … lean hogs … broilers … soybeans … wheat … canola.” The words and numbers 
were foreign to me, but I recognized that they were prices for agricultural things, and I 
quickly learned to accept them as fact. These commodity prices and their constant repetition 
echoing through the cab of my truck seemed natural as I drove through endless yellow 
swaths of rapeseed—a perennial feature of the rural landscape. 
But these farm prices (called futures) and their dissemination have a history, too, and 
“live cattle” is one of the most important ones. Economist Henry Bakken of the University of 
Wisconsin claimed that futures should rank equal with “the coinage of money, the abolition 
of slavery, private property ownership, the negotiable contract, the bill of exchange, and the 
corporate organization” in the history of “milestones” of modern capitalist development. “It 
might even be one of greater significance,” he mused.319 Bakken wrote that on the occasion 
of the invention of live cattle futures. Futures have not figured so prominently as a “social 
innovation” as Bakken hoped. Bakken understood the significance of his moment in a way 
we have largely failed to heed. I for one, had no intelligent opinion of these things when I 
first encountered them in the airwaves of Saskatchewan and North Dakota, and neither did 
the US House of Representatives when it conducted hearings on live cattle futures in 1982. 
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As Berkely Bedell (D-IA) opened the hearings, “This issue is probably the least understood 
of any issue that we face in the Agriculture Committee. I think there is a real desire for 
members to try to be as knowledgeable as possible on the issue, but it simply is so complex 
that it is very difficult for Members of Congress to be as knowledgeable as they should 
be.”320 But finance and financial instruments have come to our attention more since the 
financial crises of 2008, and the historians of capitalism have turned greater attention on the 
history of finance.321 
A future is: an exchangeable financial object that is linked to commodity prices. They 
are traded similarly to stocks, but whereas a stock is a certificate representing a share of a 
company, a future is a contract for future delivery of a specific commodity at a set price and 
time in the future. Futures are a guess of a future commodity price, and they can be 
profitable, or not, for a speculator because the real cash price might end up different. The 
owner of a futures contract literally owns the right to that commodity for that price, but they 
are rarely used as a sales and delivery mechanism for real goods. The buyers and sellers of 
futures are always supposed to close the contract in cash because what they are really doing 
is gambling on prices. We often associate stocks with the exchanges of New York, London, 
Tokyo, etc., but most futures, and this is especially true for live cattle futures, get traded in 
Chicago. Futures are derivatives, which is the same category of financial instruments as those 
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that catalyzed the 2008 housing market crash.322 A future is literally not the real commodity 
listed in its title, and it should carry a different price as it represents a separate, autonomous 
market. Futures markets are socially complex, and historically controversial. 
Futures have a long history dating back, in Chicago, to the 1860s, and, for all human 
society and culture, possibly back to Ancient Mesopotamia. However, the expansion of 
derivatives trading in the last fifty years was not assured in human society or even within 
market capitalism by the appearance of similar sorts of things in the distant past. Rather, the 
introduction of live cattle futures in 1964 was a linchpin moment that enabled the first 
trading in foreign currencies in 1972, treasury bills (or T-Bills) in 1976, financial indices in 
1982, and all the other sorts of derivatives that we now associate with the economic crises of 
1987 and 2008.323 According to Dennis W. Carlton, of the University of Chicago Law 
School, “Futures trading has exploded since 1970.” When the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME or “the Merc”) invented live cattle futures in 1964, H.J. Maidenberg, writing for the 
Denver Post and New York Times, predicted “a revolution in United States Agriculture. If 
successful, their proposals will affect every consumer in the country and large segments of 
the banking and other industries.”324 However, historians and almost everyone else know 
very little about live cattle futures, and almost no one thinks they started the revolution in 
financial trading that took off eight years later. Live cattle futures sound like part of the older 
story of agricultural commodity futures that began, at least, a century earlier, but they 
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actually represented the essential precursor to financial derivatives trading bursting out of 
agriculture and into people’s homes. 
Trading in live cattle pushed futures across a new threshold of financial abstraction. 
Before the cattle contract, there were many experiments in futures trading, but with very little 
success and never in anything other than storable agricultural commodities. After the cattle 
contract, there was a rapid expansion of futures trading in non-agricultural things and in non-
things. The listing of live cattle contracts also demonstrated the ability of the Chicago futures 
sector to break (or rather, make) the rules of the American and foreign economies. More than 
any others that came before, live cattle futures proved that anything could be made into a 
financial fiction for profit by people who had nothing to do with it. This is because it was 
supposed to be economically and metaphysically impossible to offer a futures contract for a 
living animal. The invention of live cattle futures reveals that markets do not have to follow 
laws discovered by economists. Markets may exist because enough people choose to act like 
they do. In 1964, a select group created a new set of rules that turned into a wholly new 
market. 
The invention of live cattle futures came without the consent of cattle producers, the 
United States government, or a significant portion of the public. Live cattle futures were not 
opposed either, though, since few expected great things from the contract. The key to 
ranchers’ participation in the doubtful enterprise rest in the promise futures offered to 
manage cyclical price disturbances caused by the unpredictable climate of the American 
West. Futures exist because bankers convinced enough cattle ranchers that they could use the 
world of financial risk to tame the world of environmental risk. The majority of cattle 
producers later turned against the contract and refused to participate in the market, but the 
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cattle futures market took on a life without them. The overwhelming majority of real living 
cattle and real dead beef carcasses in the United States have no relationship to a cattle futures 
contract, but the live cattle futures trade has remained popular and expanded in the last 
decade like never before. As of 2014, feeder cattle and live cattle were the second and fourth 
best performing of all types futures on global Exchanges, and, as of 2015, the CME was 
biggest derivatives exchange in the world.325 
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Figure 19. Daily Chicago Mercantile Exchange price and trading data from Quandl. Graph by author. 
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From Busts to Cycles 
American cattle producers helped create the new market in cattle futures, but a 
significant portion (probably the majority) have regretted it ever since. Cattle producers and 
some of their representatives in government worked hard to abolish cattle futures in the 
1970s and 1980s; other cattle producers, financial industry organizations, and some of their 
representatives in government worked to keep them. In general, cattle producers’ response 
has been to avoid the futures market, but it is theoretically possible that futures do impact 
real prices for real cattle even without producers’ participation. Many cattle producers 
believe this is the case, but most economists disagree. It is also possible that cattle futures 
precipitated a smaller-scale revolution just within cattle marketing because the number of 
ways to buy and sell cattle proliferated shortly after. This included the return of direct buying 
by meatpacking corporations through private forward contracts, which American cattle 
ranchers had previously fought hard to abolish in the 1910s and 1920s. Cattle futures clearly 
got out of hand, but they began in another attempt by to manage nature. 
One of the perennial problems of the American cattle industry was a boom-bust 
pattern in cattle numbers and prices called the cattle cycle. The cattle cycle was a conceptual 
model that rationalized ecological and economic instability in the form of an economic law. 
Cattle booms and busts had been infamous in the nineteenth century due to some 
combination of frontier optimism; the geographic opportunities of genocide; overgrazing; 
careless open-range management; competition with rustlers, farmers, and sheepherders; and 
climate events like droughts and severe winters. The transition from open-range pastoralism 
to enclosed ranching and the later regulation of public lands were supposed to solve this 
exact problem, but the booms and busts persisted into the twentieth century. In fact, they 
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increasingly took on a national, and eventually international, character as the total cattle 
population swelled and contracted opposite to the individual and collective fortunes of cattle 
producers. As the idea of the cattle cycle developed, these crises became less about 
individual climate or management events, but rather an overall pattern with internal rules. 
American economists and agricultural experts began discussing “the cattle cycle” in 
the mid-1920s, but the idea had been percolating for long enough for one of the earliest 
published references I found to claim “the existence of […] cattle cycles covering fourteen to 
seventeen years […] is well established.”326 The cattle cycle was a statistically and 
graphically observable pattern of deviation from the average change in cattle numbers and 
prices “swinging now up, now down, in an undulating or pendular fashion.”327 In 1926, John 
Hopkins identified five major cycles and eighteen minor cycles in beef prices since 1866.328 
The dominant explanation for the cattle cycle was that cattle producers as a group were 
pursuing their rational self-interest based on what they knew of supply and demand (as 
indicated by prices), but they were being thwarted by the stubborn biology of their product. 
The long lifecycle of a cow (3-4 years) meant that producers’ responded to high prices 
slowly, and by the time they realized everyone else had increased their stock, they flooded 
the market. Once prices fell, they again slowly liquidated the cattle herd causing an overall 
market glut.329 
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The cattle cycle had great explanatory power, but the concept did little to aid in the 
prediction or prevention of its own consequences. More thorough inquiries into the pattern, 
like Hopkins’, found “The cattle price cycles […] are irregular both in length and in 
amplitude, and for each there seems to be a different reason.”330 Hopkins attributed the 
various cattle cycles to war, industrial expansion and railroad construction, settlement booms, 
exports, business depression, advances in crop yield, and general price events, and he 
concluded, “Thus it is not possible to predict any future cyclical movements […] at any 
particular periodicity.”331 The worst fluctuations were those associated with the overstocking 
crisis and harsh winters of the 1880s and the end of the Great War and its price controls. 
Hopkins, in highlighting the unpredictability of future cattle price events, pointed out, 
“Neither is it possible to foresee another great war with attendant economic disturbances 
such as occurred from 1914 to 1921.” But that second war did come, and with it came 
federally-mandated price controls on beef, the Office of Price Administration (OPA), another 
war, some severe climate events, and ultimately one of the worst cattle busts yet. In fact, it 
became known as “The Cattle Bust” in rancher parlance thereafter.332 
However, the more that experts and cattle ranchers discussed the cattle cycle, the 
more it lost its historical nuance and context. The cattle cycle was just “a biological reality,” 
explained Peter Marble of the Cattlemen’s Association, “The demand factors—mostly in 
terms of current and expected beef prices—triggered cattlemen to expand and contract their 
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cattle operations. And because of the biological factors of the cow, their expansion and 
contractors [sic] overshot the mark—causing the cattle cycle.”333 Events like the Cattle Bust 
of the 1950s and the Dustbowl of the 1930s looked like an unbreakable pattern stretching 
back to the chaos of open range capitalism in the nineteenth century. The “cattle cycle” grew 
into an obsession for American cattle producers and their expert advocates in government 
agencies and Western land grant universities. 
 In 1964, some financial-sector businesspeople in Chicago offered a new solution—
what if cattle producers did not have to predict future prices? What if they could guarantee 
them in the present? According to Everett B. Harris, President of the CME, cattle futures 
could “ease the peaks and valleys of the so-called cattle cycle.”334 On a national and multi-
annual scale, the postwar decades were a period of sustained growth for the cattle industry 
and relatively high prices, but individual producers did not experience this the way the total 
average did as represented on the graph at the beginning of this dissertation. The conflicts 
between cattlemen and housewives demonstrate that prices are all about perspective, and 
many ranchers found daily and seasonal prices in the 1950s and 1960s unpredictable. When 
prices swing up and down frequently, someone is certainly getting a bad deal. In fact, the 
CME’s research into the cattle industry found that “the profit that a feeder makes is more 
likely to be determined by the time the animals are for sale and the market level at that point, 
than the efficiency with which the cattle are fed,” which frustrated cattlemen and made them 
receptive to any scheme for wrangling in the market from nature. 
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Cattle producers were supposed to be able to eliminate the price risk posed by cattle 
cycles. through the mysterious and wonderful mechanism of hedging. There are 
fundamentally two types of people in a futures market—hedgers and speculators—not buyers 
and sellers. Cattlemen (and theoretically, meatpackers, to the extent they would participate) 
would be hedgers—never mind the speculators (cattlemen were not supposed to think too 
hard about them). A hedger was not in the market to make a profit off changing prices, but 
rather to ensure a profit despite changing prices. It is quite possible that perfect hedging of 
cattle on futures is impossible in reality, and in all the debate over cattle futures that followed 
1964 no cattle producer identified herself as a true hedger, but the theory is essential for the 
social justification and historical success of futures trading. 
 
Figure 20. Adapted significantly from an image in Roe C. Black, “Guaranteed Prices for Your Beef?” Farm 
Journal, October 1964, Clipping in Folder 18, Box 260, NCA, AHC. Original Caption: “The 3¢ loss on your 
feedlot cattle is offset by the 3¢ gain on your “paper” cattle—an example of how “futures” could help in a down 
market. Your brokerage fees would be the cost of this price insurance “policy.”” 
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For a cattle feeder (the most likely type of operation to use the futures market) 
hedging worked like this:  
A hypothetical cattle feeder located somewhere in the corn belt buys twenty-five 
feeder calves from a western rangeland calf-cow rancher on 1 October for 23 cents per pound 
[¢/lb.]. Those calves ought to be big and fat (roughly 1,000 lbs. each) from eating corn, and 
thus ready to sell to a meatpacker in March. The cattle feeder wants to hedge the risk of cattle 
prices changing, so he phones a broker at the CME and sells, through the broker, a contract to 
a Chicago speculator for 25,000 lbs. of Choice grade steers to be delivered on 1 March. 
In the intervening period, a severe winter storm in Wyoming kills off a significant 
number of breeding and feeder cattle. Though not where our cattle feeder lives, he is affected 
because the shortage precipitates a brief rise in cattle prices, and other cattle producers, who 
have fat cattle ready for sale, rush to sell their stock and flood the market. By the time our 
cattle feeder is ready to sell in March, the price has crashed back down. There is nothing the 
feeder can do about this, and he is forced to sell his 25 steers to a meatpacker for a bargain 
price of 20 ¢/lb. This was a familiar narrative to many cattle producers. 
But our hedging cattle feeder can then buy back his futures contract from the 
speculator, who does not want the cattle, obviously. The speculator has to sell at the new 
prevailing price of 20 ¢/lb., thus the cattle feeder profits in this market exactly equal to his 
loss in the real cash-for-cows market. If the situation were reversed, and the cash price rose, 
the feeder would use profits from the physical transaction at the local or regional stockyards 
to cover his losses, when forced to close out the futures contract for greater than he sold it. If 
the feeder does this in continuous rotation—selling futures every time he buys calves, and 
buying futures every time he sells fat cows—he will never make or lose a bunch of money no 
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matter how volatile prices are. He just gets a steady, livable profit. For hedging to work 
perfectly, the cattle feeder would always have to make simultaneous trades in both markets 
on the same day. 
The above explanation is based on various documents and rural press clippings 
collected in files on live cattle futures in the National Cattlemen’s Association records at the 
American Heritage Center. The image is from an article by Roe C. Black called “Guaranteed 
Prices for Your Beef?” in Farm Journal, from October 1964. I added the narrative images of 
climate, prices, and the meatpacker and speculator for clarity. Actually, the driving message 
of the original diagram, was: make your trades at the same time. That is how you could be 
sure the prices you bought and sold for in real cattle and in futures matched up. If a cattle 
feeder did this, live cattle futures promised to out-smart the cattle cycle. For this they 
received a flurry of unbridled support from university-based economists, federal agents of the 
US Department of Agriculture, big bankers eager to move in on rural lending, general free-
market boosters, and a small, vocal group of cattle producers, who believed in the inexorable 
advance of modernity onto American rangelands. 
However, in the real futures market that the Chicago Mercantile Exchange launched 
in 1964, true perfect hedging was only possible four days a year. In fact, the diagram in Farm 
Journal got the story wrong, since the CME chose 1 November, 1 April, 1 June, and 1 
August as the closing dates for live cattle futures.335 Many more differences between the 
theoretical live cattle futures market presented to American cattle producers and the real live 
cattle futures market they got emerged after 1964, and many ranchers became opposed to 
futures on cattle. Only a small fraction of producers in the United States participated in the 
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futures market, but there were 2,366,110 working cattle operations in the United States in 
1965.336 Thus a small group of cattlemen were enough to ignite the market that ignited a 
revolution in derivatives trading.  
Futures Past 
Modern futures trading was born in Chicago in the mid-nineteenth century, but the 
history of speculation on the price of agricultural goods is much older. Trader lore often 
claims it originated in Ancient Egypt, when a man named Joseph, who was a prisoner of the 
Pharaoh and a pioneering Hebrew fashionista, used divinely-inspired insider information to 
corner the Egyptian grain market.337 The practice of future contracting may even date to 
Ancient Mesopotamia, but the earliest organized market for price speculation was established 
at the Forum in Ancient Rome in the second century BC, where the imperial accumulation of 
capital and a culture of hedonism combined to create a wealthy class of risk takers, who 
speculated on a surprising breadth of things including slaves and cattle.338 The Roman market 
flourished until the forces of Christian morality and anti-Semitism outlawed making money 
from money in Europe. Around a thousand years later, the Dutch, enriched by colonialism 
and emboldened by Calvinist self-righteousness, re-introduced commodity speculation to 
Europe, the most infamous episode of which was the self-destructive tulip bubble of 1637.339 
Next, the Samurai class in eighteenth-century Osaka, Japan, took to speculating in a sort of 
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rice futures contract. In the context of an economic deflation, the Japanese government 
encouraged it under the belief that gambling in rice would drive up prices.340 The Dutch and 
Japanese exchanges both fell into decline as the practice was re-invented on the American 
frontier.341 
In the late 1840s, boat operators on the brand new Illinois and Michigan canal in 
Chicago began a practice that would lead to the first modern futures exchange, the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), and the first modern futures contracts for grains in 1865. The boat 
operators wanted to decrease the risk of price changes while they floated out to the hinterland 
to collect grain, so they sold advance contracts for a set price to be delivered to Chicago on a 
future date. As these contracts became standardized in form, some wily operators and grain 
merchants began purchasing extra contracts in expectation that the price of grain would 
actually rise, not fall, and that they could re-sell them to people who actually wanted the 
grain for a profit. The CBOT then built a building and a special room where people so 
inclined could meet to trade in these forward contracts. This is what a futures contract is—it 
is a fungible (that is, uniform and freely exchangeable) version of a contractual promise to 
deliver a set good at a set price on a set date—and it is profitable (or not) because the actual 
cash price is unstable over time. The establishment of grains futures trading was basically 
consensual among all parties and represented a natural evolution from the commodification 
of grain and the early capitalization of agriculture in the American mid-West. 
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Different proponents of futures markets cite all the above origin stories of futures to 
make futures seem old and natural. Everett B. Harris, president of the CME, wrote a history 
of the CME in which stated with a quote from a Time magazine article: “After all, when the 
seven fat years ended in Egypt and the seven lean years began, wasn’t Joseph the only man 
with grain stacked in his barns?”342 However, each appearance of a new financial object, 
including different agricultural futures, occurred in its own specific historical context, and 
grain futures in the 1860s do not fully explain how you get to live cattle futures or mortgage-
backed indices. William Cronon reveals how the key thing making the trade possible was the 
proliferation of grain elevators to store the commodity.343 And cows do not fit in elevators. 
Futures trading represented a moral, metaphysical, and epistemological conundrum 
for postbellum Americans, since it was a trade in imaginary concepts. How could you buy 
and sell wheat that not only did not exist yet, but you never intended to own?! Prompted by 
farmers’ distrust of urban speculators, Populists increasingly accused Chicagoan futures 
traders of “fictitious dealings” or “wind trading” that was so abstracted from the realities of 
farmers’ fields that it was definitely immoral and very likely destructive of yeoman 
democracy. Farmers’ reaction against futures trading came to a head in the 1890s, when 
futures trading was very nearly banned altogether. According to historian Jonathon Ira Levy, 
the legal justification for futures trading under the US Constitution was an abstract concept 
called “contemplating delivery” that posited: as long as a speculator could imagine herself 
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owning the agricultural commodity, she could buy and sell contracts for it at will.344 
However, another important justification was “storability.” Economic theorists, 
policymakers, and CBOT insiders came to a consensus that futures trading in grain was 
permissible (and worked) because the easy and plentiful storage of grain in Chicago linked 
the abstract futures market to reality and kept it in check. Even though, traders would mostly 
avoid making real trades of grain, there was always enough grain to fulfill a futures trade. 
This was essential to make the prices “real” and the price gambles “fair.” The CBOT 
followed this market rule—only trade in grain. 
New experimentation in agricultural commodity futures waited for a new radical 
group of speculators, who formed the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) in 1919. 345 
These traders started trading in eggs and butter, and they had temporary but remarkable 
success. The trade emerged because new refrigerator technology made eggs and butter 
storable, and a large centralized market emerged in Chicago with significant volume. The 
CME had a low reputation in comparison to the CBOT, and it developed a philosophy of 
experimentation in new commodity markets. The CME could not land a commodity to rival 
the grains on the CBOT, but it did have notable successes next in potatoes and onions. Its 
decisions to list contracts in new commodities were opportunistic rather than obvious, and 
they came without the consent of producers in those commodities. Onion farmers, in 
particular, got really upset with futures trading at the CME, which they accused of causing 
price spikes and crashes. Onion farmers agitated for the Onion Futures Act of 1958, which 
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ended the only successful movement to ban futures trading in the United States.346 But they 
did not know that in 1958, at the CME lost much of it trading volume. Trading volume is the 
life blood of a futures exchange because without traders, you cannot make money off anyone. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, it looked to many within and outside the exchanges, that the CME 
and futures trading in anything other than grain were both doomed. The CME listed dozens 
of new contracts (some lasting only months) in a desperate attempt to attract enough trading 
volume to keep the exchange afloat. Then an unlikely contract stuck—live cattle. 
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange first began considering the possibility of listing 
meat contracts on the commodity futures market in the early 1960s, but these considerations 
were no more serious than those on a grab-bag of other commodities proposed at the time. 
The CME’s behaviour can best be described at the time as reckless experimentation. They 
listed frozen pork bellies in 1961 and shrimp in 1964, the former lasted until 2011 and the 
latter until 1966.347 Pork bellies became synecdoche for the whole concept of futures trading 
and CME members congratulated themselves on their brilliance, while shrimp futures were 
forgotten. At the time, cattle futures were listed then, there was little reason for people 
outside the Exchange to give it much thought. The CME listed live cattle in 1964 without any 
official authorization from the cattle industry or the United States government and without 
any published research and analysis to support the decision. The American National 
Cattleman’s Association’s official response at the time was no comment and that they would 
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think it over at their next meeting in February.348 Henry Bakken praised the CME on this 
point, writing with glee “The fact that many knowledgeable people dismissed the idea as 
doomed to fail did not deter the Exchange from continuing its research.”349  
The CME’s internal research did not uncover much to challenge the idea that live 
cattle did not fit the accepted requirements for futures trading (homogeneity and storability), 
but it did suggest live cattle might be worth moving forward on anyway. First, there was 
serious demand from within the industry for hedging. The CME received reports that, “The 
recent losses in feeding cattle made people very receptive to the possibility of hedging their 
operation.” It also found “that the banks would loan more money on the feeding operation if 
they could eliminate a part of the price risk, by hedging the feeding operation,” which would 
further drive producers into the Exchange.350 Second, the CME learned that cattle production 
was a “Glamour Industry”:  
The act of dealing in livestock, carries a great deal of prestige with it. We cannot overstate the 
likelihood that there will be a volume of trading that will completely astound even the most optimistic 
of the proponents of the futures—provided a workable contract is written. It would not be strange at all 
for people who have little knowledge of the industry, and even no real desire to make a speculative 
profit, to play the futures on cattle. Many people would be willing to buy a cattle contract and expect to 
lose a small amount, just to be able to say at the cocktail parties that they have X number of cattle on 
feed in the Midwest that will be ready for market about—the contract delivery month.351 
 
There were practically infinite commodities that already fit the accepted requirements for 
futures trading, but the CME wanted cattle and they wanted cowboys. Futures trading in 
cattle would be radically new, which would excite the speculative tendencies of many people 
in other markets. And perhaps even more importantly, the CME would be selling every 
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American the opportunity to be a cowboy. I note this prominently here, since not a single 
economist or industry expert noted this fact, and it may explain why everyone was caught off 
guard by the overwhelming early success of the contract. 
However, the CME also learned that live cattle futures could be dangerous. Some 
cattle feeders already attempted hedging in corn (as a proxy for corn-fed cattle), and the 
CME learned that some of them had so misunderstood the process that they ended up in a 
double speculative position in both corn futures and real feeder calves. Cattle producers’ 
strong potential to screw up posed a serious risk because, “It should be remembered that this 
is an agricultural commodity, the producers of which are quite vocal.” “The Exchange would 
have extreme difficulty” it was understood, “if there was any investigation of cattle contracts, 
similar to the onion and potato investigations.” Further, the large trading volume expected 
meant “that mistakes must not be made as they can become very big problems. The trading 
will likely be very large, and an investigation showing any evidence of wrong-doing or 
imperfections in the contract favoring any one group, could lead to disaster.”352 
The CME listed live cattle futures the following November. People, including a 
significant number of cattle producers, chose to participate. Live cattle futures became the 
most successful futures contract since the cutting of the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and the 
CME did it with something no one thought could be traded because of the difficulty of 
delivery. According to economic sociologist Yuval Millo, the non-agricultural financial 
index deritatives that emerged after 1970 are “strange assets,” which means they “do not 
have straightforward physical characteristics, and therefore cannot be delivered, upon buying 
and selling, in a similar manner to physical assets.” Millo argues that deliverability of the 
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underlying asset was crucial for the legitimacy of futures, and indeed was embedded in the 
coded norms of gambling laws. While the concept of deliverability became crucial to futures 
markets, however, the actual practice in the markets rendered deliverability and indeed the 
sheer physicality of assets irrelevant.”353 However, Millo looked directly to the CME’s 
decision to list foreign currencies in 1972, thus overlooking the role of live cattle futures in 
breaking the myths of storability and deliverability in financial derivatives trading eight years 
before. Kieran Healy explains, with reference to contemporary debates over the cash 
payments to human organ donors, that markets do not subsume old restrictions and moral 
taboos without a fair degree of pressure and baby steps in that direction.354 The US 
government explicitly dis-allowed derivatives trading in securities in the 1930s, and the 
proximate cause of their appearance anyway was a CME riding the unbelievable success of 
cattle futures. As Chris Muellerleile explains, securities derivatives were not born of finance 
and New York, but of agriculture and Chicago.355 
While cattle futures did not technically break out of the agricultural norm, they 
pushed futures across a new threshold of financial abstraction. They proved that trading in 
financial objects does not have to follow any economic rules as long as enough people do it 
anyway. The immediate success of cattle futures made the whole economic-philosophical 
conundrum of whether futures trading in living things was possible absolutely moot. 
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Stanley Waldner sees the Future 
On 30 November 1964, the very first ever sale of a futures contract for a living 
animal was made in Chicago. The sale was made to Larry Ryan of Francis I. Du Pont & 
Company, the American chemical leviathan, by a broker on behalf of Stanley C. Waldner, 
owner of The Ayionoros Cattle Company of Leavenworth, Kansas. The groundbreaking sale 
rested on a series of fictions. It kind of represented some real cows, and it kind of represented 
a real sale of cows from a feeder to a slaughterer, but not really. The sale assumed that such a 
transaction would actually happen somewhere, but this was not it. The sale occurred between 
brokers, neither of whom had nor wanted any cows, and the whole point of futures trading 
was that in some way the real sale of cows would be different from this transaction (that is 
how you profit, after all). Though Ryan now owned the right to about twenty-five cows in 
four months, the buyers and sellers in this market were supposed to behave as if that would 
never happen. They had to for several reasons, not least of which was that it was really hard 
to deliver 25 identical cows weighing a total of exactly 25,000 lbs. 
Waldner, the man behind the cows, was a successful corn-belt cattle feeder, and he 
rushed to make the first cattle futures sale both out of confidence in this new strategy and as a 
chance to study and document the process. “As the seller of this first contract,” Waldner told 
readers of Feedlot magazine, “I felt I had made a tangible demonstration of my faith and 
confidence in an activity which in my opinion had much to offer the livestock industry.” 
Waldner watched the reports on trading volume in live cattle closely through the winter, and 
by late March, he felt all the nay-sayers would be proven wrong when 150 live cattle trades 
were made in a single day on 400 contracts. In context, this was astounding volume, but it 
also only represented 10,000 cows at a time when there were about 100 million beef cattle in 
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the country. Ideally, no real cows would ever change hands through these futures contracts, 
but they could. Waldner understood as well as anybody that the success of futures would 
depend on everyone proving “cognizant of the advantages of not taking or making delivery” 
when the contracts closed on 20 April.356 
On April 20th, all but 20 live cattle contracts closed out successfully completing the 
fiction. “From a high of 665 contracts outstanding on Feb. 26, the liquidation had been 
orderly and mature,” Waldner documented, “The futures market and the live cattle market 
had closed one in line with the other.” But that still left 500 cattle that had to be delivered to 
CME pick-up locations. Waldner decided to travel to Chicago to watch the “final test” of the 
feasibility of live cattle futures in action. 
The first two contracts were shipped to the Union Stockyards by Cliff Haden of 
Rochelle, Illinois, on 25 April, and Waldner was at the stockyards at 6 am the next morning 
to watch the official “delivery.” Waldner waited until 10 am, when two USDA cattle graders 
arrived to determine whether these fifty cows met the specifications in the futures contract. It 
took them just five minutes per pen (1 contract of 25 cows=1 pen). The graders determined 
that the first pen had 21 Choice and 4 Good steers, and the cattle all passed, though a few 
were notably overweight. As a result, Haden was allowed to remove one of the Good steers, 
since the total weight of the remaining 24 exceeded 25,000 lbs. The graders herded the 24 
animals into a USDA pen market with the seal of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange then 
returned to their building to fill out a worksheet and phone the information in to the CME, 
which had to assess various penalties for the Good and overweight Choice cattle that had 
deviated from the contract.  
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Waldner called it “an unqualified success,” and then he proceeded to qualify that 
claim. The penalties, which were well outlined in the CME rules, were nonetheless a problem 
for cattlemen. Upon delivery it became clear that “there were owners of delivered cattle who 
did not have a clear understanding of the contract criteria under which their cattle were 
assessed,” and furthermore, while it was relatively easy for cattlemen to provide 25 cattle that 
on average fell into the contract requirements, “It soon became quite evident that a greater 
than average effort was required to provide a delivery unit in which 100% of the steers 
[passed].” And if a delivery unit had more than two animals that fell over or below the 
acceptable weight range, the entire group would be disqualified, which happened with two 
contracts. The seller had to come up with two new units of entirely new animals to try to pass 
again. Futures contracts seemed to work as a way to exchange real cattle, but not in a way 
that was useful to either cattlemen or meatpackers who would prefer to simply sell each cow 
for its value rather than perform a hokey-pokey of off-weighted animals. It is not reported as 
such, but the cattlemen, who chose to deliver these cows were probably ones who had lost on 
their futures and refused to pay the loss in cash, since they had animals on hand. For this they 
learned the penalties of not upholding the fiction. 
Waldner, though, liked the fictitious opportunities of cattle futures trading for 
cattlemen a little more than the experts would have approved of. The USDA and the CME (at 
least when others were listening) instructed cattlemen to hedge their real cattle transactions 
and not to speculate. Waldner saw it differently. “Prior to the advent of the contract,” Walden 
explained, only those cattle feeders with capital who could find good feeder calves could 
benefit from their expectation of rising prices, and cattle feeders that thought the market 
would fall could do nothing other than choose to stay out to mitigate their losses. Now, 
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cattlemen who couldn’t afford or find cattle could still just sell futures, and cattlemen who 
expected prices to fall could buy contracts for cattle in the reasonable expectation that no real 
cattle ever needed to change hands. His real interest in futures then was his expectation that 
cattlemen, knowing the cattle market as well as anybody, could now become speculators in 
their own right. 
Waldner understood better than many professional economists that futures could 
never be the “panacea for a collection of near-broke cattlemen,” but he also sold them better. 
Rather than simply present hedging with futures as an antidote to the risk of the cattle 
market, he captured the glamour of the other side of futures—speculation itself. Waldner 
argued that there was no greater risk investing in cattle futures than in buying feeder calves to 
fatten for market, and, “The futures investor need hire no labor; amortize no equipment; store 
no feedstuffs; repair no fences; have no “vet” bills; wade through no mud; undergo no death 
loss; suffer no “cost of gain” squeeze; mend no broken water lines in the sub-zero winter; 
ship, receive and process on cattle; be constantly plagued by “something else” going wrong; 
ad infinitum.” Waldner captured a reality that university economists and government experts 
refused to admit—cowboys like to gamble. 
Waldner softened his praise a few months later after a second trip to Chicago to 
observe and report on the futures market.357 He still believed in the futures market, but after a 
visit to “the pit” in Chicago, Waldner began warning his readers that the futures market was 
only for cattlemen who really understood it. In six weeks, speculators had driven the price of 
slaughter cattle up by over $2 cwt, to which Waldner exclaimed, “This rise is abnormal! […] 
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It’s dangerous!” Though cattlemen generally viewed this as “financially refreshing” news 
and a long-overdue readjustment of the market to reflect the real value of their products, 
Waldner understood that this was a speculative bubble and it would pop causing more trouble 
for cattlemen than if they never saw the increase in the first place. 
The pit was the physical space in which Chicago speculators conducted their 
gambles, and Waldner, ever the early-riser, got to the visitor balcony overlooking the beef pit 
in advance of the opening of trading at 9:10 am, where he watched the men assemble 
“shouting their orders and waving their arms.” He saw how a man would stick his arm up, 
palm out, and yell “sell 5 Dec at 52” meaning he wanted to “offer” 5 contracts representing 
125,000 lbs. of live beef cattle for December delivery at $26.52/cwt each (the dollar value is 
generally left off for brevity). If a man, palm inward, was “bidding” at an identical value, the 
trade was made. The seller had to fill out a card with the details, which he passed to a clerk, 
who took it to the men who recorded such things on a giant blackboard. In fact, Waldner 
explained, if trading volume was low enough, trades were recorded directly to the blackboard 
by the technical means of yelling. Waldner, like many observers of “the pit” before him, 
found the scene “exciting and unusual,” but he also believed it was within the capacity for 
cattlemen to understand, since it bore resemblance to a rural livestock auction. 
The trouble with futures, vis-à-vis the livestock auction, was again that the animal 
was not there (or anywhere yet). In an auction, a group of buyers assemble to offer the best 
price on a given animal, which is a pretty good representation of its value based on supply 
and demand, since it is literally the supply and the demand zoomed in to a specific 
location.358 In the pit, both buyer and seller were guessing what was going to happen in the 
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market, and they both had to guess differently meaning someone had to be wrong. The 
futures price was therefore, by intention and definition, the wrong price on the value of those 
cattle. Waldner struggled with this paradox—both buyer and seller pursued rational self-
interest based on better pricing information than ranchers had ever had before … but one of 
them had to be wrong. 
Futures straddled the space between the real physical world and a fictitious or 
abstracted financial world. The futures price was about the cash price, but real delivery of 
goods was a threat and not a goal. A widely known folk story in the Chicago futures sector 
warns traders that the futures market still carries the threat of delivery as a reminder to follow 
the rules and keep the market fake. Most Chicago traders have heard the story of some young 
sap, who forgot to close a live cattle futures contract and suddenly got a phone call 
announcing that his cattle had been dropped off and telling him to come get them.359 
However, the abstract financial futures market was also fundamentally a physical practice 
made up of telephones, chalkboards, and hands. This market was an entirely new thing that 
did not exist before 1964, but the rush of cattle producers and others into the exchange 
rendered the whole economic-philosophical conundrum of whether futures trading in living 
things was possible absolutely moot.360 However, the sudden and surprising success of 
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futures opened new questions. Who was actually participating, and who did cattle futures 
work best for? Cattle futures and the cash-for-cows market were different, but they were 
connected. Could futures, which were supposed to represent a wrong prediction of cattle 
prices several months in the future, somehow alter or affect the actual cash price for cattle? 
Waldner certainly believed the early excitement around live cattle futures led directly to an 
artificial spike in the price of beef. Remember also that a pretty significant boycott erupted in 
1966, and the price of beef did fall back down immediately. The CME listed live cattle 
futures without the express consent of anyone really. Would they still be permitted? 
The Problem of Delivery 
“The problem of delivery” was the de facto name given to the economic-
philosophical law made futures trading in large living animals impossible before 1964. Live 
cattle futures broke that law opening a financial Pandora’s box of derivatives in non-
deliverable, or “strange” things.361 However, the problem of delivery did not go away, it just 
changed. Waldner would probably say, “the problem of delivery” was exactly what would 
keep cattle producers from trying to pay off their futures losses in animals. In 1989, some 
economists returned to this question, and argued that the un-deliverability of cattle actually 
did create unique problems for cattle futures and the cattle industry compared to more 
realistic markets like grain.362 I believe we could also use “the problem of delivery” to 
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describe the inability of economists to determine with any conclusiveness what futures 
markets in non-deliverables really did to the real world after the CME delivered them. 
It proved especially difficult to determine if producers actually could hedge using live 
cattle futures.363 The problem was that there was a paradox built into futures due to the fact 
that hedgers and speculators (never mind buyers and sellers for now) wanted different things 
from the market. Hedgers wanted, and were promised, a general leveling of prices. 
Speculators wanted, and futures markets necessarily required, wild and unpredictable price 
swings. 
In much of the literature distributed to cattle ranchers before and after the futures 
offering in live cattle, there was an implication that they, as hedgers, were getting the best of 
those frivolous Chicago speculators. It had the distinct and simplified taste of propaganda, 
but in 1960 the path breaking right-wing economist Milton Friedman turned the notion into 
theory. Freidman built off the premise that futures markets were basically analogous to 
gambling dens, and that speculators were motivated by greed, thrill, and addiction. It was the 
exact argument that producers and the other enemies of futures trading had been levelling 
against speculation since the 1860s, but Friedman, in a style that was typical of 
conservativism to come but shocking at the time, said that was not a bad thing. He dismissed 
Puritan aversions to vice and proceeded to hypothesize that these gamblers could have a net 
positive effect for society, since the gamblers had a propensity to lose thus removing the risk 
distributed to the rest of society: 
“Suppose that there exists independent gambling establishments in which all gambling takes the form 
of betting on the future price of the commodity in question—say rubber. The people who bet on the 
																																																						
363 Skeptics on hedging included: M.J. Skadberg and G.A. Futrell, “An Economic Appraisal of Future Trading 
in Livestock,” Journal of Farm Economics 48 (1966), 1485-9; T.A. Hieronymus, “Futures Trading in Hogs,” 
Illinois Agricultural Economics 6, no. 2 (1966), 1-10; Gene A. Futrell, “Do Live Cattle Futures Differ from 
other Existing Futures Contracts?,” Futures Trading in Livestock – Origins and Concepts CME, ed. (Madison, 
WI: Mimir, 1970), 69-75.  
		
204	
price of rubber in the hypothetical gambling establishment do not buy or sell rubber, and neither do the 
people who run the establishment. Their operations therefore have no direct effect on the price of 
rubber; the rubber market simply takes the place of the roulette wheel at Monte Carlo.
 
We may 
suppose the proprietors of an establishment to operate solely as brokers, engaging in no gambling 
themselves but being paid a fee for providing facilities and bringing together people willing to take 
opposite sides of a common wager. And we suppose throughout that the people engaging in the 
gambling do so deliberately and are reasonably well informed: they like to gamble and are willing to 
pay a price to do so. Let us put to one side any moral objections to gambling, and suppose that the 
gambling services are provided under competitive conditions. The proprietors of the gambling house 
are then devoting economic resources to producing services to satisfy the wants of consumers, who are 
willingly buying the services and paying a price equal to the cost of the alternative services that could 
have been obtained with the same resources. Clearly there is economic gain rather than loss through 
the operation of the gambling house.364 
 
In fact, futures trading in the nineteenth century had been commodity gambling, since many 
smaller “bucket shops” acted as bookies on the larger CBOT outcomes.365 But Friedman’s 
iconoclast conservatism would not play well in middle America, and it failed to even begin to 
actually say how hedgers might use the market.366 Speculation was definitely real, but 
hedging turned out not to be so much.367 
Professional ecoxnomists were slow to examine the question of futures contracts on 
living things empirically,368 and the plurality of knowledge on the topic in the decades after 
1964 was driven by seminars sponsored by the Exchange itself in 1965, 1966, 1967, and 
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1979.369 The proceedings of these seminars reveal two general tendencies expressed in the 
viewpoints of economists on live commodity futures—including those who endorsed them 
and those who doubted them—up to 1979: 1. Enthusiasm for live commodity futures, and 2. 
Recognition that empirical evidence did not justify their enthusiasm for live commodity 
futures. The most common refrain across all the essays was “more research needed,” which 
was understandable in 1967 but not so much in 1979. Ironically, since futures markets 
thrived on the notion that they embodied the economic chimera of a free and competitive 
market responding perfectly to supply and demand information, there was almost no 
conclusive information about these markets fifteen years later! 
On the occasion of the “First Annual Livestock Futures Research Symposium” held 
sponsored by the CME and held in Chicago in June 1979, economists Raymond M. Leuthold 
(University of Illinois) and William G. Tomek (Cornell University) attempted the most 
thorough and comprehensive review of the empirical literature on live commodity futures (by 
then cattle and hogs) yet.370 Leuthold and Tomek identified eighty-four relevant publications 
primarily from US universities and the US Department of Agriculture. They apologized for 
neglecting foreign and popular publications, but it was still the largest of such undertakings 
ever completed, since the “First Annual” symposium also proved the last. They remained 
positive on the outlook for live commodity futures throughout, but their findings may prove 
troubling for anyone who believes major financial institutions should do what they are 
supposed to. 
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The greatest fear of producers was that futures impacted price movements in some 
way other than was natural in a “real” free market. One of producers’ concern was that due to 
an excess of price information, futures trading drove real prices in response to known “fake” 
futures prices. In other words, futures artificially amplify their own effects. Advocates of 
futures shot back the opposite—that futures trading unbound the market from constraints 
caused by a lack of information or means of efficient exchange. Thus futures were a much 
more “real” free market. The latter theory of belief was called, in economics, the “efficient 
market hypothesis,”371 and the specific subset of it concerning futures markets’ response to 
information was called the “random walk hypothesis.” Leuthold and Tomek identified four 
studies that tried to test whether a known futures price had any influence on subsequent 
futures prices.372 Three found that prices for live cattle futures did not walk randomly, and 
one found that they were basically “serially independent,” but Leuthold and Tomek spoke 
personally to the authors of that study, who admitted they had since discovered calculation 
errors and privately doubted their own conclusions. 
More importantly, producers feared that futures prices directly affected cash prices. 
The driving hypothesis lending support to futures by the USDA, bankers, and key beef 
industry advocates was that they futures did, in fact, affect cash prices but only to make them 
less volatile. Leuthold and Tomek identified two studies that tested cash price variability 
before and after the introduction of futures trading, and both found evidence that, on a 
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weekly or monthly scale at least, futures did correlate with reduced cash price variability. 
Leuthold and Tomek did not think the research was perfect, but the main problem was 
“simply that farmers and their representatives do not believe the results.”373 
In defense of sceptical farmers, this was not exactly their point. A lack of volatility 
was admittedly a good thing, but they feared that futures drove cash prices down. 
Unfortunately, there was not a clear way to test that—when prices were already changing 
dramatically due to unknown variables, how can you tell if any given variable added or 
removed is changing them one way or the other? Only one study attempted to trace causation 
between futures and cash prices for live commodities (it was on hogs, not cattle), and it found 
“evidence of some causality running from futures to cash prices. The magnitude or the effect 
of this causality is not ascertained in their study.”374 This hardly sounds like news to stop the 
rural presses, but what it meant was that the only available empirical evidence on the 
question supported producers’ greatest fears. Leuthold and Tomek weighed all this 
information and made the only conclusion two educated, respected academic economists 
could make: live cattle futures were great.375 
Cattle producers did not find such unanimous consent on futures. When Stanley C. 
Waldner appointed himself Kansas’ official boot stomper for futures trading within the cattle 
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industry, he was surprised—or so he claimed, since I doubt he was surprised at all—to find 
most cattlemen were opposed to them. “Aren’t you interested in becoming a ‘futures 
cattleman’,” Waldner asked “a well-to-do, weather-beaten old cattleman,” but the man 
“smiled, slowly shook his head and said, ‘Not me, Sonny, I just can’t eat those paper 
steaks’.” Perhaps a better way to put it was that cattlemen distrusted futures, since they, like 
everybody else, had no way of knowing what this thing would or would not do in real 
application.376 
In the summer of 1964, American Cattle Producer captured the optimistic end of the 
spectrum in an article aptly titled: “Cattlemen don’t understand futures but say they’re 
interested.” It was not exactly a glowing endorsement, but as the article explained, “after the 
way the market has acted this year they’d be willing to try it just to see if it wouldn’t help.” 
Good news for the CME, since that is exactly what is was counting on. But the cattlemen 
interviewed for the piece said some interesting things. Field Bohart of Colorado claimed to 
understand it all quite well, and he said, “It might be alright. It would definitely be interesting 
to see what it would do […].” John McNey, of Farr Co., a huge and influential Colorado 
operation, approved strongly of the idea, but he still worried that it might bring in too much 
outside oil, movie or industrial investment money through men who are looking for what 
they think are tax advantages in agricultural investments.” D.A. Peterson of Wyoming 
thought it might be a useful way to estimate future prices, and for some reason he thought, “I 
like to think it might put a stop to this flood of imported beef. Americans are eating too much 
imported beef with no labels, so they didn’t really know what they are eating.” It would seem 
he just thought imports were a bigger issue than futures, so elected to discuss that instead 
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apropos of nothing.377 The final interviewee was a USDA marketing official named Tom 
Ferrell, who was doubtful that cattle futures could be of much use to cattlemen, since 
“Futures buyers are speculators.” Plain and simple. 
The most enthusiastic cattleman I found on record discussing futures was Herman E. 
Lacy, a feeder from Illinois, who saw the futures market primarily as a means to stick it back 
to the meatpackers, whom he hated for reasons economic, cultural, and historical, of course. 
Lacy was responding to an opinion published by Herrell DeGraff, President of the American 
Meat Institute, which outlined packers’ opposition to futures trading on the grounds that it 
provided no new useful marketing tool and that it would not work because cattle are not 
uniform. Lacy was outraged that the meatpackers would try to deny producers a chance to 
hedge their risk, and on the issue of cattle being too difficult to store: “Dr. DeGraff, what in 
the world would you call the millions of head of cattle on ranches and in feedlots this very 
day? They are cattle and calves in storage—in inventory awaiting shipping day. They are not 
perishable—they sometimes have flies on them, but they are not spoiled.” 
In other words, producer support for futures trading did exist, but not really because 
all those producers believed strongly in its potential. Initial support for futures did indeed 
stem from the volatile price swings of the previous two decades, and it dried up to near 
drought conditions during the price swings of the following two decades. Which of course 
futures were supposed to prevent, and which, of course, they did not. 
The mid 1960s, mid 1970s, and early 1980s all saw dramatic and devastating price 
swings for cattle producers. This was bad for futures advocates because, as Clayton Yeutter, 
President of the CME, noted it in writing to the NCA, “Futures markets are always an issue 
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when the cattle industry is in economic straits,” which in his mind had nothing to do with 
futures, obviously. Peter Stubben, also of the CME, saw this thinking in action during a 
meeting with seventy-five cattle feeders in Sioux City, Iowa: 
I asked how many of them felt the cattle market in the ‘70s was more volatile than the cattle market in 
the ‘60s. Everyone put up their hands. I asked how many of them felt this additional volatility in the 
cattle market in the ‘70s was caused by the futures market. Everyone put up their hands. Then I asked 
how many people felt grain markets have been more volatile in the ‘70s than in the ‘60s. Everyone put 
up their hands. Then I asked the obvious—how many people felt this higher volatility is due to the 
grain futures market? No one raised a hand.378 
 
Stubben made a good point. Futures probably were not to blame for all the problems of the 
cattle industry. It was way more complex and involved climate, international trade, economy-
wide structural transition, population and urban growth, developments in real estate and 
portfolio investing, taxes, consumer boycotts, etc. ad infinitum. Futures trading, at worst, 
could have exacerbated the impact of some of these other forces. But, and this is the big 
point, there was also no good reason for them to exist if cattle producers did not want them 
to. 
Cattle producers began agitating for the abolition of futures trading in live cattle. The 
Iowa Cattlemen’s Association adopted resolutions calling for an end to cattle futures in 1974 
and again in 1982.379 Women Involved in Farm Economics (WIFE) called for the same in 
1982.380 These resolutions are difficult to track, but it seems that local and state organizations 
all over the West and Midwest passed these kinds of resolutions in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, and they began putting pressure on the national organization to do something about it. 
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The National Cattlemen’s Association received a great deal of correspondence from its 
members expressing doubt or fear in the first years of the contract, to which the association 
had no response. As late as October 1964, the executives of the NCA had not seen a copy of 
the CME’s proposed contract, did not know for sure if it would be offered that November, 
and had no official position on the matter.381 
At the annual meeting of the NCA in January 1980, the question rose, “should futures 
trading in live cattle continue?” The organization formed a subcommittee on futures trading 
within the important marketing committee, and the subcommittee decided to conduct a mail-
out survey to poll the association’s membership on the question. The committee analyzed 
1701 responses, and found that cattlemen’s thoughts “were extremely mixed” just on the 
question of whether futures markets even constitute a marketing tool of any use by cattle 
producers. Just over half believed that futures could “be a tool which can increase operation 
stability and profitability,” but over half said futures were becoming less valuable in “today’s 
uncertain economy,” and 60% ultimately concluded “delivery on futures contract is not a 
practical merchandizing tool.” 382 
Respondents were even less generous in regard to how they thought futures markets 
were being applied. “There is a fairly strong belief among the respondents that futures 
markets have a negative influence on cash markets. Almost two-thirds believe that futures are 
a major cause of price fluctuation.” And worse, “More than 90 percent believe that large-
volume trading by some brokerage firms enables those firms to influence price movements; 
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and 59 percent believe the cattle industry would be more economically sound without 
futures.” 383 
The survey finally asked, what should be the NCA’s position on futures? 52% said 
positive, 8% said neutral, and 40% said negative. It was also pretty clear that the survey was 
not representative of the opinions of cattle producers as a whole, since 54% of those who 
decided to return the survey had experience in cattle futures, when the large majority of 
cattlemen in America refused to touch them. Of those, who had tried futures trading, the 
majority rated futures between “moderately necessary” and “not necessary” to their 
operations, and most had never hedged more than 40% of their real cattle stocks at a time. 
The NCA concluded from these results that its membership wrongly believed futures 
were bad, so the organization redoubled its efforts to educate membership on the wonders of 
futures trading.384 The truth is, the stated purpose of the membership survey on futures was 
disingenuous. The purpose was not to determine whether the association should support, 
remain neutral, or oppose futures—it was rather to determine how much the association 
needed to support futures and in what ways. The Cattlemen’s Association, for reasons that 
were never stated explicitly in their internal documents, had already became an essential 
proponent of futures trading. The “Final Report of the NCA Cattle Futures Market 
Surveillance Committee,” admitted that “At the very least, the cattle futures markets 
influence cash prices in the short term,” but it downplayed that problem in context: “[…] just 
as other factors, in addition to basic supply and demand, influence prices. Other factors 
include such things as supplies and prices of competitive meats, interest rates, meat imports 
and exports, government actions, international events, market psychology, cattlemen’s 
																																																						
383 “National Cattlemen’s Association Membership Survey […],” 1980, Folder 14, Box 217, NCA, AHC. 
384 “National Cattlemen’s Association Membership Survey […],” 1980, Folder 14, Box 217, NCA, AHC. 
		
213	
bargaining positions, and a host of other factors.”385 That was not a bad point, but it was 
curious that the NCA sought to defend futures. 
Perhaps, the association saw its role as ensuring stability, and the removal of futures 
trading would surely cause some form of instability. More likely, it was due to the fact that 
the cattlemen’s association was by the 1980s dominated by larger operators and especially 
cattle finishing operations (corn feed lot owners), which tended to be the highest value and 
most capitalized outfits in the cattle growing chain. This in itself marked a pretty remarkable 
transformation in the membership, since cattle feeders had barely existed before 1940 and 
were barred from membership in the organization until 1977. Regardless of the reason, 
Yeutter could praise the NCA in 1981 for “do[ing] a fine job in keeping those emotions 
[from the membership against futures] under control”and for “mak[ing] a very major 
educational contribution in the interim.”386 The CME had a vital interest in attracting cattle 
producers and dissuading those already trying futures from leaving when it did not work 
out.387 
The early 1980s marked an important moment of challenge to futures trading in 
cattle. The context of “the farm crisis” meant producers were on the defensive and looking 
for someone or something to blame. In the absence of a meatpacker’s oligology, futures 
markets were an obvious and available culprit. Furthermore, a report entered to Congress in 
September 1980 by representative Neal Smith of Iowa, garnered widespread attention when 
it discovered that small traders (mainly hedgers) lost $115.5 million to large traders 
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(speculators and firms) over a 16 month period. Smith’s report concluded, “the cattle futures 
contracts still fail to meet minimum requirements necessary to make them a justifiable 
economic tool and as presently constituted, they do more harm than good to farmer-feeders 
as a whole.”388 To this the CME responded that the statistics were all correct, but Smith had 
misread their meaning. Futures were actually good. 
In 1982, the US House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture oversaw 
hearings into cattle futures in Iowa (the center of cattle feeding in the country) in 1982. The 
testimony ranged from humourous—“One of them said he had used them one time and lost 
his shorts and that was it; he was through”—to tragic—“ He said that he would never again 
use the cattle futures as a marketing tool […] the psychological affects on himself and his 
family were more than he would care to go through again.”389 
The committee heard testimony from nine cattle producers with varying experience 
with futures, and they learned of a common pattern among those who tried to hedge cattle on 
the Merc. William Utesch reported that he and his three sons were driven by declining profits 
to try to learn to use futures in 1980, but he summed up the experience: “And let me tell you 
right now our experience there has been none too good.”390 Victor Tomka tried to hedge with 
futures in 1973 and lost money. He pushed it off as inexperience and misunderstanding and 
avoided futures until 1980, when serious losses motivated him to try to learn how to do it 
right. He attended seminars, met with several brokers, and, “After amassing this evidence 
and studies and experience of others, in May 1981, I began in earnest to hedge cattle futures. 
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Since May 1981, I have hedged hundreds of contracts with my sons.” He had a small profit 
on the first few contracts, but, “Since that date, there has been no time that I could hedge 
cattle at a break- even price.”391 Donald Smith also began using futures after “profits began 
to fade away feeding cattle” in 1973, but he made money. However, Smith was not there to 
defend futures; he was there to admit that he learned to make money by buying fat cattle that 
should have been sold to a meatpacker to be processed into food and re-“hedging” them on 
futures. What Smith was doing was short-term speculating under the guise of a hedger, and 
he admitted, “I don’t believe this type of business is good for the cattle industry because this 
tool was being used against me and the only way I could survive was do the same thing.”392 
Two other cattlemen who tried to defend futures revealed that they, too, engaged in 
speculating and never really “hedged” a majority of their stock.393 A poll in Livestock Weekly 
in April 1981 found that 96 percent of respondents believed futures trading was harmful to 
the cattle industry.394 
Why did the majority of American cattle ranchers oppose futures trading in live 
cattle? And more importantly, why did it matter if they could simply choose not to participate 
(which is exactly what most of them did)? Cattle producers alleged that the mere existence of 
futures trading disrupted the normal forces of the “supply and demand” market and, at best, 
caused greater price volatility, or at worst, systematically drove down the price producers 
received for their real cattle. 
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Critics of futures trading said that cattle producers did not necessarily become 
hedgers on the Merc willingly. Many smaller cattle producers using futures (and futures are 
especially poorly suited to small operators), were forced (or strongly encouraged) to do so by 
large banks, which were moving increasingly into rural lending and preferred financial 
metrics of risk to old rural bankers’ handshake method.395 Nancy Espy, a range cattle grower 
from Montana and the National Beef Chairman of WIFE, went out and asked a number of 
bankers about the role of futures in their lending policies and practices. She found that many 
rural banks actually regretted their early advocacy of futures, and one banker, “said he was 
scared to death every time he read accounts of manipulations in the futures because he felt a 
great deal of responsibility for those clients that he had encouraged to go ahead and go into 
the feedlots and hedge their cattle.”396 Further, the choices cattle producers made once they 
did hedge were often strongly influenced by others. Espy spoke to several cattle feeders, who 
had the experience of receiving calls from their brokers urging them to day trade, and she 
believed many just did whatever a broker said since they had pressing farm business to deal 
with and couldn’t seriously consider their options in the moment.397 In fact, it was such a 
problem that every bank that Espy spoke to had instituted explicit contracts barring lendees 
and brokers from trying to alter or lift hedges without the bank’s approval.398 
Many cattle producer claimed that futures affected them even if they did not 
participate. Donald Budlong expressed a reasonable defense of futures as an option for some 
cattle producers, saying, “I certainly have no quarrel with people that do not want to use the 
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Mercantile. If they want to play as I used to do, play big stakes poker, I certainly hope that 
the ability for me to reduce my risk is not taken away from me.”399 But many cattle producers 
reported that they didn’t have to participate to lose on futures, since cattle buyers 
representing meatpacking firms would use low futures prices to undercut producers during 
farm sales.400 Donald Smith recounted three examples of how shady the meatpackers were in 
using futures against cattlemen: 
I called a packer and asked what the market was doing. He told me it was too early to tell yet. I said, 
“What do you mean? Are you waiting for the futures to open?” He said, “I guess so.” 
 
At about 10 a.m., this same superior announced on his radio, “Futures are down the limit. Better take 
off $2 from the beef card.” This same cattle buyer told me he couldn't understand what the futures had 
to do with the market that day and he was very disgusted. 
 
In the afternoon on Monday, January 11, 1982, I priced four loads of heifers to a packer buyer at 
$59.50. On Tuesday morning, January 12, he came to my place to buy the cattle and at approximately 
10 a.m., he asked me to sit in his car and listen to code calls.401 
 
Wildin explained, because packers used futures to quote prices, “Futures trading is the 
primary and major force in determining the prices we receive for our major livestock and 
grain commodities. Therefore, futures trading is the dominant factor in determining whether 
or not producers make a profit or lose money on their operation.” Cattle producers got no say 
in whether futures could be traded on their products, and no say in how the exchange would 
be handled. 
Cattle producers further alleged that futures trading increased price volatility. William 
Shermer, chairman of the marketing committee of the Iowa Cattlemen’s Association, 
responded to the claim by futures advocates that futures should stabilize prices: “In reality, 
just the opposite is true. Speculators must have a volatile market if it is to work to their 
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advantage. We recognize that futures prices can also influence cash prices in an upward 
direction. As producers, we don’t complain, loudly when this occurs. It does point out, 
however, that cattle futures contracts add volatility to our markets.”402 They had a strong 
point, as the President of the Chicago Board of Trade President revealed to Forbes magazine 
in 1981: “Market breaks actually help us. Futures markets thrive on economic un-certainty, 
high interest rates and violent price swings.”403 
More often, cattle producers argued that futures systematically drove down beef 
prices.404 There were a couple possible explanations for how this would work. One was 
simply that the way meatpackers used futures meant they would lower prices if futures were 
down, but they obviously would not raise them. Mike Madden, who owned a livestock 
stockyard and brokerage, opined expertly, “I don't think there is any doubt that cattle futures 
are setting the highest cash cattle prices.”405 
Most critics argued (in direct contrast to the guiding justification for futures markets) 
that they obscured and obstructed the proper functioning of the free market. Cattle producers 
said futures were a “rumor” market; a “psychology market”; a “Pyramid” scheme; a “yo-yo 
market; and just “hot air.”406 Cattle producers railed against the idea that futures reflected 
actual supply and demand in any way because: 
Far and away the most devastating aspect of futures trading is the fact that an unlimited number of 
people that have no cost of production and no investment in land, livestock or equipment can sell 
livestock or grain they don’t even own to begin with and they can do this at prices the actual owner 
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never agreed to take. The term used to describe this practice is speculative short selling. Speculative 
short selling provides processors and wealthy speculators with opportunities to make monumental 
profits each time a bearish cattle on feed report, crop report, weather report or any other potentially 
depressing rumor surfaces.407 
 
And it turned out to be a well-documented fact that the majority of meatpackers using the 
futures market were doing just this—selling, not buying, cattle on the bet that the price of 
cattle would go down! Another cattleman pointed out the rather obvious fact during the 1982 
hearings: “It [The futures market] is billions of dollars taken out of industrial investment, out 
of industrial capital investment, and put into a market that produces nothing.”408 
Cattle producers basically made the argument that it did not matter whether futures 
markets theoretically impacted cash markets because they knew that the live cattle futures 
market literally, de facto, objectively, actually did impact the price they got for their cattle. 
The producers’ argument turned the economic theory on its head. One of the main 
justifications for futures markets is that they help make cash-for-commodity markets function 
more like the idealized free market. They are supposed to do this by assembling a large group 
of faceless competitors and distributing free and equal pricing information. The ranchers 
turned it around and said the futures market provided too much price information that was 
not linked to the specific animals or places of the exchange. It was too much market 
abstraction. 
Whether or not you believe that, it mattered a lot that cattle producers did believe it. 
Cattle futures upset the normal ways of doing business in the beef industry, and there were a 
proliferation of new ways to buy cattle after 1970.409 One of those was direct buying by 
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meatpacking firms through predatory forward contracts. In the 1910s and 1920s, cattle 
producers had fought for and won some of the strongest regulations to prevent corporate 
manufacturers from capturing supply and dictating prices, but in the 1970s and 1980s cattle 
producers rushed directly back into those types of relationships leading to a meatpacker 
oligopoly that would have made Amour, Morris, Wilson, and Swift blush (See figure 13). In 
fact, Koontz et al. argued that cattle futures became less accurate cash price predictors in the 
1980s exactly because of greater “direct buying” by meatpackers.410  
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6. Beef, Oranges, & Comparative Disadvantage 
In May 1982, the first of a string of anti-American beef protests erupted in Japan. 
About eight thousand farmers marched on government buildings and the US embassy in 
Tokyo chanting, “no more beef” and “no more oranges.”411 In December 1982, the Argus-
Leader of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, reported that “war banners festoon the cow barns of 
rural Japan” in opposition to US trade demands.412 In January 1983, ten thousand farmers 
marched on Tokyo again chanting the more aggressive slogan “down with America.”413 The 
farmers presented the Japanese legislature, called the Diet, with a petition carrying 9.7 
million signatures in opposition to US beef and citrus imports.414 As protests raged in Japan, 
American ranchers demonstrated in Colorado to urge on their government’s aggressive trade 
policy, and Australian ranchers threatened “violence,” according to one source, if the 
Japanese Diet acquiesced to US demands.415 Five years later in April 1988, protests flared up 
again, this time smaller but more violent. About three hundred farmers in headbands reading, 
“protect Japanese agriculture,” demonstrated in Kokonoe in western Japan, and they smashed 
an American car, loaded it up with oranges and an American flag, and set the pile on fire.416 
This was how “free trade” worked. 
Proponents of free trade theorize that all nations will benefit if all nations produce 
only the goods they are best (or most economically efficient) at producing and import other 
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goods from nations that have advantage in those. It is also clear that free trade ideas dominate 
economic theories of transnational markets as well as the political ideologies of the 
transnational capitalist elite and many of the world’s national governments. Free trade is even 
the official policy of international trade law due to the General Agreement of Trade and 
Tariffs, created along with the United Nations in 1946. And yet, free trade in Pacific Rim 
beef met with fierce resistance in the 1980s, which continues in various forms to the present. 
The “beef and citrus war” of the 1980s was part on an ongoing process to impose 
free-market international trading conditions in the Pacific Rim. The United States wanted 
Japan to remove its import quotas restricting beef and citrus imports; Japan wanted to 
continue protecting domestic food-production; and Australia wanted the US to stop meddling 
in Japanese markets that Australia previously held uncontested access to. The conflict was 
surprisingly hard fought on all sides, especially, since there was very little to gain in terms of 
actual dollars and yen. The conflict highlights the political construction of global trade 
markets; the confluence of social, cultural, and environmental constraints to market-
formation; the role of national-scale governmental, non-governmental, and semi-
governmental organizations in negotiating and enacting market rules; the power of economic 
ideas in driving market-change; as well as the folly of proscribing abstract economic 
principles to a real-world market that you do not actually understand.  
During the conflict, United States trade negotiators, with the backing of beef 
producers, tried to change the rules of the Japanese beef import market to make trading 
across the Pacific Rim better match their vision of free trade based on comparative advantage 
theory—the idea that American soil and market conditions were superior and more efficient 
for beef production on a global scale, and that free competition across borders was natural 
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and best for all citizens of the capitalist world. American pressure did force important 
changes to the Japanese market, but the US team never secured a real advantage for its cattle 
producers. Not only did US leaders fail to understand how and why international beef trading 
actually worked the way it did, but they also encountered a strong system of non-free-trade in 
beef that the United States helped create during the preceding fifty years. Following the US 
model, national producers’ trade associations and other governmental and semi-governmental 
industry organizations became the key drivers and negotiators of transnational beef trading, 
and they tried to manipulate a wide variety of institutions that regulated national and 
international beef exchange—including trade laws, tariffs, import quotas, domestic subsidies, 
consumer cultures, local land use patters, and even health-and-safety regulations.  
The existence of a nearly decade-long trade war between equally rich nations over a 
basic agricultural commodity casts doubt on the very freeness of free trade. In fact, the 
prominent inclusion of oranges in a trade war over beef foreshadows the complexity of these 
market politics. Free trade is more than a myth; it is a lie designed to obscure the violence of 
market aggression across national borders. The history of US market imperialism is lined 
with the corpses of small-producers from across the Global South, but they are not the 
victims of free markets. Free markets are not real, and they certainly do not have agency. The 
beef and citrus war is a rare case of failed globalization that lays bare just how unnatural this 
process has been. 
The Beef & Citrus War 
The beef and citrus war was a bitter, drawn out conflict fought with words and threats 
as well as commodities. At the heart of the dispute were three different visions of the 
transoceanic beef market, which state and beef-industry representatives from the United 
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States, Australia, and Japan tried to impose onto the rules of beef exchange around the 
Pacific Basin. The bulk and heat of the trade war occurred between 1979 and 1988, when 
Japan apparently acquiesced to US demands and began a formal process towards total 
liberalization of its beef import markets. However, the United States still, in 2017, does not 
have totally free access to the Japanese beef market. The beef and citrus war carved out the 
market conditions for what is now the largest, most valuable, and most complex market 
within the global beef economy, but it is an obscure and all-but-forgotten episode of a decade 
that already seems so far away. 
I first learned about the 1983 demonstrations in Japan, the United States, and 
Australia over US beef and orange imports to Japan in the preface to Australian scholar John 
W. Longworth’s Beef in Japan, a 325-page tome on the origins, practices, economics, labour 
processes, politics, consumption, distribution methods, legal structures, and culture of beef in 
Japan, which I picked up from the University of California, Santa Barbara Library in the 
United States. Beef in Japan was published just months after the demonstrations, and it left 
only a hint in a few sentences. The authoritative work is well distributed across university 
libraries in North America, and it closed the door on the subject for long enough that when 
the Anglophone world considered East Asian beef again (mostly after 2003), the beef and 
citrus war must have seemed unimportant if anyone even remembered it. After all, US 
exports to Japan, rose slowly from zero after 2003. 
I learned that this shadow of a trade war was a big problem for the executive branch 
of the United States federal government across two presidential terms, when I consulted the 
Japan and Australia files at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, 
California. The beef and citrus war aligned with the overall global free trade mantra of the 
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Regan Whitehouse, but the specific focus on this issue for so long was a result of the specific 
political context; the culture-driven symbolic importance of the commodity; and the pressure 
of a lobby group called the National Cattlemen’s Association, but which Whitehouse insiders 
called “the cattlemen,” was putting a lot of pressure on the US government to push for full 
elimination of Japanese trade restrictions long after the issue lost excitement for the 
President. 
When Ronald Reagan took the White House in 1980, he inherited a trade crisis with 
Japan decades in the making. In the postwar economic boom years, it looked like the United 
States could buy another country out of depression. 417 And that was what it did for Japan, as 
president Dwight Eisenhower said in 1954, “If we will not trade with her […] what is to 
happen to Japan? It is going to the Communists.”418 However, Eisenhower underestimated 
the real ability of the Japanese economy to fully recover. In fact, the secretary of state argued 
in 1954 that there would be “little future for Japanese products in the United States,” but by 
1960, some White House insiders began to note that Japan’s recovery might actually be 
coming a little too quickly, and they noted the potential for a protectionist reaction in the 
United States.419 
In 1981, the trade deficit with Japan crossed $10 billion dollars, and the American 
economy appeared decidedly less impervious following a decade of run-amok inflation, 
declining manufacturing output, and increasing unemployment.420 American workers and 
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sympathetic members of Congress especially resented surging Japanese auto imports as 
midwestern auto plants closed and turned to rust.421 In this context, congressman Ronald M. 
Mottl (D-OH) now complained that America’s Cold War ally was “exporting a recession to 
the United States,” and sure enough the American public and their advocates in Congress 
began articulating the desire for protectionist restrictions against Japanese cars and other 
goods.422 
The Reagan administration was ideologically opposed to protectionism, and it went in 
search of an issue that put Japan on the spot, distracted from the auto issue, and forwarded 
the case for free trade. During the frantic exchange of letters over Japanese autos in Reagan’s 
first year, the US department of agriculture (USDA) dropped the issue in Reagan’s lap 
saying, “We believe that agricultural and overall trade interests would be best served by a 
policy that does not restrict U.S. imports of Japanese autos.”423 The USDA realized that 
American interests in auto manufacturing ran counter to American interests in agricultural 
trade. Even as the auto issue raged in Washington DC, the Department of Agriculture 
identified a much different concern—Japanese quota barriers to U.S. exports of beef and 
citrus. American ranchers reinforced the USDA argument, as a Montana rancher testified: 
“There is something wrong here. I can go to a Datsun dealer in Billings and buy a nice little 
pickup truck for an attractive price […] but when it comes to offering my tasty Montana beef 
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at a competitive price to the Japanese worker who made the pickup truck, the Japanese 
Government says no. This just isn’t fair.”424 
Beef served a symbolic more than economic, dollars-for-yen, purpose.425 In 1988, the 
US trade deficit with Japan was $50 billion, and the most outlandishly optimistic projections 
estimated that the US could sell up to $1.2 billion of beef to Japan (It was selling about $750 
million at the time).426 The US could never make up the difference this way, but beef had 
immediate cultural resonance in the United States, and the White House expected that a 
nation of beef-eaters could really get behind the issue. US ranchers also wanted the 
government to act, as the NCA wrote directly to the President, in 1983: “The government of 
Japan is arbitrarily and unfairly restricting our ability to export high quality U.S. beef to that 
market. [...] Therefore, denying both the U.S. producers of a market and the Japanese 
consumer of a good product at a reasonable price.”427 It was not even the Reagan 
administration’s first attempt to deflect from the auto issue with an extra-American 
commodity; first they tried cigarettes and aluminum baseball bats.428 The USDA linked the 
beef and citrus issues because they faced similar types of quotas, but American citrus 
growers did not support the trade war. Oranges got taken for a ride to make it look less like a 
one-item issue, but really it was all about pushing American beef.429 
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The main US trade representatives all recognized that they were engaged in a 
symbolic exercise. Bud McFarlane wrote to Reagan privately explaining the U.S. 
delegation’s stance: “The key issues are beef and citrus quotas. The dollar amounts involved 
are not large but the symbolism is very potent—if we can reach a satisfactory agreement on 
beef and citrus, the rest of the issues to be decided in April should follow rather smoothly.”430 
Likewise David Demarest, a spokesman for Brock, let slip to the New York Times, “Everyone 
recognizes that the volume of trade does not equal the kind of symbolic importance that the 
beef and citrus issue has taken on.”431 During Congressional Hearings on the issue, Bob Dole 
claimed, “To argue that removing beef quotas couldn’t help the bilateral trade deficit very 
much is to underestimate the symbolic importance of this issue.”432 Tom Cook of the NCA 
agreed, “The beef issue has become symbolic. We are the first to recognize that increased 
beef trade relative to the total picture will only make a dent in the trade imbalance. However, 
there must be a strong commitment from Congress and the administration to re- solve our 
differences with Japan on the beef trade issue, or we can expect continued disappointments 
on the other trade matters.”433 The Japanese delegates, too, recognized how much of the 
exchange was about pageantry, and they celebrated the 1984 agreement with a meal of Big 
Mac hamburgers from McDonalds.434 Despite the fact that beef and citrus could barely make 
a dent in the trade deficit with Japan, their symbolic value to the American and Japanese 
people propelled this issue into a full blown trade war. 
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The U.S. first vocalized its concern about Japan’s quota restrictions on US beef 
imports during the Tokyo Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) that concluded in 1979. The GATT was a multi-national treaty that emerged in 
response to the European trade wars of the 1930s. It was signed in 1947 and became one of 
the defining institutions of free trade in the second half of the twentieth century. It had three 
principals: 1. Non-discrimination—Signatories had to give fair and equal import preference 
to any member countries; 2. Tariffs—the only acceptable restriction on trade was the tariff, 
quotas were forbidden except by special bilateral agreements; And 3. Enforcement—the 
GATT provided an impartial forum and mechanism for settling trade disputes.435 In 1979, at 
the end of the Tokyo Round, the US and Japan signed the Strauss-Ushiba Agreement to 
permit the continuance of Japanese beef and citrus quotas while increasing the United States’ 
share of imports. As the conflict progressed, the United States increasingly leaned on the 
GATT to pressure Japan. During Congressional hearings on Japanese beef quotas, Senator 
Danforth asked, “What’s GATT for? Is it just a waste paper?” He suggested the nation 
pursue its GATT-given right to dump beef in Japan and find out.436 
The GATT served as an important vehicle for expanding free trade, but it did not 
actually make up the rules of international trade as practiced. Japan had a complex system of 
national import quotas and other non-tariff-barriers (NTBs) to free trade that could be very 
difficult to identify. United States leaders (from government and industry) saw that Japan 
exhibited explosive beef consumption trends; Japanese people still ate much less beef than 
consumers in economically-similar “Western” nations; the Japanese Government strictly 
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limited US beef imports; domestically-produced Japanese beef sold for much higher prices 
than US beef. Some estimated that US producers could deliver beef to Japan at one tenth the 
price if allowed.437 Seeing these things, the Americans concluded that abolishing the 
Japanese trade barriers would make a giant new market for US beef. It was supply-and-
demand, and the locals be damned. Instead, the locals put up fierce resistance, the Japanese 
government outmaneuvered the Americans, and economically-pointless conflict dragged on 
for over five years. 
The beef and citrus trade war with the US was a central issue in Japanese national 
media. A photograph in the newspaper, Asahi Simbun, from 13 January 1983 depicted tens of 
thousands of Japanese protesters filling a stadium, and I identified them as beef and citrus 
protesters by the posters flanking the main stage.438 The posters depicted Ronald Reagan, 
dressed as superman and flying, attacking a personified Mt. Fuji using cows, oranges, and 
lemons. The heavily muscled Mt. Fuji appeared up to the fight as it held the onslaught at bay. 
Political cartoons from various issues showed: Ronald Reagan dressed as a sheriff force-
feeding beef and oranges to Prime Minister Nakasone dressed as the deputy; Reagan and 
Nakasone as ventriloquists using puppets to trade autos for beef and oranges; A cafeteria 
serving a “net domestic lunch” covered in little Japanese flags under the banner “Welcome 
Agricultural Cooperative Customers!”; Nakasone’s report card for “USA school” depicting 
full 5/5 grades for various military spending issues but 0/5 grades for beef and oranges; and, 
my favourite, an orange, standing on a cow, throwing a tomato at a well-dressed businessman 
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Figure 21: Photograph of a poster designed and printed by a Japanese Agricultural Cooperative (unspecified), c. 
1983. © Richard Kalvar / Magnum Photos. Reprinted with Permission. 
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or government official.439 Senator Danforth claimed that in the Fall of 1983 he received over 
1,300 postcards from Japanese people saying, “Please don't […] force the liberalization of 
restrictions on U.S. beef going into Japan.”440 
The United States trade team was ill-prepared for Japanese resistance to 
liberalization. Negotiations began in October 1982, but Alan Middaugh, President of the 
Meat Export Federation (MEF), warned that the US was going in “with what appears to be a 
less than well articulated strategic plan for dealing with the Government of Japan.” 
Middaugh advised caution, saying: “I believe we had better approach the problem with 
greater finesse than has been exhibited up until this point. The temptation to come down 
particularly hard with the “Jap bashing” technique is one way to possibly accomplish short 
term goals. On the other hand, I feel there is much more to be gained by negotiating 
“Japanese style” whereby we avoid finally backing them into a corner, and do a little horse 
trading on our own.”441 Nonetheless, Middaugh also made clear that it must be made clear to 
the Japanese that anything short of full liberalization of the beef market by 1 April 1984 
would be unacceptable.  
The US trade negotiators did not behave as Middaugh suggested. In anticipation of 
the Strauss-Ushiba agreement’s expiration, Japan and the United States scheduled 
discussions to set new quotas agreements on a broad array of goods for October 1982. But by 
the time the delegations assembled in Hawaii, the United States team had an express 
“objective of full liberalization in beef and citrus,” and the Americans deliberately refused to 
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address any other quota issues, so they could not be used as leverage against the U.S. 
position of beef and citrus.442 The U.S. delegation’s aggressive tactics offended the Japanese, 
and the Japanese delegation left the discussions a day early without coming any closer to a 
new agreement.443 According to the Japanese U.S.-Japan Trade Subcommittee, the Japanese 
were open to discussions on increasing quotas, but they viewed total removal as unrealistic 
due to strong domestic resistance to import liberalization. According to the Japanese, the 
American position posed a major impediment to starting a meaningful discussion on quota 
expansion.444 From there the government of Japan just stonewalled American efforts, which 
embarrassed the Whitehouse. 
A little over one year later Reagan returned from his visit to Japan (November 1983) 
to immediate criticism that he had not conveyed the importance of removing beef and citrus 
quotas. Senator Max Baucus, for one, expressed his stance that the state of Montana simply 
could not tolerate Japan’s continuing restrictions against “high quality beef.” Baucus argued 
that the glaring absence of Ambassador William E. “Bill” Brock (United States Trade 
Representative) and Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige from Reagan’s entourage 
during the visit to Japan suggested to Japan that the U.S. did not place a high priority on 
trade. Baucus also made the thinly veiled threat that Congress might not support free trade 
any more if Japan did not change its position.445 Meanwhile, the Japanese began to build up 
the beef and citrus issue, too.  The Japanese media mistakenly reported that beef and citrus 
had been a central issue of Reagan’s November visit, and they subsequently reported that 
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Sigur was making rounds in Japan calling for an early solution to prevent beef and citrus 
from becoming a political tool of the Democrats in the 1984 Presidential race.446 The news 
only emboldened the Japanese because they believed Reagan was in a vulnerable position, 
and another meeting in January between Vice President George Bush and Prime Minister 
Abe ended in yet another stalemate.447  
American interests became increasingly aggressive about the Japanese quota issue as 
the Strauss-Ushiba agreement approached expiry on for 31 March 1984. Bob Dole, head of 
the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade, argued, “At a minimum we must assert our 
rights under international law.” Dole pointed out that the US could not drag Japan to GATT 
prosecution so long as the Strauss-Ushiba bilateral agreement was in place, but “now that this 
agreement has expired, our rights under GATT entitle us to initiate dispute resolution 
proceedings.”448 The issue grew dire in 1984, when Congress launched hearings into 
“Japanese Quotas on U.S. Beef Products” that turned highly critical of the executive. Bonnie 
Kuraoka, an American living in Japan, wrote to the committee leading the hearings: “With an 
air of arrogance and smugness, they [the Japanese] do not believe that the American 
Congress will ever really have the guts to impose trade restrictions. […] I wonder if you 
know just how proud the average American would be to see the U.S. stop acting like the 
paper tiger she is believed to be here.”449 
By 1984, the beef and citrus issue was not moving forward, and the US government 
was ready to settle for a symbolic increase in the American quota that fell well short of real 
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trade liberalization, but the NCA kept the issue hot. As even Bob Dole knew, GATT 
arbitration could be “slow, tedious and do not directly redress the problem at hand” because 
the GATT could award compensation for continued quotas rather than actual liberalization. 
The White House and the US trade representatives all agreed that the GATT was not the best 
option, mostly because they did not want to offend Japan, but American ranchers blocked a 
moderate compromise.  
National security advisor Robert “Bud” McFarlane believed the Japanese could be 
willing to offer a 7,000 metric tonne increase per annum over a five-year period. That would 
ultimately double the quota, which would satisfy the American delegation if they could get 
the NCA on board:  
“Undersecretary Amstutz of the Department of Agriculture believes he could sell an increase of 7,000 
tons per year to the U.S. Cattlemen […] Bill Brock is perfectly willing to keep negotiating with the 
Japanese and is willing to settle for anything that will guarantee a vote of support and appreciation to 
you from the Cattlemen’s Association. […] Brock will be very much influenced by Cattlemen’s 
attitude as he believes that we must gain their support for any agreement that we sign with the 
Japanese.”450 
 
Bill Brock, the lead negotiator, met with the Cattlemen’s Association the same day and 
learned that the NCA “were markedly not enthusiastic about the Japanese offer.”451 Brock’s 
partner, Donald Gregg of the CIA recorded his impression of the meeting:  
Mrs. Smith [NCA President Joanna Smith] spoke up and said that the Cattlemen’s Association would 
prefer taking the Japanese to the GATT rather than having Brock “sell out” with a low offer. […] 
Mechanics of the GATT were then explained. It was made clear that long delays would be involved 
and that even a positive ruling would not allow the U.S. to sell any more beef to Japan. I pointed out 
that this was why hard-line conservatives in Japan were hoping that we would take them to the GATT. 
I also stressed that President Reagan viewed Mr. Nakasone as the best possible Prime Minister we are 
likely to have in Japan and he would not want to see his political standing damaged. (This made little 
visible impression.) […] Brock was very fair in spelling it out to the Cattlemen the other equities 
involved. He stated that the citrus growers want to settle and that the Japanese have hinted at more 
generous settlements in other aspects of the follow-up process if beef is surmounted. None of these 
points seemed to make much impression on the Cattlemen.452 
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Brock took the cattlemen’s demands to heart and rejected the Japanese offer of 6,900 tonnes 
per annum.453 
Internally, the White House sung a different tune. After the NCA meeting, an 
anonymous staffer wrote to McFarlane in a private, hand-written note: 
Bud, We simply can’t let the Cattleman’s Assoc. drive this problem. We’ve been told by Okawara 
recently that we will get everything else we want. It seems to me one possibility is to push for 7000 
increase and make argument on that contingent on getting the other items we want. We’ve made the 
point to Don that the VP will have to exercise some leadership here with our own negotiations. Don 
will (over) […] talk to the VP during the trip.454 
 
McFarlane responded: “Agree - I expect they will come back to us with some ‘grief.’ GATT 
solution doesn’t help them.” 
It is clear in the internal correspondence that the NCA was pushing US policy in the 
Pacific, and it is also clear that the government was growing weary of the whole issue. In 
1984, the US settled for the Japanese offer to double quotas over four years. William Brock, 
US trade representative, told the media that “I’ll take a doubling of exports any day of the 
week – especially to Japan,” and he claimed, “We’ve just guaranteed our cattlemen a 
minimum of $300 million in new sales over the next four years.”455 Nonetheless, the 
cattlemen remained unimpressed, beef quotas had not been removed, and the US only 
managed to buy a four-year bilateral extension of the quota system they set out to eliminate 
after over two years of hard negotiations. 
In response to its unpleasant experiences with both the Japanese negotiators and the 
NCA in 1984, the Reagan administration overhauled its trade policy after the second 
election. In December 1984, Bill Brock and Malcolm Baldridge outlined the administration’s 
new trade policy based on the lessons they learned from beef and citrus in an extended 
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memorandum for the President. First, they contextualized the Japan issue reminding Reagan 
that the United States had a trade deficit with the whole world, and the deficit had increased 
more rapidly with Europe, Canada, and Latin America each than it had with Japan. 
Nonetheless, Japan was “poisoning the well of world trade” and would have to continue 
being a target for free trade—just not in beef. They criticized past efforts for focused on 
removing the formal barriers to imports such as quotas on beef and citrus rather than 
focusing on real increases in sales to Japan, which would be much more promising in other 
areas.456 Previously, the Americans singled out beef and citrus for their political importance 
while other restrictions on valuable commodities like nuts went virtually unnoticed.457 Brock 
and Baldrige realized that beef and citrus had garnered far greater attention than their actual 
importance to bilateral trade warranted. 
However, beef was like the issue that would not die for the Reagan administration. In 
the heat of the much more important “Microchip War” of 1987, Sam Nakagama, chairman of 
an international economic advisors firm, brought the issue right back to beef and citrus 
saying, “Destructive as it is, the microchip war will do nothing to realign the basic forces that 
are producing the enormous trade imbalance between the United States and Japan. A much 
more promising route is through agricultural trade.”458 The NCA drove the United States into 
hardline negotiations again in 1988 despite the quota increases.459 This time, the US 
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negotiators got what they wanted—an agreement for liberalization of Japanese beef and 
citrus imports gradually from 1988 to 1991.  
Forceful-liberalization of Japanese beef imports was a colossal economic mistake that 
compromised the US export position overall. As Iwamochi Shizuma, President of an 
organization called ZENCHU, wrote directly to the US President to remind him in 1981: 
Japan was already “the American farmer’s best customer” buying 15% of total U.S. 
Agricultural exports. By the 1970s, Japan was the single largest grain importer taking about 
27% of global exports, and 90% of that came from the United States.460 The US agricultural 
trade with Japan was so important that, in April 1968, “To promote goodwill, and as a token 
of respect for the Meiji centenary celebrations, the United States Department of Agriculture 
[staged] a major 17 day show at Tokyo,” which featured American farm products and 
livestock.461 Select US cattle breeders had also made major gains in the Japanese breeding 
stock market since the 1960s.462 All that American grain and semen fed Japan’s domestic 
beef industry. In other words, the US gambled an established fourteen-million-tonne grain 
market for the hope of selling just thirty-thousand tonnes of beef, and apparently the 
President was informed of the fact.463 
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Further, the Japanese market could not really absorb that much new American beef. 
From 1984 to 1991, a huge proportion (as much as half) of the quota increase went into 
government storage due to oversupply. The Japanese government basically bought and froze 
tens of thousands of tonnes of beef just to placate the US government.464 When markets 
liberalized in 1991, this artificial preference for US beef—fostered by the Japanese state and 
the very institutions Americans so resented—disappeared, and US imports dropped. In the 
short term, Australia seized on Japan’s now de-regulated markets and increased sales to the 
direct detriment of US exports. The imposition of ad valorum (landed-value-based) tariffs in 
1991 put Australia, the much closer nation, back on top.465 In fact, an Australian report from 
1989 estimated that the Australian quota was equivalent to a 200% tariff, so 50-70% was 
very acceptable, and gave “Australia	a	potential	market	larger	than	any	other	in	its	history	of	
beef	production.”466	Many observers predicted this would happen throughout the crisis, but 
the American State and cattle ranchers ignored them.467 For example, Curtis Anderson, 
President of Sunkist Growers Inc., argued on behalf of citrus interests, “Without quotas the 
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Japanese Market would be in chaos […] We couldn’t win. There are countries much closer to 
Japan who would come in and who we couldn’t compete with. We’d most likely lose the 
market.”468 As it turned out, US beef exports to Japan actually during the liberalization 
process from 716 million lbs. in 1989 to 574 million lbs. in 1990.469 Japan cut US imports 
immediately down to zero in 2003. 
The announcement of Japanese beef market liberalization in 1988 set off a wave of 
outside investment in the US and Australian beef sectors. Japanese companies bought up US 
ranches, feedlots, and packingplants. “American trade officials predicted that sales of 
American beef and oranges to Japan would double within a few years. Judging from their 
investments in American ranches and citrus groves, Japanese companies agree,” opined 
Andrew Pollack of the New York Times, “even the American cowboy now seems to be falling 
under Japanese sway.”470 American ranchers were less impressed, as Tom Cook of the NCA 
remarked, ranchers “want to sell them the beef, not the operations.”471 A disproportionate 
share of American beef going to Japan turned out already to be Japanese-owned. Japanese 
producers, in turn, launched major exports of “Kobe beef” to the US which came to dominate 
the upper tier of the market.472 The Japanese domestic beef industry ultimately survived, and 
it was still worth $4.4 billion in 2008.473 Recognizing the advantage of Australia due to its 
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proximity, a number of Japanese and US firms began buying up Australian operations and 
investing in the expansion of feedlot infrastructure. 474 Since Australia lagged in lot feeding, 
local capital was cut out of the modernization of the industry. More importantly, Australian 
ranchers no longer performed—and therefore collected profits from—the full maturing of 
cattle. The most capital intensive and profitable part of production now belonged to 
American and Japanese businessmen. Geographer Fraces Ufkes predicted in 1993: “The 
fortunes of farmers in the US, Japan and elsewhere are less likely to be determined by 
struggles within national forums as they are by the deals made by corporate leaders in 
boardrooms or on golf-courses halfway around the world, all of which are highly insulated 
from public scrutiny.”475 
The was no tangible victory for American ranchers, but the beef and citrus war did 
advance the interests of global capital. As Roderick Francis argues, only a superficial 
analysis makes it look like the US, Australia, and New Zealand compete for markets in North 
Asia today. Actually the same corporations source for consumers from these regions.476 The 
US attempt to assert dominance over Japan’s markets did not really benefit the United States, 
but it did benefit capital broadly. Ufkes speculated that this may have been the point. 
“Japan’s beef sub-sector was the creation of another geopolitical era; its viability became 
incongruous within the dynamics of the current capitalist world economy.”477 The point was 
to ruin Japan’s domestic livestock industry—not to promote America’s. And yet, it seemed 
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clear in the Whitehouse letters at the Ronald Reagan Library that the 1988 outcome would 
not have come without the insistence of “the cattlemen. 
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American Ranchers & Transnational Beef 
The beef and citrus war was not the first time the National Cattlemen’s Association 
got involved in transnational beef markets; in fact, the organization helped shape the whole 
system of un-free transnational beef that prevailed around the Pacific. In the records of the 
National Cattlemen’s Association at the American Heritage Center in Laramie, Wyoming, I 
learned that the NCA was much more than a lobby group, and it operated at the center of the 
cattle industry and its relationship with the US government in not only the Whitehouse, but 
also Congress, many federal departments and agencies, and, through its state and local 
affiliate organizations, State legislatures, and county governments. The NCA and associated 
producers’ organizations were the most important and successful architects of US 
import/export policies on beef for most of the twentieth century, and they helped develop the 
protective market technologies that came to make the Pacific beef trade such and un-free 
market. 
The history of transnational beef trades predated, and included of course, the arrival 
of cattle in America.478 Following Megan Black’s observation that the interior American 
West was in the nineteenth century essentially foreign lands with many sovereign and 
subjected nations, the American beef trade has been fundamentally transnational for most of 
its history.479 The American beef industry increasingly overlapped with markets in other 
countries in the late nineteenth century, when European investors—especially Scottish and 
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English—sunk capital into American rangelands and US cattle and beef products shipped 
across the Atlantic Ocean. Contrary to the belief that some might have that trans-Atlantic 
beef trading was an obvious and inevitable outcome of the expansion and industrialization of 
American beef production, economist	C. Knick Harley demonstrated that, in fact, the trade 
was shaped primarily by the opportunism of shipping companies and the special constraints 
of their technology.480 The Atlantic beef trade surged in response to war demand, but overall 
it dwindled until it was all but cut off entirely by the European Economic Community in the 
1960s.481 Europeans have upheld restrictions on US beef ever since due ostensibly to concern 
of disease, growth hormones, antibiotics, and other things hiding in American beef.482 
The South American beef industry also expanded into an important global exporter in 
the late nineteenth century, but it did not penetrate US markets significantly. The Argentinan 
beef export trade focused almost exclusively on Britain, and the Uruguyan trade focused on 
continental Europe.483 For example, in 1890, only three firms controlled the whole 
Argentinian export trade; two were British, and one was Argentine with offices in Liverpool 
and London.484 Nonetheless, this oligopoly also meant that the firms dictated low prices to 
Argentine ranchers, which made Argentine beef imports a potential threat to domestic 
American cattle producers. 
																																																						
480 Harley, C. Knick. “Steers Afloat: The North Atlantic Meat Trade, Liner Predominance, and Freight Rates, 
1870-1913.” Journal of Economic History 68, no. 4 (December 2008): 1028-1058.; See also: Richard Perren, 
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European Economic History 32, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 591–620. 
481 Perren, 175-177. 
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South American import beef was the first issue to get cattle producers directly 
involved in shaping the American beef market’s place in international markets. American 
cattle producers saw an immediate and competitive threat to their beef consumer market, 
which was the biggest in the world, and they launched successful resistance to cheap beef 
imports through the same organizations they created to resist sheepherders and monopolistic 
meatpacking corporations in the 1930s. United States cattle producer’s actions against South 
American imports developed an important, but not obvious, strategy and mechanism for 
livestock industries to interfere in international trade against the foreign policy of powerful 
global capitalist elites, who support free trade. They used health-and-safety regulations as a 
means to manage market competition.  
The first and formative example of this was American ranchers’ scuttling of the 
Argentine Sanitary Convention in 1933 and every time it reappeared after that.485 The Tariff 
Act of 1930 banned beef imports from countries known to have foot and mouth disease. Foot-
and-mouth disease is a deadly and highly contagious virus for hooved animals, and while it 
does not harm humans, it threatened the economic vitality of unexposed cattle industries. In 
1933, the State Department—following the United States’ “good neighbor policy” towards 
South America—put forward an argument that the region of Patagonia in northern Argentina 
should be considered a geographically—if not politically—separate country and therefore 
should not penalized due to cases of the disease in southern Argentina. The proposed treaty 
made sense since viruses do not naturally align with political borders, and there was a lot of 
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capital support behind it. Americans had invested heavily in the Argentine cattle industry, 
and American packers welcomed cheaper import product for processing. Nonetheless, the 
treaty failed spectacularly.  
Cattle ranchers feared exposure to foot-and-mouth in general, but in this case they 
were most concerned with economic competition from cheap imports. Protection from foot-
and-mouth became a convenient way to regulate a beef supply chain that was threatening to 
expand globally. Ranchers held political influence disproportionate to their economic 
significance due to their regional distribution in western ridings with fewer people and less 
industry as well their cultural significance as the heirs of America’s imagined cowboy past. 
Stockmen’s associations also organized their members on the issue and encouraged them to 
harass their Congressional representatives. As Sam Hyatt, president of the Wyoming 
Stockgrowers’ Association, dictated to cattlemen at their annual convention in 1938, “The 
Argentine Convention at present is lying with the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations 
and let us hope that there it remains.” Hyatt warned members to “be ever alert to guard 
against any move to bring about its ratification,” and it worked.486 Ranchers continued to 
pressure Congress to the chagrin of the State Department, and the federal government 
dropped the treaty entirely in 1947. 
Blocking the Argentine Sanitary Convention was a huge victory for cattle ranchers 
that protected domestic producers from South American imports for decades thereafter and 
shifted the balance of power over the American beef supply chain further in producers’ 
direction. The incident emboldened ranchers’ protectionism, and ranchers’ trade policy grew 
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to oppose any reciprocal trade agreement or any increase in cattle import quotas.487 This 
drew the NCA into an enduring animosity with the US State Department, which wanted to 
use import markets to curry favour with Cold War allies. The cattle producers most-often got 
the better of their own nation’s free-trade advocates, but their tactics exported easily to other 
domestic livestock industries that feared completion from cheaper beef from the United 
States. Disease regulation became an essential part of the political economy of beef, 
especially after the General Agreement on Trade and tariffs (GATT) made free trade a 
cornerstone of international law in 1946. 
American ranchers became vocal opponents of the Executive branch’s free trade 
policies, which F.E. Mollin, executive secretary of the American National Live Stock 
Association, likened in 1953 to “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” “We have no sympathy for those 
who advocate free trade, either as a manifestation of good will toward all, at the expense of 
Uncle Sam, or for the selfish purpose of encouraging greater imports of foreign products,” 
explained Mollin, because it was not fair to burden “the American workingman or the 
American farmer or stockman” with the surplus goods of “underpaid foreign labor.” 
According to Mollin, free traders were “not even entitled to be considered true 
Americans.”488  
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Ranchers saw free trade as charging producers for debts incurred by others or by all 
Americans together. In 1969, in conversation with William Galbraith, deputy undersecretary 
of the USDA, another cattleman scoffed at the idea that ranchers “owe these people 
something for their assistance with various conflicts in which we are and have been engaged, 
as well as their general loyalty to the United States.” Galbraith asked, “what we can possibly 
do in the foreign trade field in order to not alienate our friends and allies in Australia and 
New Zealand?” The cowman answered the “obligation is really the responsibility of the 
entire country,” and really the problem was “that European markets, where much of this meat 
could go, are practically closed to these exporters unless the governments in Europe want to 
let it in.” He thought “our situation would be relieved materially if the US State Department 
could force the European countries to reduce or eliminate their non-tariff trade barriers and 
take part of the meat from Australia and New Zealand which they definitely need and could 
use.”489 
The National Cattlemens’ Association (NCA), the main producers’ organization, 
actively fought against the State Department on this issue. In about 1963, the NCA caught 
wind that Robert E. Lee, the deputy assistant secretary of the State Department, was 
distributing materials in Congress to discourage them from passing any legislation to restrict 
meat imports. In notes prepared by the NCA for its members to start another harassment 
campaign, the NCA wrote: “In our opinion, this “epistle” of the State Department 
emphasizes the “free trade” philosophy adopted by our government and indicates the 
ominous overtones […]. Their position is contrary in everyway to our own and many other 
industries. It must also be assumed […] they consider certain products and industries 
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expendable. Apparently beef is one of them.” The document then took each State Department 
claim in turn and provided a detailed and aggressive response for ranchers.490 
Despite the opposition of the State Department and several presidents, cattlemen 
repeatedly succeeded in building up institutional restrictions to free trade in beef. From 
Eisenhower forward, no US presidents really wanted to restrict beef imports—even Johnson, 
who ranchers’ though was one of their own—but over and over again they signed laws doing 
just that. Australian observers, also the main targets of beef import restrictions by the 1960s, 
identified the cattlemen’s association as the key driver of legislation saying “A pretty high 
wind has been blowing steadily across the President’s desk from cattle areas.”491 Following 
hard NCA campaigning, the US Congress passed the Meat Import Act of 1964, which 
instituted new import quotas. Then in 1979, cattlemen won a revision to the Act that 
provided for a counter-cyclical quota system that responded directly to domestic prices and 
the cattle cycle.492 O.R. Strackbein, a protectionist ideologue from the Nation-Wide 
Committee on Import-Export Policy, pointed to meat import legislation and cattlemen’s work 
to pass it as one of the most important examples in the fight against free trade.493 
The other side of American rancher’s success at restricting trade was through 
personal cooperation with foreign cattlemen’s Associations, especially in Australia and 
Canada.494 Ranchers learned that even with legislation presidents could not always be trusted 
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to enforce protectionist laws passed in Congress, so they negotiated for voluntary restrictions 
at the source by using the threat of those laws. Importers were willing to work with American 
cattlemen simply because they sought stability more than export volume. Following the 1964 
law, a news report directed at attracting US capital to Australia explained, “but Australian 
cattlemen aren’t complaining. They say that their share of the U.S. market is generous and 
that the built-in expansion factor provided by Congress gives them an assured market in the 
years ahead.”495 Really, Australian or Canadian producers never posed a threat to American 
cattle markets like American capital invested in cheap labour regions. American cattlemen 
ultimately resigned themselves to Australian imports, since most Australian beef—being 
grass-fed and therefore of lower quality—ended up in hamburger.496 American ranchers even 
helped cover up an error that had Kangaroo meat enter the US meat supply mislabeled as 
beef from Australia.497 
In fact, the very idea of competition between US, Canadian, and Australian cattle 
producers assumes falsely that they were separate industries. The total integration of the 
Canadian and US stock industries is well documented, but the US also helped develop and 
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modernize Australian grazing in the twentieth century.498 Australia welcomed greater 
integration with the United States cattle industry. No one was as instrumental in shaping this 
relationship as Sir William Gunn, a cattle grower and head of the Australian Woolgrowers 
Association.499 Gunn invited American ranchers to Australia starting in the 1950s and 
personally led tours of the country’s expansive and under-utilized rangelands.500 Gunn and 
leaders in the Australian cattle industry recognized that they needed greater capital in the 
industry and they valued American ranchers’ particular emphasis on capital investment in 
breeding and land improvements. The Financial Times estimated that modernization of the 
Australian beef industry would cost two billion pounds, and Americans seemed like the best 
source.501 For example, H.C. Forster of the college of agriculture at the University of 
Melbourne, told an American reporter, “We would be delighted to have more American 
capital and manpower come in to develop our northern areas.”502 Another Australian expert 
corroborated, saying “If the land is valued at 50 cents an acre, the Australian rancher usually 
doesn’t see any point in spending, say, $10 an acre on improvements. But along comes one 
of your countrymen. He looks at the land in terms of what he figures it will produce—and in 
view of what comparable land back home is worth. He determines it is worth spending $10 
an acre or more on improvements. There’s no mental barrier there.”503 
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Some Americans viewed Australia as an extension of their lost frontier with the 
opportunities it had once offered. “What the Americans are finding is a cattle country much 
like the American West in the early 1900s,” a journalist wrote back, “problems and prospects 
are much the same as those that faced American cattlemen when they began to fence the 
open range.” 504 Asa Townsend emigrated because “it was getting too crowded here.” 505 
Francis J. Cheney of South Dakota wrote to McMillan seeking advice saying he and his 
family were not afraid of real work or an outdoor toilet, but “If I have to live with a bunch of 
cows, I feel like doing it where there is some reward for that, instead of increasing 
discrimination.”506 Aside from the lure of frontierism, some estimates placed Australian 
production costs for land at as low as 11 cents per head versus upwards of $30 in the United 
States. As Forster put it, “Land is virtually free in the North.” 
Bigger cattle operations saw Australian holdings as a capital diversification strategy. 
The famous and enormous King’s Ranch of Texas in cooperation with Swift and Co. 
meatpackers acquired a massive but troubled ranch (of almost a million acres) in Northern 
Australia and quickly turned it around raising the calfing rate from 40% to 70% (good US 
ranches could expect 90%) in a relatively short time. 507 Likewise, Cushman Radebaugh, a 
Florida cattleman, partnered with Gunn and acquired over a million acres in Northern 
Australia on a cut-rate government lease—they secured a fifty-year lease for just four 
hundred dollars per half million acres, all tax free. The Duda brothers, also of Florida, got 2.7 
million acres under similar circumstances. Radebaugh told a reporter, “We’re doing all the 
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things over there that cattlemen did here 50 or 60 years ago […] We’re clearing, fencing, 
developing good pastures, crossbreeding the scrub cattle. This country is one of the last 
frontiers, and it really grips you.” But Radebaugh and the King operation really only 
managed these lands temporarily. As a result of deals like these, Gunn personally managed 
twelve million acres of Australian rangeland.508 
United States cattle producers, therefore, developed a set of structures that severely 
restricted free trade in beef despite important pro-free-trade international laws. They 
developed means of regulating imports from low-cost competitors by associating them with 
disease threat as well as flexible import quota structures linked directly to the profits of US 
producers. The producers’ association provided a powerful constituency to support these 
structures, and it also negotiated independent non-free-trade compacts with foreign 
producers’ associations. These rules probably hurt the producers and consumers of excluded 
nations, but they seemed to work well for Americans as well as Canadians, Australians, and 
New Zealanders. Producers in all these nations benefitted from stable, non-free international 
trade in beef commodities as well as parallel sharing of ideas and capital investment.  
However, US producers created and supported this whole system because they had 
the largest and most desirable domestic consumer market, but that changed after 1975. 
Americans started eating less beef, the price of beef started falling, and the American cattle 
heard went into a steady and continuous decline. Just twenty years earlier, the head of the 
NCA was whining, “It seems to us that there is altogether too much emphasis on the current 
need for exports and too little consideration given to the tremendous consuming power of our 
own country,” but suddenly American ranchers needed exports as an outlet for an industry 
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faced with a crisis of overproduction.509 Rather abruptly, ranchers had to look outwards and 
what they found was a Canadian industry already integrated with their own, a British market 
locked up by commonwealth exporters, a European market cut off by import regulations, 
and, in general, a world too poor to buy expensive, high-quality American beef. By process 
of elimination, there was only one country with a wealthy enough population that was not 
already eating lots of beef—Japan. 
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Figure 22. “Cattle: Annual and Cumulative Year-to-Date U.S. Trade – All Years and Countries,” USDA ERS 
Livestock and Meat International Trade Data Online. Graph by author. 
 
 
Figure 23. “Cattle: Annual and Cumulative Year-to-Date U.S. Trade – All Years and Countries,” USDA ERS 
Livestock and Meat International Trade Data Online. Graph by author. 
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Figure 24. “Beef and Veal: Annual and Cumulative Year-to-Date U.S. Trade (Carcass Weight, 1,000 pounds),” 
USDA ERS Livestock and Meat International Trade Data Online. Graph by author. 
 
 
Figure 25. “Beef and Veal: Annual and Cumulative Year-to-Date U.S. Trade (Carcass Weight, 1,000 pounds),” 
USDA ERS Livestock and Meat International Trade Data Online. Graph by author. 
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Australian Stockraisers & Transnational Beef 
Japan was indeed an emergent beef consumer market when Americans discovered it 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but it was not brand new. The American trade team quickly 
learned they could not freely or easily make it into what they wanted. One issue that vexed 
me about this trade war even more after I learned about the NCA and its history restricting 
imports was the alleged violence threatened by Australia. Longworth seemed to think it 
mattered, but neither US trade policymakers nor beef industry leaders cared or knew enough 
about Australia as an impediment to US-Japan beef trading for it to come up in any serious 
way. I travelled to Canberra, the capital city of Australia, to learn more about why Australian 
cattle producers, represented by organizations that sounded similar to the American’s 
producer associations, would submit to, and even seem satisfied with, aggressive US 
restriction of their imports and why they would be upset with the US trying to open up the 
Japanese market to more Australian as well as American imports.  
The short answer was that the Australians got there first, and the emergent market that 
the United States discovered in Japan was in part something Australians had made for 
themselves. At the National Archives of Australia, I learned that the Australian national 
government, like the United States federal government, actively pursued the interests of the 
Australian beef cattle industry on a global scale, but unlike American trade negotiators, who 
fought an ideological and symbolic trade war, the Australian trade team seemed genuinely 
interested in securing greater sales for producers.510 At the National Library of Australia, I 
examined various materials from the Australian Meat Board, and at the Noel Butlin Archives 
at Australian National University, I consulted the extensive records of the Cattle Council of 
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Australia.511 I learned that these organizations took an even more active role in creating and 
regulating beef trade flows than the NCA had done in the United States. In these archives, I 
learned that the longer answer to my question was that Australia and the United States in the 
1980s represented two remarkably different varieties of bovine capitalism. 
American ranchers’ approach to Japan stood in stark contrast to Australian ranchers, 
who became export oriented from almost the inception of their industry. Australians resisted 
US efforts during the beef and citrus war because they had already learned to work expertly 
with the status quo. Even though Australia could produce some of the cheapest beef in the 
endemic-disease-free world, the Australian national government and beef industry leaders 
were not interested in price-based competition for foreign markets; rather, they sought stable 
and well-regulated international markets. In fact, many of them saw domestic East-Asian 
beef production as a driver of local demand that Australians could build on in areas that did 
not traditionally eat beef. The Australian approach to international markets (relative to the 
United States) was not to compete but to make advantage through market intelligence and 
cooperation with locals. In general, Australia viewed the institutions regulating trade not as 
artificial barriers to a preferable and freer market, but as the market as it actually was, and 
Australian ranchers learned to work with them. Therefore, Australian beef export 
policymakers had a remarkably different philosophy and set of strategies for global beef 
trading, despite these two nation’s similar histories of bovine colonialism and bovine 
capitalism. 
The Australian beef cattle industry developed in the nineteenth century autonomously 
from the United States, though the industries shared networks that brought immigrants from 
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the same sorts of places to both frontiers. The histories of the two industries have remarkable 
parallels, but also important differences and outcomes. The Australians created a distinct 
indigenous vocabulary to describe the frontier cattlescape and market just as Americans did. 
All livestock growing, including open range and ranching methods, was called “pastoral”; 
“mob” was a very large herd held tightly together; stockyards were “stations”; gathering or 
wrangling cattle, was “mustering”; trailing cattle over the vast distances was “droving”; 
stealing or rustling cattle was “duffing”; and illegal squatters were “selectors.” “Tramps” 
would not compare well, since the selectors became the heroes in the Australian narrative. 
The “trailing” period lasted for less than twenty years in the United States, but “droving” 
dominated in Australia until at least the 1940s, and the Australian industry still marches 
“mobs” over such distances that some use aircraft and helicopters.512 
Cattle came to the Southern tip of Australia with the British colonizers in the late 
eighteenth century, but the colonial state immediately claimed cattle and grazing lands as 
crown property. The cattle population grew from a handful to about 54,000 head in 1818. 
Most still belonged to the “government herd,” but there were some notable private owners 
who also own and ran large sheep herds. The English settlers in Australia advanced 
genocidally though aboriginal lands, and in 1813 they forged a path across the Blue 
Mountains that separated Southern Australia from the vast and mostly arid lands to the North 
and West, which caused a land crisis for the colonial state. The British government for 
centuries restricted access to crown land, and the colonial state outlawed settlement across 
the blue mountains. The “selectors” ignored it, and the human and cattle immigrant 
populations of the Australian continent expanded quickly in the 1830s. The colonial state 
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compromised with a fee for grazing, which partly inspired the American system, too. Driven 
in part by belief in a great “inland sea,” the immigrants found some good grazing lands and 
many deadly deserts. Poor conditions and low stocking capacity meant settlers needed to get 
as much land as possible, and they developed a mustering system that paralleled open range 
stockraising in America. Just as in the American West, cattle producers formed protective 
associations to regulate grazing and prevent losses from duffing.513 In the late nineteenth-
century, trans-continental infrastructure and the discovery of the Great Artesian Basin, an 
massive aquifer source of water, enabled a much greater expansion of cattle North and West 
out from Queensland. The aboriginal population became deeply intertwined in the cattle 
industry first by hunting the semi-wild open range herds; then by providing land expertise to 
“overlanding” cattle drivers trying to cross spaces on a continental scale; then by entering the 
stock industry themselves, first under colonial force and later in earnest. The Australian 
industry has faced similar changes to the American industry since the 1960s—including 
greater corporate control and the subdivision of ranches—but it remains distinct as even the 
subdivided ranches dwarf the largest holdings in Texas.514 
The Australian industry tapped global export markets later than the American 
industry, but it became more fundamentally export-oriented much sooner, and it quickly 
outpaced the domestic Australian consumer market.515 The Australian beef industry made its 
first major transnational export of beef to England in 1877, but the meat spoiled and ended 
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up dumped in the Thames. A successful shipment landed two years later, and the United 
Kingdom became Australia’s primary export market and raison d’etre until the 1970s. The 
Ottawa Agreements of 1932 established British commonwealth buying preferences, and 
Australia drove the American cattle industry out of the most important beef consumer market 
in the Atlantic.516 In the 1970s, Australian beef export preference shifted towards Japan, and 
Australia has continued to dominate emergent beef markets all over East Asia, South East 
Asia, and the Middle East. Due to its open range cattle industry, Australia today is, by far, the 
world’s largest exporter of pasture resources and energy, chiefly to Japan, the United States, 
South Korea, and China, in that order.517 
Australia pioneered new global beef markets earlier than any other major beef 
producer because it lost the UK trade that functioned practically like an assured, stable 
domestic consumer market. In 1958, the UK released its dominions from the Ottawa 
Agreement giving them the freedom to trade on the world market. Really the UK released 
itself, and it slowly shifted its official buying preferences towards Denmark until it formally 
joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 leaving Australia to fend for 
itself. Australia increased its beef exports to the United States significantly, but American 
cattle producers placed strict limits on the trade. Australians identified Japan as a potential 
market to replace the UK market almost immediately, and in 1963, the beef industry and the 
Australian government launched a campaign to liberalize Japanese beef imports.518 A 1963 
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memo from the Australian embassy in Tokyo states not only that Japan could swap out the 
UK market, but also that it could alleviate pressure on the controversial US trade.519 
Australia did not convince Japan to remove all import restrictions in 1963, and both 
government and industry shifted to a strategy of working with the complex, highly-regulated 
Japanese import market.520 Some efforts sought holes through the barriers. William Gunn 
tried fattening a herd of Australian cattle for a duration in Okinawa hoping to get them 
graded as domestic product in mainland Japan.521 But other efforts sought to strengthen 
Australian ties to the people and organizations that controlled the Japanese market. In 1964, 
the Australian Meat Board hosted a 23-man Japanese mission to observe sheep and cattle 
farms and meat processing facilities in Victoria, Australia. Photographs of the tour held by 
the Australian National Archives depict Australians politely showing Japanese men around 
stockyards and packingplants, and the captions announce optimistically, “Japan is expected 
to import increased quantities […] as a result.”522 
The Cattle Council of Australia (CC) and the Australian Meat Board (AMB) 
investigated, promoted, negotiated, and strengthened foreign markets for Australian beef. 
The organizations sponsored research and established relationships with idividuals and 
organization around the globe. The CC was an independent producers’ association like the 
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NCA, and the AMB was a semi-governmental industry organization produced by statute.523 
The two organizations were intimately aligned, and the CC communicated stockmen’s 
desires to the AMB, which at cattlemen’s behest increasingly acted as a single national seller 
on the global market. The CC developed ties with the NCA, and both the CC and AMB 
worked to ensure the “voluntary restraint” quotas to the United States ran smoothly.524 
Australians, some of whom knew American ranchers well since they fought together in the 
Second World War, could see plainly that the NCA used dubious politics to circumvent free 
trade precedents. 525 Many Australians were truly upset, but rather than fight the US in the 
GATT arena, they broadened their international focus. The organizations also launched and 
hosted missions to and from other potential buyer-nations—none more than Japan in the 
1970s and 1980s.526 
Trips of Japanese to Australia and Australians to Japan served both relationship-
building and practical reconnaissance goals. For example, the CC launched a visit to Japan in 
May 1975 with the express goals: “learn something of the manner in which the meat industry 
in Japan is structured”; and “establish a liaison with Japanese cattle farmers, so that both 
Australian and Japanese farmers have a better understanding of each others [sic] 
problems.”527 They carried out the first goal by meeting with many Japanese government 
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officials and beef industry leaders over several carefully-planned days, and team members 
collected and recorded-by-hand many sorts of data on the Japanese beef industry and market. 
The team carried out its second goal by meeting with nokyo representatives and delivering 
their message of cooperation at a press conference attended by twenty five different Japanese 
news sources.528 Japanese cattle producers also travelled to Australia to learn from the more 
advanced industry. Ken Miyakita worked as a jackaroo (Australian variation of “cowboy”) 
for some years at Booroomooka Angus Stud in Bingara, NSW, before going on to be one of 
Japan’s more successful non-purebred-Wagyu cattle producers.529 In Miyakita’s words, “ “I 
learned what I know in Australia.”530	
In addition to the work of the Cattle Council and the Australian Meat Board, was the 
work of an individual. At the National Library of Australia, I also consulted the papers of 
Frank H. Johnston, who, I learned in a document on the origins and importance of the 
collection provided by Johnston, donated his papers to the National Library in return for a tax 
break from the Australian federal government. The collection consists of Johnston’s field 
note books from his personal and professional travels, clippings of his writings from decades 
in the Australian rural press as well as personal correspondence with people all over the 
world to support the same, correspondence and ephemera from his business providing special 
tours of foreign stock industries for Australian ranchers, and an extensive and beautiful 
collection of black and white photographs from all those trips. Johnston’s photographs alone 
are the most extensive window into this global trade that has ever been amassed. Johnston 
ended his career somewhat bitter that his influence on the Australian beef industry was not 
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greater, but his legacy (so narrowly preserved by the “Taxation Incentives for the Arts 
Scheme”) ought not be underappreciated.531 
In my estimation, it is likely that the Australian Frank H. Johnson knew the global 
cattle industry in the 1960s and 1970s better than any other person alive, and he did not raise 
cattle. Global and industry are slight misnomers here, since what he actually knew were the 
cattle production practices of many different nations and regions that were in the process of 
knitting together into something global and something much more business-like—this was a 
process Johnson was personally advancing. Johnson was a writer and newspaper editor for 
the rural Australian press with a longstanding personal interest in livestock, and he spent 
much of his personal and professional life visiting and writing about livestock raising in 
many countries on all six continents with livestock populations.532 In fact, by the time the 
Americans discovered Japan, Johnston was already writing detailed articles on the cattle 
industries of Bali, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, etc.533 “My interest in the world of meat 
was second only to my lifelong love of the land,” Johnston explained, “I regarded myself as 
an extension worker in the field and my object was to encourage country people to get out for 
themselves about the influences affecting the success of their products in the international 
market places.”534 To this end, Johnston also became a travel entrepreneur, and he launched 
his own company, Intra World Travel Services, that specialized in organizing and conducting 
tours of international livestock industries especially for Australian stockraisers. The service 
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was an astounding success with tours usually selling out quickly, and Johnston, thus, 
personally took groups of Australians to view different aspects of the beef supply chains in 
Japan, Taiwan, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Argentina, and more.535 
Johnson was a keen supporter of the Australian stock industry, and a tireless booster 
of modernization through capital improvements and international trade, but he never wanted 
local stockraisers to suffer for his own countrymen’s benefit. Johnson was a liberal and a 
social progressive who painted a vision of stockraisers all over the world benefitting together 
from global networks.536 In fact, Johnston kept personal correspondence with American 
cattle ranchers, including NCA leaders, and he openly criticized Australian producers and the 
Australian Meat Board when they failed to cooperate well with the Americans. He publicly 
warned Australian beef exporters that American ranchers were not stupid and knew that lots 
of high quality Australian product snuck in to the US market labled as “manufacturing grade” 
beef.537 Further, a letter Johnston wrote to CW McMillan of the NCA indicated, “Sir “Bill” 
Gunn scowled at me recently during a visit to Queensland’s Cattle Show, so perhaps he got 
the message,” after Johnston criticized the AMB for mismanaging a trip of NCA visitors.538 
The fundamental difference between the American and Australian approach to the 
Japanese beef import market was that the Americans sought to proscribe market conditions, 
in which they would have a theoretical advantage, while the Australians studied the complex 
market conditions to better work towards their advantage. It would be wrong to say that in 
general Australian cattle producers and government and industry leaders understood the 
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Japanese beef industry or global beef trading especially well, but more Australians were 
engaged in these topics than anywhere else in the Anglophone world.539 My attempts to write 
this narrative of the beef and citrus war from all sides has been somewhat thwarted by my 
strict limitations in Japanese, but we can learn a lot about Japan from the Australians. 
Japanese Beef Farmers & Transnational Beef 
The thing that really perplexed Americans about the Japanese beef industry was how 
it could sustain such a high price for beef when such a price could easily be lowered by 
increasing imports. The US beef industry, after all, faced regular consumer revolts over high 
prices, and after the mid-1970s ranchers had no choice but to accept a domestic bargain beef 
market. The thing that really perplexed me about the beef and citrus war was how a much 
smaller group of Japanese beef farmers could stave off the greedy force of the world’s largest 
beef industry and the world’s foremost enforcer of (selective) global free trade. It is one thing 
to point out that US trade objectives tried to reshape transnational markets, but it is entirely 
another to explain why it did not work. The Americans failed to re-make the Pacific Rim 
beef market as they desired precisely because they did not understand what was really going 
on, which left me with a wealth of sources full of flawed notions of Japan and no answers to 
why Japanese beef could be so expensive or how Japanese beef farmers could be so 
powerful. 
John Longworth travelled to Japan four times from 1975 to 1981, for durations of one 
to six months, to study the beef industry. He was compelled by the crisis his nation faced 
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when Japan shut out imports in 1974, and he described his published monograph as “an essay 
in market intelligence.” His words coming on the cusp of a bitter and needless trade war 
sound ominous: “Only by appreciating the complexities of the subject can producers, 
packers, exporters, industry leaders, trade negotiators, and politicians in Oceana and North 
America formulate reliable expectations about their future prospects in the Japanese beef 
market.”540 It is strange that such a statement was not and is not obvious. Frank Johnston 
travelled to Japan dozens of times from 1936 to his death in 1989. Johnston, as a “privileged 
visitor to Japan,” also sought to counter the views “of other experts on the subject who 
viewed it without, in my opinion, much actual knowledge of Japan and its people.”541 Both 
relied heavily on local contacts forged through friendship. 
Longworth’s Beef in Japan (1983) and Johnston’s unpublished manuscript, “Essay – 
The Beef Situation: Japan – Australia, 1981” (1981), reveal that Japanese beef production 
developed rapidly from obscurity in 1945 to a uniquely impressive, modern industry and a 
cornerstone of rural Japanese life as well as Japanese politics and culture writ large at the 
outset of the beef and citrus war. Japan, in the 1980s, had even stronger structures against 
free trade than the United States, and an even more powerful network of producers’ 
associations behind them. Japanese beef producers deserve much credit for the explosive 
growth of their industry and for their political resistance to hegemonic US free trade, but 
ironically, the basis of their strength originated in large part from American interventions in 
Japanese society during and after the postwar US Occupation.542 
																																																						
540 Longworth, Beef in Japan, xviii. 
541 From intro in archive to Johnston’s unpublished manuscript, “Essay - The Beef Situation: Japan – Australia, 
1981,” Book 49, Box 18, FHJ, NLA. 
542 Yakata Yoshioka, “Development of Agricultural Policy in Postwar Japan,” from Agriculture and Trade in 
the Pacific: Toward the Twenty-First Century. William T. Coyle et al., eds. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1992), 91-93.; Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 9-10.; Frank H. Johnston, “Some Background Information about 
		
269	
Beef growing was a marginal practice for most of Japanese history. Ungulate-rearing 
and eating were legally taboo in Feudal Edo Japan (1603-1867), and Japanese society 
confined people involved in hooved meat trading to special, disadvantaged hamlets called 
buraku. These people became a sort of untouchable caste called the burakumin. Although the 
formal feudal structures outlawing beef were abolished in 1871, beef as well as all people 
who handled cattle faced stigma and discrimination into the mid-twentieth century. John 
Longworth estimated that in the 1980s, as many as three million people continued to bear the 
burden of being burakumin.543 However, a significant social, cultural, and political shift 
began to change the fate of beef and the burakumin after the Second World War (1931-1945 
for Japan). 
The Japanese beef industry was bolstered by both Japanese and US dietary policies. 
In the postwar (Cold War) period, the United States promoted livestock production—a 
decidedly anti-Communist past time—around the world, and to help feed the animals it 
dumped cheap grain on its allies’ markets as a sort of back-handed aid that also served to 
prop up farm receipts in the surplus conditions of the period.544 Japan, of its own accord, also 
sought to diversify its agricultural sector (previously over-focused on rice) and to strive for 
national “food self-sufficiency,” especially in protein-rich products like beef.545 The two 
policies proved symbiotic as Japan imported greater shares of cheap US grains to help grow 
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expensive Japanese cattle. From 1955 to 1986, livestock production rose from 7% to 27% of 
Japanese agricultural output, and Japan protected its domestic beef producers by imposing 
quotas on cheap beef imports from places like the United States and Australia.546 
Beef-eating, a practice that disgusted polite society for centuries, became rather 
suddenly elevated in Japanese culture. “It used to be a sin to eat meat in Japan but now it’s a 
pleasure,” wrote K.M Yamaguchi in the 1950 edition of a handbook to Japanese culture and 
society called, “We Japanese.” “In fact, it has become a patriotic duty to do so in order to 
help build up the strength of the Nation’s youth,” Yamaguchi explained, but “Never was a 
patriotic duty so delightful.”547 “We Japanese” was proscribing the change as much as 
describing it, and Yamaguchi, a restauranteur, stood to profit handsomely from the future 
expansion of beef eating in his country, which increased 800% from 1955 to 1986.548 
Johnston got a hold of the text, in which he learned much about the Japanese beef dish 
sukiyaki. 
Sukiyaki is a dish of very thinly sliced beef, cooked rapidly, and served on its own, 
with rice, or with vegetables often in a hot pot.549 Japanese beef recipes like this echo 
Japanese preparation of fish, but Johnston relished in the low-class origins of this dish when 
burakumin would carve and grill (yaki) strips of meat on their spades (suki) while out in the 
field far from Feudal scrutiny. “It appears that the aroma of this plough-share cooking got 
wafted across the countryside,” Johnston jested as he explained, “Sukiyaki was destined to 
become famous throughout Japan as the best of all meals and the most delicious ‘ever 
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created’.”550 The cult of sukiyaki that rose in the mid-twentieth century captivated visitors to 
Japan from the hamburger nations of the world, even when they sought to abolish it. 
Sukiyaki and like-recipes formed one cornerstone of the high-price beef market in 
Japan. Sukiyaki was a sort of normative rule about how beef could be distributed and sold in 
Japan, and it meant that Japanese beef was traded in highly-visible small portions. Johnston 
described how Japanese consumers shopped for beef in “some of the most attractive retail 
butchers shops to be found anywhere in the world. Bright, modern, hygienic places which 
sprang up like mushrooms during the late 1960s and 70s.” The butchers were highly skilled 
and would “strip the flesh from a side of beef and leave the bones as clean as the proverbial 
whistle not leaving a vestige of meat on them,” which was necessary to achieve the sukiyaki 
standard.551 A whole vocabulary developed to interpret these slivers of flesh. A 1972 
publication of Kobe beef described the commodity as, “Bright cherry-red lean and a creamy-
white fat that is agreeably firm and sticky. […] the taste must be pleasing to the palate and 
give a melting feeling in the mouth!”552 The butchershop was a setting that justified a high 
cost product, and a set of cultural practices developed to make the cost more palatable. 
Johnston believed that Japanese consumers were more finely attuned to the subtleties 
of beef marbling that Australians, and they could make sense of the prices through the 
patterns of muscle and fat displayed so carefully behind the glass.553 Johnston observed that 
the Japanese consumers, “mainly women, unhurried and selective,” would only purchase 
beef for one meal per visit to the butcher unlike Australian women, who managed their 
																																																						
550 Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 14. 
551 Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 16. 
552 As quoted, Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 26. 
553 Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 18. 
		
272	
family economy by buying for two, three, or more meals at one time. 554 According to 
Johnston’s contact Mrs. Fumiko Miyamoto, an impressive but representative woman who 
managed a working-class home, “My family eats beef once or twice a week […]” even 
though “Everyone in my family likes beef […].”“Of course most people like beef steak 
[high-grade beef] best, but this is too expensive for common people to afford often,” 
Miyamoto explained, “My friends say they serve steaks only once every one or two 
months.”555 Some Japanese consumers clearly resented the high prices, but they accepted 
them as legitimate. 
Japanese consumers believed that only the Japanese beef supply chain could produce 
the perfect look and taste. Miyamoto told Johnston that none of the butchershops she 
frequented carried any Australian products, and she estimated “I think that both the butchers 
and the customers in my community are likely to believe that Japanese beef only is tasty.” 
Some large supermarkets in the cities sometimes had United States, Australian, and New 
Zealand beef but not always, and it received 200 to 300 yen per 100 grams of sukiyaki 
compared to 350 to 500 yen “and up” for Japanese sukiyaki where Miyamoto shopped. 
Miyamoto was a woman with a family that loved eating beef but could only afford it for a 
few meals a week, but Miyamoto said she would rather switch to pork chops than have 
Australian beef. All her friends also complained that they could not afford much Japanese 
beef, but “they think that imported beef including Australian is not so tasty, and they say that 
they don’t want to buy it even if it is much cheaper.”556 According to Johnston, a general 
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complaint in the 1970s was that Australian beef had a “smell of grass” that turned off 
Japanese consumers.557 
Imported beef served only to supplement—not compete with—the preferred supply. 
Even though imports could sell for several hundred yen less per hundred grams, they sold 
much nearer to the high price set by Japanese beef than their landed price justified. Johnston 
dwelled on Miyamoto’s comments as a warning to Australian producers about getting too 
optimistic for higher sales even if greater imports were permitted to sell at lower prices. In 
other words, domestically-produced Japanese beef drove the expansion of beef consumption 
on the archipelago, and exporters from other countries ought to support and build on 
continued local production. Longworth found support for this assumption, when he separated 
data on Wagyu from Dairy cattle being slaughtered for beef. From 1965 to 1983, the beef 
supply from the Dairy herd grew from a marginal fraction to over two thirds of total Japanese 
beef production, while traditional Wagyu production remained overall constant.558 Japanese 
Dairy cattle beef sold in between Wagyu and the imports. Not only were the Japanese already 
learning to buy beef across different price strata, but it was also clear that traditional Japanese 
beef production was not capable of growing at pace with the human population and beef 
demand. Johnston and Longworth both believed Australian and Japanese beef could be 
compatible, but they certainly were not interchangeable commodities. 
The Japanese people were proud of their special beef cattle. According to Longworth, 
“Japanese with even a passing interest in beef wax lyrical about the wonderful Wagyu.”559 
The Black Wagyu cattle breed developed from the draught animals kept by burakumin, but in 
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the 1980s, these giant animals were “treated as household pets.”560 Japanese rice farmers 
raised only one to three Wagyu cattle at a time, kept the animals mostly indoors (often in the 
family home), hand massaged the animals’ muscles to tenderize meat over a lifetime, and 
strictly managed the animals’ diets.561 The animals grazed only in summer, when the farmers 
tended to the rice. For example, Johnston’s friend Mr. Higetard Okubu grew rice, barley, and 
award-winning beef for the selective sukiyaki market in Tokyo on a 1.6-hectare farm near 
Kyoto. Okubu fed his animals exclusively on rice straw from his own farm, fresh grass 
gathered from a local hillside, and grains cooked in the family kitchen on bovine-sized pans. 
The whole family participated in massaging the animals whenever time permit.562 Traditional 
practices like these were accompanied by strict and modern breeding registry (all Wagyu 
were artificially inseminated like thoroughbred horses) backed by producers’ organizations 
and breeding programs (including one hundred research centres) backed by the national 
government.563 
Raising beef on the taxed Japanese landscape required prodigious use of space and 
compensation for lost roaming through human energy. The intensive labour put into 
producing Wagyu beef meant that despite beef prices that outraged outsiders, beef farmers 
did not receive significant compensation. Many Americans believed, or at least argued, that 
this meant Japanese land was inherently inefficient and it would be better for Japanese 
consumers if beef production was left to lands that could do it right—lands an ocean away. 
Considering the real costs of American agriculture (the United States is the world’s leading 
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exporter of irrigated water), that is a dubious claim.564 Thanks to an aggressive land 
conversion and improvement program launched by the federal government in the 1960s, 
Japan was said to have the world’s highest agricultural yield per acre.565 The traditional 
Japanese beef sector might be commended for raising a limited beef supply through highly-
efficient mixed agriculture, although they still relied heavily on imported feed grains. Either 
way—comparative advantage, or not—hopeful American exporters encountered fierce 
resistance to their attempts to share cheap beef with Japanese consumers. 
Formerly marginal Japanese beef farmers became a powerful political force due to 
structural changes prompted by the postwar US Occupation. Following Japanese defeat in the 
Second World War, American occupiers and their new Japanese allies re-cast Japanese 
agriculture in the Jeffersonian vision of an American yeoman society in order to democratize 
the Japanese state and alleviate rampant starvation after the war. Two laws from the 
American Occupation became the key institutional structures propelling Japan towards this 
goal. The Farmland Law redistributed land to establish small owner-producers and prevented 
future urban or industrial development. The Agricultural Cooperative Law encouraged these 
small owners to join into cooperatives, called nokyo, that functioned to manage supply and 
prices and to express the farmers’ political needs.566 According to Johnston, Nokyo were 
“strongly capitalised” and handled “most of the business related to agricultural material and 
equipment used by their members” meaning, most importantly, imported feed grains.567 
																																																						
564 MacDonald et al., 275-289. 
565 Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 9-10.; Frank H. Johnston, “Japan’s Farmers are the Backbone of the Economy,” 
21 March 1968, MS 8272 Papers of Frank Johnston, Box 16, Book 46, NLA. 
566 Yakata Yoshioka, “Development of Agricultural Policy in Postwar Japan,” Agriculture and Trade in the 
Pacific: Toward the Twenty-First Century, William T. Coyle et al., eds., (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), 
91-93.; Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 9-10.; See also: Frank H. Johnston, “Some Background Information about 
Japan’s Agricultural Industry,” June 1976, Book 46, Box 16, FHJ, NLA. 
567 Johnston, “Beef Situation,” 8. 
		
276	
Unlike most attempts to save family farming in the United States, these laws succeeded and 
made Japanese farmers some of the most politically and economically powerful farmers 
around the Pacific Rim.568 
The nokyo in general and the beef farmers’ nokyo, in particular, had significant 
influence in national politics. The National Central Union of Agricltural Co-operatives, or 
Zenchu, was the lobby arm of the nokyo system, and it had direct access to the Liberal 
Democratic Party which had ruled Japan continuously since 1955.569 Japanese beef farmers 
backed Zenchu’s strong protectionist demands with “massive grass-roots membership” and 
sophisticated political mobilizing.570 Japanese beef farmers also concentrated in voting 
districts that had disproportionate electoral power in the Diet system.571 Sam Nakagama, an 
economic consultant, estimated that a Japanese beef farmer’s vote was worth as much as 
three times more than an urban consumers’.572 Finally, In 1969, the Japanese government 
launched a formal decade-long program to alleviate this discrimination mainly by pump 
capital into beef-producing regions. 573 By the 1980s, the burakumin had become politically 
conscious and militant, and they made themselves untouchable in a completely different 
sense. A USDA report from 1987 found that Japanese beef producers received some of the 
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highest government subsidies to agricultural producers in any commodity in any country in 
the world.574 
Contrary to the position in the United States that catalyzed American ranchers’ 
aggressive exports agenda, consumers did not represent a significant countervailing power 
against high retail prices in Japan. Japanese Consumers accepted higher prices because they 
bought into a State rhetoric of food self-sufficiency that was especially strong in the 1970s 
and 1980s. An internal Australian government memo called it the “our producer right or 
wrong philosophy,” and it suggested that even if Japanese homegrown beef could never fulfil 
demand, there was no place for economic efficiency arguments in discussions of beef imports 
with the Japanese.575 This, too, was partly America’s fault. By the 1970s, Japan was the 
world’s largest soybean importer, and the United States controlled 90% of that market. In 
1973, there was an unexpected disruption of the anchovy market. Anchovies were used in 
animal feed, and soybeans were a useful replacement, so the US imposed an export embargo 
on soybeans to prevent inflation in the beef sector. Soybeans were used in Japan as both a 
human staple and animal feed, and the sudden shortage caused panic (both economic and 
psychological). The “soybean shock” was barely noticed by Americans at the time, but it 
made Japanese consumers especially distrustful of reliance on US food exports.576 Since 
consumers never advocated against high food prices, politicians in all the major political 
parties of the Japanese Diet had little impulse to challenge high prices or the status quo 
system of tariff and non-tariff restrictions against agricultural imports.577 
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Not only did these particular Australians understand how strong Japanese resistance 
to free trade in beef would be, they also recognized that the status quo was an admirable 
market system that Australian beef producers could work with. The Japanese beef import 
market, like the regulated market for access to public grazing lands in the American West, 
deliberately took exchange off the open market and transferred it to bureaucratic 
organizations (governmental and semi-governmental) that could manage exchange 
deliberately and ensure a responsive, stable market. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries (MAFF) would set national import quotas based on domestic production trends, 
and the Livestock Industry Promotion Corporation (LIPC) would act as a single, centralized 
national buyer to see that it was all carried out smoothly and non-competitively. The LIPC 
also set the retail price of imported beef so that it would not compete with Japanese beef.578 
Johnston especially appreciated this, since he wanted Australian producers to improve their 
methods and expand into high-quality production—not compete with Americans for the 
bottom of the price spectrum. 
This Japanese beef import cartel was willing to work with Australians to ensure a 
stable market. The first Australian export of beef to Japan occurred in 1957, but it was 
utilitarian brisket (barely considered beef in Japan), and the trade did not blossom 
immediately. In 1968, the Australian Meat Board and the Japan Meat Conference negotiated 
an increased quota for Australia, which led to the first real import of Australian chilled beef 
in 1970.579 The Japanese showed a strong preference for Australian beef until the United 
States used political force to seize greater market share starting in 1982. In 1972, the 
president of Nippon Meat Packers Inc. in Osaka claimed, “We in the Japanese meat industry 
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are always pressing our Government to extend quotas for imported beef and you Australians 
can expect these to rise steadily in the future,” and in 1976 a MAFF official revealed, “It 
appears that we may have to rely on your country [Australia] for the supply of much of our 
meat in the future.”580 
In the late 1970s, Yoshihiro Yamashita, a senior bureaucrat in the Japanese 
agriculture ministry, toured Australia to assess Australian thoughts on the Japanese beef 
market. He concluded that Australians thought Japan was a much bigger place than the 
Japanese did. Australians wanted Japan to be like the UK used to be—a stable, guaranteed 
export market—and the Australians felt victimized whenever Japan proved otherwise (as had 
happened suddenly in 1974).581 Yoshihiro also noted misunderstandings and distrust of 
Japanese business practices, but overall he was sympathetic to Australian efforts to work 
with Japan. He acknowledged the ongoing hardships of Australian cattle producers in a 
volatile export industry without the domestic market to sustain them, and he suggested that 
the Japanese ought to work with Australia to avoid any sudden changes again.582 Most 
importantly, Yoshihiro found that Australians did not want liberalization of Japan’s beef 
markets.583 Yoshihiro’s visit and report, published and distributed by the Australian National 
University, was part of a much larger effort in Australia to make sense of the peculiarities of 
the Japanese market and assure their favoured access to it. 
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By the 1980s, Australia had become dependent on a stable Japanese market for its 
beef. With the help of American capital, Australia had developed a beef industry with 
productive capacity far exceeding the consumptive capacity of its population. Australians 
knew the Japanese market much better than Americans did, and Australia had certain 
underappreciated advantages in trade. Even though the Australian beef industry was most 
vulnerable to changes in the Japanese market, it was also the most responsive. In general, 
Australia viewed the institutions regulating trade not as artificial barriers to a preferable and 
freer market, but as the market as it actually was, and Australian ranchers learned to work 
with them. However, Australian advantage declined when the United States focused political 
pressure on Japan. As Japanese quotas increased between 1984 and 1988, Australian exports 
rose, but their relative market share fell significantly.584 Australians recognized that US beef 
was not outcompeting them on the open market; but rather, the Japanese government has 
deliberately shifting its preference due to US pressure. It was only when the regulatory 
institutions began working against them, that Australia pushed for liberalization along with 
the United States. 
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Figure 26: Japanese consumers eating American hot dogs, c.1969. Yearbook of Agriculture 1969 (Washington, 
DC: USDA, 1969), frontispiece. 
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Conclusion: Pacific Rim Beef? 
The beef and citrus war, thus, pit at least three difference varieties of transnational 
bovine capitalism against each other. None of these visions survived the trade war fully 
intact. Free trade (as an ideological and political project) transformed the Pacific Rim beef 
market, but the result was no more a “free market” than what existed before. Free trade had a 
coherent free-market justification behind it based on comparative advantage theory, but even 
the staunchest supporters of global free-market ideology (in this case, the US Whitehouse 
trade team) pursued free trade for ends and with means that were symbolic, opportunistic, 
disingenuous, and mathematically dumb.585 Even though American cattle ranchers were 
losers in the conflict, the free-market ideas that helped propel US policy have become even 
more influential since.586 The beef and citrus war of 1979 to 1988 was a stupid conflict, and 
yet, as of 2017, the nations of North America, Oceana, and East Asia look well poised to do 
it all over again. 
I first learned that there was such a thing as the Pacific Rim beef trade, when I 
worked seasonally at a local meat processing and distribution facility on Vancouver Island, 
British Columbia, as a student in 2008 and 2009. I worked in final-stage processing and 
packaging of red meat, which included labeling boxes with what was inside and where it was 
going. The facility supplied restaurants and hotels all over the thirty-one thousand square 
kilometer island—including two cities, Victoria and Nanaimo, and many towns. Unlike at 
supermarkets that only label the country-of-origin on fresh meat when it is favourable (ie. 
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“We Sell Canadian Beef!”), this company labeled products with their country of origin 
because it explained the wholesale price and quality-level to the restaurateur. I was surprised 
to learn that these restaurants, many of which I had eaten at, bought a significant amount of 
beef and lamb from Australia and New Zealand for prices well below the Canadian products 
that did not come from all the way across the world. This isolated local market was linked to 
a transnational market as large as the ocean that surrounded it. I was a part of it, but I knew 
nothing about it or its contested history.587	
How do you make sense of a market that spans the biggest thing on Earth—the 
Pacific Ocean—and crosses many nations with unique (sometimes fundamentally different) 
histories, societies, cultures, economies, geographies, and natural resource landscapes? 
Economists tend to rationalize such things by reducing them to measurable units that have 
internally coherent rules. There is value to this approach, but in the course of the beef and 
citrus war, theory was taken for reality waiting to burst forth. The failure of US economic 
predictions to come true led me to investigate a different way of conceptualizing Pacific Rim 
beef. I have followed the approach of a few pioneering Australians, who sought to study the 
Japanese beef market for what it was, rather than for what they thought it should be. One of 
the first things I learned, and perhaps one of the biggest problems from a global free trade 
perspective, was that there was indeed a distinct and identifiable Pacific Rim trade market 
within the global beef economy. 
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Meat is the highest value-per-calorie commodity sold on the world market,588 and the 
Pacific Rim beef trade is the largest, most valuable, and most complex market in the global 
meat economy.589 The primary participants are, in order of trade volume, the United States, 
Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and South Korea. These nations import and 
export less than 5% of their beef outside the Pacific Basin.590 The Pacific market is confined 
and defined by the absence of Foot-and-Mouth disease (FMD), a deadly and highly 
contagious cattle virus, over the past sixty years in all the nations listed above.591 China, 
Mexico, Argentina, and many other non-FMD-free countries ranging from El Salvador to 
Indonesia have had inconsistent, but sometimes significant, access to this trade in the past 
fifty years, and China is rapidly becoming the most significant beef trader in the Pacific. 
In a time when the majority of manufacturing has moved to East and South Asian 
nations with low labour costs to supply first-world markets, the meat trade defies the 
prevailing logic of globalization.592 Labour costs matter, but they matter less than land 
availability, available financial and industrial capital, strong domestic markets, and stable 
disease control. It is a distinct feature of the Pac Rim beef trade that most producer nations 
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have advanced developed economies and most cattle growers are (relatively) high-income, 
politically powerful, and economically autonomous producers.593 This means that beef is 
expensive, and rich nations trade it with other rich nations. There are also no windfall profits, 
and the beef industry historically operates at a profit rate of just 2-3%.594 
The Pacific Rim beef industry, therefore, relies on something called “intra-industry 
trade,” which means the nations involved trade in particular body parts and types of meat in a 
biologically precise pursuit of scale economies. In this context, the United States becomes 
both one of the largest exporters and one of the largest importers of beef in the region. 
According to expert trade analysts, it works something like this: Canada and the United 
States produce high-quality grain-fed cattle favoured for cuts like steaks and roasts. Australia 
and New Zealand produce lower-quality grass-fed cattle, which can undercut domestic North 
American prices, where it is used for cuts like hamburger. At the same time, the United 
States sends its fatty marbled beef to Japan for sukiyaki, while Australia sends its own 
utilitarian product to South Korea for various processed products. More importantly, neither 
the US nor Australia have a strong market for offal (including organ meat and other off-cuts), 
while offal is actually prized in Asian markets.595 Shipping different organs of animals to 
different, distant markets like this perfects the long-time goal of industrial meatpacking to 
maximize profits on every animal part “except for the squeal.” 
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Viewed this way, the Pacific Rim beef trade looks like a perfectly rational mapping of 
bovine biology onto the unique geographic, economic, and cultural characteristics of the 
Pacific basin. The market therefore captures well the basic notions of comparative advantage 
in free trade—nations produce what they are naturally good at producing and everyone 
consumes the things they want. Comparative advantage theory dates back to Adam Smith 
and a contemporary named David Ricardo, who developed a mathematical proof that free 
trade necessarily benefits all participant nations in his 1817 work On the Principles of 
Political Economy and Taxation. A nation’s comparative advantage in a given commodity 
stemmed from a combination of its natural environment and social conditions. Smith reduced 
it to “soil, climate, and situation,” while Ricardo labeled it the nation’s “situation, its climate, 
and its other natural and artificial advantages.”596 Ricardo argued that nations should only 
produce the goods that they have comparative advantage in, and they should import all goods 
that other nations have comparative advantage in. If all nations do this, they will all receive 
the maximum amount of consumer goods for the most efficient expenditure of labour and 
natural-resource costs on a global scale. Even adherents of comparative advantage realize 
that the theory fails to describe what actually happens when rich nations economically 
colonize poor nations, but Ricardo’s idea still forms the theoretical and ethical basis of free 
trade, which lies at the heart of late twentieth-century globalization.597  
Comparative advantage is the dominant way of understanding international markets 
today, and it was highly influential in US trade policy during the beef and citrus war, but it 
does not apparently make sense to most people.598 Nobel-prize-winning economist, Paul 
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Krugman, called it “Ricardo’s Difficult Idea,” and he claimed that outside academic 
economist international trade experts, even “intellectual people […] somehow find this 
particular idea impossible to grasp.”599 Krugman asserts that this is a problem, since it leads 
regular smart people to doubt free trade, when all the really smart people understand that 
comparative advantage is true. 
Krugman attributed resistance to comparative advantage theory to people’s 
discomfort with mathematical explanations of human society. More likely, people sense that 
the math does not add up. Comparative advantage assumes that nations are (or can be) free to 
make choices about what they produce, export, and import in response to transnational 
supply-demand-type market forces. It also assumes that one can realistically measure the 
comparative advantage of producing goods in totally different contexts. During the beef and 
citrus war, the United States (as represented by the executive branch of its federal 
government, which I assume is what comparative advantage theorists mean when they 
attribute agency to bordered geographic entities in world history) believed in the 
transnational benevolence of free trade, but it found that powerful groups in all nations 
involved (including the United States) did not. The opposition and resistance free traders 
encountered from the overseas beneficiaries of their strategy should have called comparative 
advantage and the cult of free trade into doubt, but the United States pursued free trade in 
beef with ideological vigour. It struggled to impose free trade on Pacific Rim beef, and when 
it finally kind-of did, the United States found that its analysis of its own comparative 
advantage was dead wrong. Once the barriers came down, it turned out that Australia, the 
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much closer and much better-networked exporter, had an overwhelming advantage over the 
United States. 
If free trade is mathematically better, why did Japan and Australia oppose the 
application of freer international market trading? Why did the United States even have to 
pursue an outcome that should emerge naturally from globalization? And why did the United 
States think it would have advantage in the beef trade over a nation whose imports it had to 
severely restrict less they out-compete domestic American cattle ranchers?! My archival 
work in pursuit of these questions revealed a different version of market reality defined not 
by commodities or their production efficiency but rather by powerful rules about what could 
be traded and by whom. I also learned that national governments were not the only, or even 
primary, negotiators and creators of international trade policy or the aforementioned rules; 
organized groups of livestock producers were. My findings supported the approach of 
Francesco Duina, who argued that global free trade was actually a site-specific social and 
political construction that never really reflected widespread acceptance of the ideology. 
Duina examined several successful cases of free trade market creation but found “much like 
national market building, it occurs in the midst of rich institutional and political contexts. 
Market officials take action, but powerful constraints limit their choices. Traditions, 
structures, values, and norms along with the preferences of powerful actors define the range 
of what is possible.”600 Duina’s work, as well as my own, thus found support for an 
institutions-based approach to understanding markets. While I did find acceptance of free 
trade theory among US trade leadership, I likewise found that the United States’ pursuit of a 
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particular version of free trade in Pacific Rim beef was motivated also by domestic economic 
and political context. 
Comparative advantage was, and is, successful as a concept because it provides an 
environmental determinist argument that fits well with American beliefs about American 
landscapes as well as a political need for support (or posturing) for farmers and the rural 
sector. It is an irony that after a century of US leadership in industrial manufacturing, high 
technology, super-sized retailing, and advanced service economy infrastructure, the country 
still declares that its greatest assets and greatest advantage on world markets are in 
agriculture. Comparative advantage theory makes sense of ludicrous notions like solving an 
automotive trade deficit for a handful of beef and oranges. While mathematically plausible, 
the concept is fundamentally flawed. First, the United States has no natural advantage in 
agricultural production. American agriculture today (which is indeed world-class) is the 
result of almost two centuries of corporate and government effort to re-engineer landscapes. 
The United States, as a result, is the world’s largest exporter of irrigated water.601 Second, 
there is no free market on which the world’s nations may choose what to produce, what to 
export, or what to import. 
Japanese advocates for domestic production tried to offer an alternative 
environmental argument. The Japanese beef industry put together and distributed a handbook 
to educate Americans on the value of domestic Japanese production and the danger posed by 
low-price imports, which argued that Japanese people, just like Americans, believed that 
rangeland landscapes, however scarce, ought to carry cows. Not only did Japanese people 
like seeing cows on the landscape, “beef cattle farming is important in terms of effectively 
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utilizing national land resources […] and maintaining rural communities.”602 Many 
Americans may well have believed that the continental US landscape was uniquely perfect 
for cows, but many of their ideas about cows and the land had already spread around the 
world and adapted to different lands and peoples. 
The liberalization of the Japanese beef market in 1988 was supposed to create free 
market conditions, but American ranchers had long before proven that such rules were easily 
avoided with health-and-safety regulations. In December 2003, the first case of spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE or “mad cow” disease) was detected in the United States. The US 
Secretary of Agriculture called it the “cow that stole Christmas.”603 Though the US blamed 
Canada for the afflicted animal, fifty-three countries including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and China banned US beef imports immediately. Japan briefly re-opened its markets in 
December 2005 only to re-impose the ban 6 weeks later after finding bone in a veal 
shipment. South Korea resisted US pressure to reopen its markets until 2008. Tens-of-
thousands of Korean protesters tried to halt a re-opening of US beef imports, with 
demonstrations lasting for two months and police shooting protesters with water cannons 
before the nation folded to US demands. Taiwan opened its markets in 2005 only to place a 
ban on ractopamine and beta-adrenergic agonists, both used in US beef production, in 2006. 
Japan reopened its markets to all US beef products in January 2015, but has already restricted 
them again. China announced it would begin a process of opening markets to US beef 
imports in September 2016, which is ongoing. Different internal and external political forces 
																																																						
602 “Beef Situation in Japan: From Production to Consumption,” Booklet, (Tokyo: Agricultural Policy Research 
Committee, [c.1983]), 22. 
603 Michael Johanns in “Examining the Effects of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on U.S. Imports 
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shape the market decisions of each of these Asian beef consuming nations, but a relatively 
minor epidemiological event has given them full control over beef imports for over a decade. 
Health and safety regulations are rational and good in their own right, but it is 
generally understood that this is at least as much about how you do business now. For one 
thing, most of these countries have had more cases of BSE than the US has. They also work 
symbiotically with other trade agreements. Under the Uruguay Round GATT agreement on 
beef, Japan and other importers can impose emergency quotas if imports in a given fiscal 
quarter exceed 117% of the previous year’s corresponding quarter. So if you have a BSE ban, 
you can hold down imports for years. Japan has never actually imposed this rule, but it is 
largely because countries voluntarily restrict their exports for fear of it.604 Another reason 
countries use BSE to regulate trade is that BSE is worse in older cattle. An importer nation 
can restrict beef above a certain age, and it looks like a reasonable response, but it also 
restricts the most value-added products. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated 
that BSE regulations cost the US beef sector $1.5–2.7 billion in lost revenue annually from 
2003 to 2008. This is the new (and old) form of resistance to free trade.605 
Perfect free trade is a myth, but transnational markets have certainly transformed the 
beef industry and will continue to do so. China’s decision to begin importing US-beef 
reflects the fact that, perhaps for the first time ever, an East Asian nation wants as much beef 
as American cattle producers and meatpackers want to send them. The explosive growth of 
beef-eating in China may turn out to be the biggest development for the beef industry in 
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almost a century (since regulation of industry and rangeland grazing, 1919-1934) with the 
greatest consequences for the economic, social, and environmental well-being of rangelands 
and rangeland communities around the world. 
Less than a decade ago, China was not even on the list of relevant countries in the 
global beef trade. The Pacific Rim trade has been the most important beef market for some 
time due to the unique meeting of wealthy nations with large semi-arid rangelands and other 
wealthy nations with complementary tastes, but China was actually excluded from that trade 
due to poverty and its own health and safety risks to other nations. When China banned US 
beef imports in 2003, it did not matter. They did not import any US beef as it was, and they 
were jumping on a bandwagon led by other more important countries. That has all changed, 
and now China is the largest by volume and most influential beef importing nation in the 
world. In 2013, the year China passed the United States as the world’s largest importer of 
beef, China increased imports by 1.5 billion pounds in a single year (for comparison, Wal-
Mart, the largest beef retailer in the world, sells about 2 billion pounds a year). Gregg Doud, 
the NCA economist, called the explosion of beef imports in China “one of the biggest things 
to happen—possibly ever—to ranchers all around the world.”606 
American cattle ranchers have fallen on hard times (again) in the past half-decade. 
Actually, they live in a continuous cycle of hard times, but it seems we are in the midst of a 
bad one. And cattle ranchers have created a political-economic paradox for themselves that 
makes it hard to find good solutions. On the one hand, cattle producers, who often call 
themselves “cowboys” (a total misnomer), have embraced conservativism and free market 
ideology. They often point out that they are the only major producer group that does not 
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receive subsidies from the federal government (which is true except that their water, land, 
and taxes on capital are all subsidized indirectly). On the other hand, consumer demand for 
beef is capped by their unwillingness to pay high prices. So you have a bunch of supply-and-
demand minded cowboys, who can’t find demand for their supply but won’t dare take direct 
subsidies or price supports (an obvious, if politically incorrect, solution). Some ranchers say 
the problem is that their cheap land is not cheap enough, so they wave guns around and 
occupy federal lands and buildings. Most ranchers are embarrassed by those types, and they 
look for markets abroad instead. 
However, the Chinese beef bubble may cause social or economic crises in rangeland 
communities that rely of the beef industry. The American beef industry exists in a perennial 
boom and bust cycle, but some busts are worse than others. The industry has been managing 
relatively low prices in the last half decade by holding back product (in fat cattle on the range 
or frozen carcasses) and it is well prepared to respond to Chinese demand. The industry has 
been desperate for a period of high profits to cover capital losses incurred in past years, and it 
will expand its herds if China opens up. Referring to health-and-safety import bans, Gregg 
Doud of the NCA noted that “Historically these shenanigans have kept the U.S. government 
up at night,” but he remained very optimistic for US beef in China.607 However, the history 
of the international beef trade demonstrates how easy it is to close off a beef import stream, 
and China is not the kind of nation that becomes permanently beholden to the US for its beef 
supply these days. The very real possibility that China shuts out US imports again as 
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suddenly as it opens them, would mean massive oversupply on the US market and 
devastation for local beef economies. 
Growing demand for beef in China comes at a time when the world needs to reduce 
its total beef consumption. Environmentalists have accused cattle of pushing out wildlife and 
trampling and chewing up important ecosystems since at least the 1970s, but cattle ranching 
is now being cited as major contributor to human-induced climate change. Cattle release 
some greenhouse gases in digestion, but more importantly, say some scientists, they 
encourage changes in the composition of the soil and types of plants that grow there that 
reduce the land’s ability to store carbon. In other words, not only do they release carbon, but 
their continued presence prevents the land from sucking up carbon emitted from other 
sources. Rangelands cover at least one third of the earth’s land surface, and as they become 
increasingly overstocked to feed China, they may contribute as much to climate change as 
industrial pollution. 
The United States has long over-taxed the natural advantage from its Western 
rangelands, and American cattle producers should not re-orient production towards China. 
Not only will that be bad from a net environmental position, but it is also unlikely that the 
United States will excel in the Chinese beef market. The Chinese market is at least as 
complex as Japan’s was in the 1980s, and Australian policymakers, academics, and beef 
industry leaders have already been engaged in a deep exploration of market conditions there 
since at least 1988.608 The exciting new Chinese market clearly already belongs to someone 
else, and the United States will only suffer from its comparative disadvantage. 
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Figure 27. Data compiled by Earth Policy Institute from U.S. Department of Agriculture, Production, Supply 
and Distribution, electronic database, at www.fas.usda.gov/psdonline, updated 10 May 2013. Graph by Author. 
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Figure 28. “Live Animals, Cattle,” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United States, FAOSTAT online 
database, http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data. Graph by Author. 
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Epilogue: Carbon-Neutral Cows 
American cattle producers and others are in the process of creating another new 
market for the sale of greenhouse-gas-emission offsets to large-scale industrial polluters. The 
polluters are in state-regulated carbon cap-and-trade markets. Cattle producers do pollute (all 
first-work humans pollute significant amounts), but the architects of carbon markets have not 
heretofore created these things for cows. Some environmentalists think cap-and-trade will 
solve climate change; some cattle producers believe they could profit from it. In this case, 
again, the rules of the market will depend on what people believe the relationship of cattle is 
to the natural environment and climate. If successful, cattle producers could begin trading in 
a climate-based market as large as the troposphere. It is also possible that the economic-
environmental link in this market-to-save-climate-change could be the most broken thing in 
the whole history of poor market-environment relationships for the American beef industry. 
Cap-and-trade is supposed to reduce pollution by assigning it an exchangeable 
commodity price.609 The idea behind cap-and-trade markets is that the government sets a 
limit on a firm’s pollution allowance, and that firm must either reduce emissions or purchase 
offsets at market value from another firm that can reduce below the cap. United States 
National Air Pollution Control Administration economists pioneered the cap-and-trade model 
in the 1960s, but it has exploded in the past decade, and emissions trading has become the 
darling solution to climate change.610 Governments and industry have launched carbon 
markets in the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, China, and others; and 
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many major national environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the United 
States have some sort of statement or policy approving cap-and-trade.611 Emissions trading 
promises to become increasingly vibrant and lucrative, and it is touted as a solution to 
economic problems as well as environmental problems. 
Parts of the American cattle industry have already integrated into emissions trading 
markets. Starting in 2015, some dairy producers have installed biogas digesters that convert 
methane from manure into electricity, and they have constructed a way to sell not the 
electricity, but the methane (or rather its absence in the atmosphere), and they sell it through 
a market fiction as carbon in California. The State of California launched a carbon cap-and-
trade market in 2011 that requires major industrial carbon polluters to participate, but it does 
not cover agriculture or methane pollution. But as of 2015, the rules allowed a polluter to 
seek out cheaper equivalent greenhouse gas offsets outside the market such as methane from 
a dairy. Dairy owners from all across the country were allowed to sell and they worked 
through agents and brokers similar to the futures exchange. John Upton for Scientific 
American explained that the trade has faced opposition and a lawsuit, but it has far greater 
supporters, like the Environmental Defense Fund, and won on the verdict that: “It is not 
standard practice to install anaerobic digesters […] Cost is the primary barrier to installing 
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digesters and offset credits directly address this problem.”612 The scope is limited, though. 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the digesters were “technically 
feasible,” at just 8,200 dairies and hog farms in the United States. 
 It is possible and highly likely that cattle producers will be able to sell carbon offsets 
for carbon sequestration in the soil soon, which would allow a great deal more cattle 
producers to participate at a great deal less effort. Modern Farmer explained that “carbon 
farming” has stalled due to the difficulty of quantifying the actual offset, and at current prices 
a farmer with 100 hectares, who converted to no-till agriculture, might only make $3,000 and 
that was not guaranteed to repeat annually.613 However, the Marin Carbon Project, an 
organization of California dairies north of San Francisco demonstrated successfully that 
spreading one-half inch of compost on grazing lands and converting it to pasture for milk or 
grass-fed beef cows yielded a predictable one metric tonne of carbon per year, which 
repeated annually without reapplication. San Francisco has a mandatory composting 
program, so there could be plenty of compost available for pasture conversion.614 
The questions now are: How far will it go, and in what direction? The direction is a 
big question because it is not clear right now whether cattle producers will have to continue 
to participate in the market by investing in pollution-reduction projects or spreading compost, 
or whether they will be able to claim that they suck greenhouse gasses from the atmosphere 
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simply by running their cattle. If this latter thing happens, cattle producers, their expert 
advocates, environmental movement NGOs, and policymakers, will produce a climate-based 
market that will be terrible for the climate. Grazing cattle can have positive ecological and 
social effects on rangeland landscapes, and a growing number of ecologists, land managers, 
and others in groups previously opposed to grazing have positively reassessed the role of 
cattle and ranchers on the land.615 But cattle are bad for greenhouse gas emissions. How 
could cattle producers then sell carbon offsets? Because there is growing understanding 
emerging around the idea that the opposite of what is true, is true. In the creation of new 
market rules, we can often see a layering of cultural and social norms with legal and 
economic laws. This idea that cows are good for the climate is an emerging norm. It is also a 
re-expression of the understanding that market capitalist production is good for the land 
going back to rancher conservation, wise use, the open range, and before that underwrites 
landscape-based capitalist market in general. 
Allan Savory, a highly-celebrated and controversial grasslands ecologist and grazing 
management expert, says he can solve climate change by increasing global livestock grazing 
several orders of magnitude. Savory articulated this most explicitly in his most influential 
work—a 2013 TED Talk distributed by YouTube and viewed over 4 million times (counting 
just one version).616 Savory described his own history of trying and failing to stop animals 
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from turning grass to desert, which set up a paradox leading to: “There is only one option. I 
repeat to you, only one option left to climatologists and scientists, and that is to do the 
unthinkable. And to use livestock, bunched and moving, as a proxy for former herds and 
predators, and mimic nature. There is no other alternative left to mankind.” He goes on to 
claim that by quadrupling livestock grazing animal numbers, “we can take enough carbon out 
of the atmosphere and safely store it in the grassland soils for thousands of years, and if we 
just do that on about half the world’s grasslands that I have shown you, we can take us back 
to pre-industrial levels while feeding people. I can think of nothing that offers more hope for 
our planet, for your children, and their children, and all of humanity. Thank you.” Savory can 
make that claim because: 1. People want to believe it. 2. The science on the relationship 
between cattle and climate change is mixed and inconclusive. 
What is the relationship between cattle grazing and human-induced climate change? 
Based on a review of scientific articles, there are theoretically four major answers. The 
relationship between livestock grazing, as a form of land use, and climate change may be 
direct or indirect, and it may worsen climate change or alleviate climate change in both cases. 
The bulk of literature finds that cattle directly increase atmospheric greenhouse gasses 
(GHGs) from their own bodily processes, or cattle producers and others in the beef supply 
chain tend to do things with or for those cows that pollute GHGs. However, Savory and 
others argue that cattle may directly decrease GHGs by doing something to soil and 
vegetation that makes them suck carbon from the atmosphere.617 Irregardless of direct GHG 
emissions, some argue that cattle may make the effects of climate change worse on rangeland 
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landscapes.618 Alternatively, since cattle do have documented positive impacts on 
historically-grazed ecosystems, cattle might alleviate or counteract select landscape impacts 
of climate change.619 I contribute another possible positive-indirect response below that I 
extrapolated from the “cooperative conservation” literature:620 
 DIRECT INDIRECT 
BAD Cattle contribute to total atmospheric 
greenhouse gases by emitting methane and 
nitrogen through digestion and excretion. 
Conversion of forest to grazing land and 
running and grazing cattle on rangeland soils 
both release significant carbon and decrease 
global capacity to cycle carbon forever.  
Cattle, even when run well, put significant 
pressure on fragile arid and semi-arid 
ecosystems. Overgrazing cattle have similar 
negative impacts on grasses, soils, and water 
resources to what are predicted with climate 
change. Thus, cattle will only make things 
worse as climate change advances. Climate 
change will also reduce the stable stocking 
capacity of lands making even good current 
levels unsustainable.  
GOOD Cattle, when grazed properly, increase the 
carbon storage capacity of rangeland soils 
causing them to suck carbon from the 
atmosphere. 
Western landscapes facing pressure from 
climate change will need strong land stewards 
with roots, experience, and networks in these 
remote places. Cattle ranchers are the best 
available group, and keeping them on the 
range and keeping their operations profitable is 
in the best interest of these communities and 
landscapes. 
Figure 29. Possible statements on the relationship between beef cattle production and human-induced climate 
change. 
 
The science behind these claims is complicated and contradictory. Sometimes, the 
same observed change in a rangeland ecosystem may justify any of the above conclusions on 
the relationship of grazing to climate change. Vegetation change from tall grasslands to 
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woody shrubs has been a common indicator of grazing-degraded landscapes since before 
consideration of the climate. In the climate debate, the transition from grasses to shrubs 
becomes ambiguous. Some ecologists argue that the loss of tall grasses decreases the 
capacity of rangeland soils to store carbon, but others argue that woody shrubs actually store 
much greater amounts of carbon making the transition desirable as a climate change 
mitigation strategy.621 Still others argue that the transition from grasses to shrubs increases 
the probability of potential climate impacts like soil erosion and atmospheric heating by 
increasing the amount of bare ground. Erosion, whether caused more by climate or by 
grazing, would ultimately release carbon into the atmosphere. 
The arguments that cattle directly worsen climate change associate cattle and beef 
production more broadly with three main sources of global warming: carbon dioxide (CO2), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), and methane (CH4). Cows emit N2O from their manure and urine, and 
CH4 from their manure and farts. Many scientists and activists argue that cow farts are no 
joke because CH4, even though it has a much shorter lifespan in the atmosphere, can have 
much more severe global warming potential in the short term.622 Cattle grazing may also 
have effects on soils and vegetation that cause them to release carbon and lessen the ability of 
those landscapes to capture and store carbon thereafter. Studies differ as to whether this is 
necessarily true of all grazing or just highly likely due existing practices. For example, 
clearing forests and converting the lands for grazing, which few ranchers in the United States 
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do anymore, would be the absolute worst way cattle could increase CO2 in the 
atmosphere.623  
Cows pollute GHGs from their bodies, through digestion and excretion, and through 
their land impacts, but they also have GHGs polluted on their behalf, since they are 
commodities in capitalist production. Cattle producers, meatpackers, consumers and others 
all do things that pollute GHGs through the overall beef making and eating process. 
Estimates quantifying Livestock’s direct impact on atmospheric GHGs vary wildly 
depending on the scope of the data, and studies attempting to trace the entire life cycle of a 
beef cow—accounting for all the fossil fuel inputs from farming petrochemicals, fertilizer, 
transport, industrial processing machines, refrigeration, and supermarket lighting, as well as 
the lost mitigation potential from soil and vegetation recovery that would happen if that cow 
did not exist—may attribute as much as 51% of all global GHGs right now to livestock 
agriculture.624 One study even found that life cycle GHG emissions from pasture grazed 
cattle were substantially worse for grass-fed cows than for CAFO or Factory Farm fed 
cattle.625 Viewed this way, no matter which gas you focus on, the direct relationship between 
grazing and industrial pollution ranges from bad to ugly. 
However, the relationship between cattle grazing and GHGs is less straight forward 
when scientists measure by soil. Soil contains carbon, and soil is capable of capturing carbon 
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from the atmosphere and storing it under ground, where it does not contribute to climate 
change.626 Livestock grazing may adversely impact soils by compaction, erosion, and 
breaking with visible consequences for landscape functioning. These actions may also release 
the carbon that is in the soil into the atmosphere or compromise the soil’s ability to store 
carbon in the future. However, theoretically, cattle might also cause vegetation and soil 
change that leads to increased carbon storage. The latter idea motivates several new pro-cow 
environmental strategies that praise themselves for thinking outside the box of past eco-
biases. There is a serious scientific debate about this. 
The majority of scientific research finds that grazing, and especially overgrazing, 
releases stored carbon and reduces the capacity of the soil to sequester carbon in the future, 
thus compacting the overall negative impacts of livestock grazing well into the future.627 An 
Australian study took this as the consensus and sought to quantify the economic potential 
from increased carbon sequestration against the economic returns from existing grazing 
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based on the Australian cap-and-trade price for carbon, and it found that the profit from not 
having cows could be roughly equal to continuing ranching.628 Although I seriously doubt 
cap-and-trade can stop or even slow climate change, this would at least be an interesting and 
somewhat justified way for cattle ranchers to participate in carb markets.  
However, other research—including a smaller but growing number of case studies—
finds that grazing, under certain management methods, can and does increase the capacity of 
rangeland soils to capture and store atmospheric carbon.629 The potential for carbon 
sequestration whether by adding or removing cattle is site context-based making studies 
difficult to compare and conclusions elusive.630 There are several convincing arguments 
against getting too starry-eyed about studies showing increased carbon sequestration as a 
result of cattle grazing. Even if it could be proven that cattle have the potential to increase 
carbon sequestration, it would be difficult, costly, and slow to implement this as a significant 
climate change mitigation strategy.631 The total carbon-storage potential of arid and semi-arid 
rangelands is actually relatively low in the best of times, so this would be a poor area to 
focus.632 It would seem to me especially unlikely that free market forces would be a good 
way to manage these carbon cattle. Finally, there is the issue of cow farts again. A study in 
China seeking to demonstrate the carbon storage potential of sheep grazing, found that the 
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increased carbon storage only offset 3.1-8.6% of the animals’ methane emissions from 
digestion.633 
Thus, Allan Savory is not really telling the truth. However, I believe Allan Savory 
and other boosters for climate-saving cows have a greater influence on cattle producers, 
policymakers, and the carnivorous public than do most of the authors of the scientific studies 
cited above.634 Denis Hayes and Gail Boyer Hayes interviewed many top organic and green-
branded cattle operations in the United States and found, “virtually all of the exceptional 
ranchers we interviewed for this book acknowledge their indebtedness to Savory’s 
teachings.”635 Land managers accuse Allan Savory or failing to produce any replicable set of 
methods that achieve his goals without one hiring his company for a site-specific plan, and 
scientists accuse Allan Savory of falsifying data.636 Allan Savory alleges he discovered and 
fundamentally proved his method during grazing experiments in former Rhodesia, but the 
records and data seem to have been lost in the civil war there.637 But most people who hear 
him, believe him. And cattle producers’ role in emissions markets does not depend on the 
reality of emissions, but rather the rules people make to link the market to them.  
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If our society produces a market in which the existence and expansion of cattle on 
fragile landscapes can be sold for the right to emit more industrial pollution, it can only be 
bad for climate change. It does not even really matter whether cows increase or decrease 
carbon in the soil, since the best cap-and-trade has to offer is a slight reduction of already 
terrible global pollution levels. Markets are not, and have never been, a good solution for 
environmental problems. Cattle ranchers ignited a revolution in financial derivatives trading, 
do we really want them to do it for emissions trading, too?  
 
